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ABSTRACT 
ARNIE PAUL ALDRIDGE: Labor Market Outcomes of Individuals in Recovery from 
Addiction to Alcohol 
(Under the direction of Donna B. Gilleskie) 
 
The majority of the cost burden of Alcohol Use Disorders (AUDs) is due to 
alcohol’s adverse impact on the labor market in the form of lost wages for those not 
employed and decreased productivity for those employed. In this study, I develop a 
model of employment, drinking, and treatment-seeking that is based on an economic 
model of individual behavior. The model is estimated using longitudinal data on 
individuals from COMBINE, a National Institute of Alcoholism and Alcohol Abuse and 
Drug Abuse (NIAAA) randomized control trial of two pharmacotherapies and a cognitive 
behavioral intervention for dependence.  The first aim of this study is to estimate the 
causal effects of AUD outcomes on employment over a three-year period following the 
COMBINE trial.  The second aim is to estimate the effects of employment outcomes on 
subsequent drinking. The third aim is to evaluate the role of ongoing therapy for AUDs. 
To this end, I develop a dynamic model that attempts to control for time varying and 
permanent individual heterogeneity and uses an identification strategy to reduce any bias 
from the endogenous relationships across these outcomes. Within this framework, I also 
evaluate several policy experiments related to the price of consumption goods and 
treatment as well as policies around treatment dosage.  The results indicate that drinking 
behavior during treatment (in this case, the COMBINE trial) have large and lasting 
effects on subsequent drinking, though the effects stabilize over the long term. Full time 
employment over 90% of the period leads to a slight increase in problem drinking. A ten 
iv 
 
percent increase in gasoline prices leads to a 3.6 percentage points increase in the 
probability of abstinence (p=.003).  A simulated experiment of doubling the prescription 
period for pharmacotherapy has an unequivocally positive effect on drinking outcomes. 
Here, abstinence increases by 4.6 percentage points (p<.001) and problem drinking >50% 
of the period (PDH) decreased by 2.6 pp (p=.005).  These results improve our 
understanding of how trials for treatment of alcohol use disorders can be evaluated, 
particularly to understand how changes in alcohol consumption translate into 
employment outcomes and then used to inform policy decisions. 
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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
By the 21
st
 century, 8.46% of adults in the United States met clinical criteria for 
alcohol abuse (4.65% or 9.7 million adults) or alcohol dependence (3.81% or 7.9 million 
adults) (Grant et al., 2004).  Alcohol Use Disorders (AUDs), including abuse and 
dependence, impose significant costs on society, estimated at $230 billion in 2009 
(Rehm, 2009; Harwood, 2000; Mokdad, 2004).  The majority of the cost burden (60%) is 
due to alcohol’s adverse impact on the labor market in the form of lost wages for those 
not employed and decreased productivity for those employed.  It has been shown that 
alcohol abuse (MacDonald and Shields, 2004, Feng et al., 2001; Mullahy and Sindelar, 
1996) and dependence (Johannson et al., 2007) are associated with unemployment and 
labor market detachment.  AUDs are associated with lost productivity (Cook and Moore, 
1999; Mullahy and Sindelar, 1998) and lower earnings (Keng and Huffman, 2002; Jones 
and Richmond, 2006; Zarkin et al., 1998).  Understanding the causal relationships 
between alcohol and labor market performance is valuable for constructing alcohol use, 
prevention, and treatment policies.   
Literature on the connection between AUDs and labor market outcomes broadly 
fits into two categories. The first looks at how outcomes differ between populations with 
and without AUDs. Public health and economic research has sufficiently shown the 
deleterious effects of AUDs. Econometric studies in particular have been valuable in 
refining the estimates of these effects by addressing several common confounders: 
reverse causality and unobserved characteristics that simultaneously influence drinking 
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and labor market success.
1
 The value of this literature is that it has identified 
AUDs as a measurable problem and has broadly described its costs to individuals and 
society.  
The literature, however, has several limitations. Most studies are based on a 
snapshot of current substance use and labor market outcomes, ignoring how changes in 
both behaviors evolve over time and how the compositions of the AUD and non-AUD 
samples change (MacDonald, 2004).
2
 Economic decision making has a direct bearing on 
how the costs of substance abuse are determined, and understanding that behavior 
directly informs policy (Caulkins and Nicosia, 2010). Finally, it does not incorporate the 
role of AUD treatment in changing the composition of the AUD and non-AUD 
populations that are compared in static cross-sections.    
The second type of literature broadly focuses on the efficacy and effectiveness of 
prevention and treatment of AUDs (Room et al., 2007). These studies are generally based 
on clinical trials of interventions and specialty treatment and evaluations of programs or 
policies that directly provide treatment, reduce barriers to treatment, or create 
disincentives for alcohol consumption. Labor market outcomes are usually analyzed as 
secondary outcomes in these studies. These studies are limited in their understanding of 
how improvements in AUDs lead to labor market outcomes and how those labor market 
outcomes recursively influence AUDs (e.g., psychosocial benefits of employment as a 
protective factor or work stress). Often, they are simply limited by the period of time over 
                                                 
1
 These studies do not always compare two discrete populations, those with and those without AUDs, but 
estimate local average treatment effects and implicitly compare populations with marginally different AUDs.  
 
2
 Johannson (2006) shows, for example, that currently abstinent, previously dependent drinkers often have poor 
enough outcomes that comparisons between abstainers and moderate drinkers yields biased results. 
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which they follow participants and do not allow sufficient time for improvements in labor 
market outcomes. Moreover, studies of specialty treatment often ignore the extent to 
which participants seek additional or future treatment beyond the original study. Yet, 
additional or repeated treatment is considered appropriate and is often based on attained 
employment which provides insurance or financial accessibility (CSAT, 2004).  
In the study, I develop a model of employment, drinking, and treatment-seeking 
that is based on an economic model of individual behavior. The model is estimated using 
longitudinal data on individuals from a National Institute of Alcoholism and Alcohol 
Abuse and Drug Abuse (NIAAA) randomized control trial of two pharmacotherapies and 
a cognitive behavioral intervention (CBI) for dependence called Combined 
Pharmacotherapies and Behavioral Interventions for Alcohol Dependence (COMBINE).  
The first aim of this study is to estimate the causal effects of AUD outcomes on 
employment over a three-year period following the COMBINE trial.  The second aim is 
to estimate the effects of employment outcomes on subsequent drinking. The third aim is 
to evaluate the role of ongoing therapy for AUDs. To this end, I develop a dynamic 
model that attempts to control for time varying and permanent heterogeneity and uses an 
identification strategy to reduce any bias from the endogenous relationships of these 
outcomes. Within this framework, I also evaluate several policy experiments related to 
the price of consumption goods and treatment as well as policies around treatment 
dosage.  
The remainder of this manuscript contains a more in depth discussion on the 
background and literature of employment, alcohol and treatment modeling (Chapter 2), a 
theoretical model (Chapter 3), a description of the sample used for estimation (Chapter 
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4), and an empirical model (Chapter 5). Chapter 6 provides results and Chapter 7 
concludes the manuscript with a discussion of the findings. 
  
 
CHAPTER II. BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE 
Alcohol Abuse and Alcohol Dependence 
Understanding what is meant by different AUDs is necessary for interpreting the 
literature on alcohol use and related outcomes.  Moreover, the specific measures of AUDs 
can have different theoretical relationships with outcomes being studied.  The Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, currently in its fourth edition (DSM-IV), provides 
clinical criteria for diagnosing alcohol abuse and alcohol dependence. Although various 
levels and patterns of alcohol consumption can be detected through biological screening 
(e.g., urine tests detect increased liver enzymes), DSM-IV clinical determinations are based 
on self-reported information.  Indications of alcohol abuse are based on perceptions of 
drinking’s secondary effects: does the individual feel that alcohol caused problems at home, 
work, or school; led to dangerous behaviors; or led to criminal justice interactions.  In 
addition, if the individual reports the inability to reduce consumption despite the perception 
of alcohol’s consequences he qualifies as abusing.   
The DSM-IV defines dependence with a focus on consumption patterns, drinking’s 
primary consequences, and the individual’s relationship with alcohol.  A positive diagnosis 
of dependence is typically made when a clinician identifies three or more of the following:  
(1) Spent a great deal of time over a period of a month getting, using, or getting over the 
effects of alcohol; 
(2) Used alcohol more often than intended or was unable to keep set limits on alcohol 
use;
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(3) Needed to use alcohol more than before to get desired effects or noticed that same 
amount of alcohol use had less effect than before; 
(4) Inability to cut down or stop using alcohol every time tried or wanted to; 
(5) Continued to use alcohol even though it was causing problems with emotions, 
nerves, mental health, or physical problems; 
(6) Alcohol use reduced or eliminated involvement or participation in important 
activities; and has experienced two or more withdrawal symptoms during the 
same time period:  
(7) Reported experiencing two or more alcohol withdrawal symptoms at the same 
time that lasted longer than a day after alcohol use was cut back or stopped. 
Symptoms include (i) sweating or feeling that heart was beating fast, (ii) having 
hands tremble, (iii) having trouble sleeping, (iv) vomiting or feeling nausea[ted], 
(v) seeing, hearing, or feeling things that were not really there, (vi) feeling like 
could not sit still, (vii) feeling anxious, and (viii) having seizures or fits.
3
 
 
It is important to recognize that abuse and dependence are psychological constructs 
that categorize a degree of severity in drinking behaviors, drinking consequences, and an 
individual’s relationship to drinking.  AUDs represent a measurement problem described 
originally in psychological research in which a latent construct (e.g., dependence) is not 
observed but can be defined by how it manifests itself in behavior, consequences, and 
perceptions.  AUDs are uniquely challenging to define because they are dynamic.  Over 
time, individuals may cycle in and out of different levels of severity, even returning to 
abstinence.  These observed cycles are not a reflection of the reliability of clinical testing 
                                                 
3
 Diagnosis criteria come from the National Survey on Drug Use and Health’s version of the DSM-IV criteria.   
7 
 
but are in evidence when measured by self-reported consumption patterns, clinical 
interviews, and biological screening (McLellan, 2007).   
A special challenge for researchers is determining which measurement is useful 
for analysis.  Consumption levels are correlated with the severity of a disorder as defined 
by the other criteria but their inconsistency has implications for some research questions.  
Clinical interviews have the advantage of evaluating an individual’s ongoing struggle 
with an AUD (e.g., strong cravings to drink or a fixation on alcohol) that may not be 
manifested through current consumption alone.  For example, a currently abstinent 
individual may still have a latent disorder that is reducing his functioning or altering his 
preferences.  In the first case, cross-sectional analyses of drinking and labor market 
outcomes would only represent the direct impact of drinking and the impact of disorders 
only for current drinkers.  Altered preferences largely explain such phenomena as 
continued treatment seeking by abstainers as well as their avoidance of certain social 
environments (e.g., weddings with open bars).  Longitudinal observation of consumption 
resolves these challenges to some extent while also providing more specificity (i.e., 
timing, lagged consumption patterns) than discrete clinical diagnoses.   
In addition to the DSM-IV diagnosis criteria and in response to the public health 
burden of moderately risky drinking, researchers have also developed screening 
instruments to detect both finer levels of less risky drinking while remaining sensitive 
enough to detect severe problems with minimal respondent information.
4
  Most screeners 
ask about an individual’s average alcohol consumption in standardized drinking units, 
usually the quantity of drinking in an episode and the frequency of episodes during a set 
                                                 
4
 For example, the Alcohol Use Disorders Identification Test (AUDIT) is designed to detect a continuum of 
risky use levels and the four question CAGE (Cut-down, Annoyed, Guilty, Eye-opener) is designed to detect 
dependence.   
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time period.  They also ask about perceptions of drinking and related consequences.  
Although consumption measures seem crude, they tend to be strong indicators of non-
consumption criteria.  In fact, there is an emphasis among public health and clinical 
researchers to move to a core quantity and frequency (Q-F) measure to more quickly 
screen individuals (Saitz, 2005; Gastfriend et al., 2007; McLellan, 2007).  These 
instruments and Q-F measures are prevalent in many large observational studies and have 
been used to estimate the relationship of drinking with secondary outcomes.  Again, the 
use of reported consumption is often more appropriate in models of alcohol’s causal 
impact, since the alternative constructed measures described above often include the 
measures of the dependent variables being analyzed (e.g., absences from work).    
Following from these different measures of drinking disorders, terms like ‘risky’, 
‘problem’, ‘harmful’ or ‘hazardous’ drinking are used in different studies and are 
sometimes used interchangeably with ‘abuse’.  In the remainder of this literature review, 
I use the exact measures that the authors used and clarify their meanings when necessary.  
In the theoretical model described in Chapter 3, AUD is a continuous variable 
representing the severity of an individual’s drinking disorder. In Chapter 4, I describe the 
primary measure of drinking that I use in my empirical model.  
Employment and Drinking 
AUDs are associated with labor market outcomes along multiple causal pathways.  
Both acute alcohol abuse, such as binge drinking, and longer term dependence can reduce 
an individual’s work productivity through reductions in human capital, health, and 
motivation (Cook and Moore, 1999; Mullahy and Sindelar, 1998; Corrao et al., 2004).  
They likewise decrease the intensity of job searching through the same mechanisms.   
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Even if real productivity decreases are not realized, such drinking behaviors can serve as 
a negative signal to current and prospective employers.  These adverse effects accumulate 
over time with increasing productivity loss and a growing portfolio of negative signals 
that can include sporadic labor market attachment and a reputation of low productivity.     
AUDs may be associated with labor market outcomes through the individual’s 
preferences.  An abusive or dependent drinker may value leisure differently because of 
worse health or a complementarity of drinking and leisure (Mello and Mendelson, 1972).  
He may discount time differently or have a different attitude toward risk, relative to the 
general labor market population either due to pre-existing characteristics or due to 
neurological changes brought on by drinking [Dom et al., 2005; Moselly et al., 2001; 
Tavares et al., 2004].  Therefore, he may leave the labor market more often and for longer 
periods of time.  He may choose to work part time which may have later consequences 
for his earnings profile and employment probabilities.  Alternatively, the deleterious 
effects of AUDs on health may provide more incentive for an individual to remain with 
an employer who provides health insurance.   
Identifying causal pathways is further complicated by the fact that an individual’s 
labor market experience also influences drinking behaviors.  Employment produces an 
income effect on all consumption, potentially increasing drinking.   There may likewise 
be an income and insurance effect on drinking that operates through expectations about 
treatment for AUDs.  Individuals anticipating sufficient income or insurance coverage for 
specialty treatment may increase their current drinking (ex ante moral hazard).  Both 
employment and unemployment can induce stress that is associated with AUDs (Frone, 
1999; Gallo et al., 2001).  Employment may provide a social network that facilitates and 
10 
 
encourages drinking.  Finally, employment may provide protective factors that reduce the 
prevalence of AUDs.  These include social norms that encourage safe drinking, wellness 
programs, and easier access to treatment through employer provided insurance and 
Employee Assistance Programs.   
In this study, I focus on employment as the primary labor market outcome for 
several reasons.   Employment is the broadest measure of labor market value and 
subsumes labor supply.  For individuals currently in the labor market, real wages do not 
change much over a several-year time horizon.  On the other hand, choosing to seek 
employment and finding employment are both outcomes with substantial variation over 
the study period. 
Most of the estimated effects of AUDs on employment found in the economics 
literature rely on large, cross-sectional datasets.  Specifically, these studies explain the 
different rates of employment between individuals with and without AUDs among an 
observed population.
5
  The fundamental econometric challenge in these studies is 
estimating the causal effects of AUDs in the face of a simultaneity problem or when 
unobserved heterogeneity is likely to explain both the AUD and labor market success.  
The standard approach in these studies is to use instrumental variables (IV) that predict 
an individual’s AUD but are theoretically and empirically uncorrelated with labor market 
outcomes other than through the AUD.  With data from the National Health Interview 
Survey (NHIS), Mullahy and Sindelar (1996) used parental AUDs and beer and cigarette 
taxes as instruments of dependence, abuse and harmful drinking.  MacDonald and Shields 
(2004) used non-acute illnesses that might limit drinking (e.g., asthma and diabetes) as 
                                                 
5
 A similar approach is seen in the literature on wages and labor supply as summarized in Jones 
(2006) and Johansson et al (2007). 
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instruments of dependence in the 2000 National Health Survey of England.  Johansson et 
al. (2007), using Finland’s Health 2000 survey, utilized parental characteristics, asthma 
and diabetes, religiosity, a person smoking behavior at the age of 18, and medical 
biomarkers as instruments of dependence.  All of these studies found significant and large 
effects of abuse and dependence on employment.  Several found a positive relationship 
between moderate levels of drinking and employment.   
One study (Feng et al., 2001) used a repeated cross-sectional dataset to estimate 
the effect of problem drinking on employment.  Problem drinking was defined by 
combinations of lifetime DSM-IV criteria and drinking behaviors during the previous 12 
months.  Employment was defined as any employment during the same 12 months.  With 
data from the Epidemiological Catchment Areas of six southern US states, they estimated 
bivariate probit models of the contemporary effect of problem drinking on employment.  
When using county alcohol sales policies as instruments this study found no negative 
consequences of problem drinking on employment and argued that the effects of problem 
drinking on employment may occur over a long period of time. 
While these studies have been useful in demonstrating reasonable estimates of the 
employment consequences of having an AUD, they exhibit a common limitation in cross-
sectional studies.  They provide only the estimated effect of recently having an AUD on 
current employment, when both the AUD and employment outcomes are the results of a 
long series of prior decisions.   Abuse and addiction have complex dynamic paths over 
time within individuals. This limitation presents several challenges to interpreting results 
and to making alcohol policy.  It is uncertain what proportion of the population ‘without a 
recent AUD’ has experienced one in the past.  Without knowing how long the negative 
12 
 
employment consequences of an AUD last, we cannot know to what degree we may be 
underestimating the effect of having an AUD.  Moreover, without understanding the 
causal mechanisms, we do not know whether we should expect prevention or treatment 
policies to have any short or long term labor market benefits.  The only panel study of the 
AUD-employment relationship highlights this problem by offering the explanation that 
there may be a delay in employment consequences of problem drinking.   
Treatment for Alcohol Use Disorders 
In 2010, the number of persons aged 12 or older needing treatment for an alcohol 
use problem was 18.5 million (7.3 percent of the population aged 12 or older). Of these, 
1.6 million (0.6 percent of the total population and 8.5 percent of the people who needed 
treatment for an alcohol use problem) received alcohol use treatment at a specialty 
facility. Thus, there were 17.0 million people who needed but did not receive treatment at 
a specialty facility for an alcohol use problem. Among the 17.0 million people aged 12 or 
older who needed but did not receive treatment for an alcohol use problem in 2010, there 
were 698,000 (4.1 percent) who felt they needed treatment for their alcohol use problem. 
Of these, 485,000 did not make an effort to get treatment, and 213,000 made an effort but 
were unable to get treatment in 2010 due to lack of health coverage/cost of treatment, 
and/or lack of transportation (NSDUH, 2010). 
Background on different types of treatment provides useful context for the 
treatment options and outcomes that this study analyzes.  The sample of individuals I 
study are engaged in treatment and meet certain AUD and other criteria.  Overall, they 
are high-functioning, e.g., engaged in the labor market, and do not represent the most 
severe AUDs.  They consume little inpatient and residential treatment and have little 
13 
 
criminal involvement.  More detail on the sample is provided in Chapter 4.  The three 
treatment options that I focus on are self-help (SH), outpatient counseling (OPC) and 
pharmacotherapy (RxT) which represent the majority of treatment sought by study 
individuals in the US.  They also represent the most common treatment consumed by 
substance use treatment seekers in the US with 54% attending a SH group and 42% 
receiving OPC during a 12 month period (NSDUH, 2008).  More importantly, these three 
modalities are of interest because of the way in which they fit lifestyles.  The time and 
monetary costs of these are low relative to inpatient and residential treatment.  
Individuals can continue working, living in their own residence and otherwise 
functioning ‘normally’ while consuming these.  Increasingly, an individual can seek OPC 
or RxT starting with their primary care physician and can avoid the stigma associated 
with traditional treatment.  Along the continuum of AUD severity, there is a role for any 
of these.  Even for the most severe AUDs, ongoing use of SH, outpatient and RxT should 
be considered following other more intensive therapies.  Finally, their flexibility and 
relatively low costs make them ideal subjects for public health policy.   
This chapter also provides the clinical basis for how treatment fits in the 
theoretical model presented in Chapter 2, including the justification of modeling 
treatment as a stock.  I describe the dynamics of treatment and the recovery.  The chapter 
ends with the economic theory of treatment demand.  
Defining Recovery 
Although abstinence has traditionally been a goal of specialty treatment, 
researchers on treatment effectiveness have placed new emphasis on reductions in 
harmful drinking episodes, recognizing that a steady state of moderate drinking can be 
14 
 
the goal of individuals seeking treatment (McLellan, 2004).  Overall, specialty treatment 
for alcohol is effective with some studies finding more than half of recipients remaining 
abstinent by the end of the observation period (CSAT, 2004; Room et al., 2005; Project 
Match Research Group, 1997).  Although many studies use length of time to relapse as an 
outcome, relapsing to problem drinking does not mean that the recovery process has 
ended and returning to treatment is not a bad outcome.  Initial abstinence is a good 
predictor of long term healthy behaviors (Maisto et al., 2006; McKay and Weiss, 2001) 
including the maintenance of safe or controlled levels of drinking after treatment 
(McLellan, 2004; Gastfriend et al., 2007).   
For an individual with a more severe AUD, ‘recovery’ is often defined by more 
than an episode of abstinence or controlled drinking.  As noted earlier, consumption is 
useful for measuring outcomes over the limited periods of observation that studies face.  
However, clinicians, patients and researchers recognize that recovery is not simply an end 
state in which a ‘disease’ has been ‘cured’.6  Rather, language such as ‘in recovery’ is 
more commonly used to refer to ongoing success with an acknowledgement of the 
potential for relapse.   Moreover, successful recovery is better conceived of as a steady 
state in which not only consumption is controlled but the latent factors that motivate 
problematic consumption are also alleviated or managed.  These factors include 
antecedent individual characteristics such as genetics and socioeconomic environment 
that led to the initial AUD.  Manifestations of these are risk- or sensation-seeking 
personalities, depression, anxiety and other psychiatric disorders, social acceptability of 
excessive drinking, social norms regarding leisure activities, and limited opportunities for 
healthy or fulfilling activities are all risk factors for AUDs that may remain in place even 
                                                 
6
 Note for instance the “Disease” model of addiction that is implicitly used by Alcoholics Anonymous.   
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after initial treatment has led to abstinence or controlled consumption.  Dynamic factors 
brought on by past consumption also challenge the recovery process.  These include 
changes in brain structure that alter decision-making faculties and alter preferences for 
alcohol and other goods and activities; development of mental illness; habits; and 
socioeconomic circumstances such as reduced human capital or a primary social group 
that is centered on alcohol.  The broader goal of treatment is therefore to facilitate a 
steady state of recovery by managing these factors in addition to managing consumption.  
Traditional Specialty Treatment and Self-Help 
Conventional forms of specialty treatment vary by the severity of the AUD and most 
types of treatment may be considered part of a continuum of care that ideally helps an 
individual improve from his current AUD to steady state recovery.  The intensity of 
treatment in the continuum is intended to match the severity of the AUD and decreases as an 
individual improves.  The intensity is loosely correlated with consumption level, due in part 
to the biological nature of severe physical addiction.  The most intensive care associated with 
AUDs a period of detoxification in which a patient is sequestered, monitored and medicated 
for safety and management of withdrawal symptoms.  Inpatient is traditionally 28 days and 
nights of treatment in a facility that offers a range of services, including RxT and counseling.   
Along the continuum of care, residential treatment, day treatment and outpatient 
therapy follow inpatient treatment with group and individual sessions occurring 1 to 7 times 
per week.  Inpatient and OPC usually rely on motivational enhancement therapy, 12-step 
facilitation treatment, cognitive behavioral treatment and behavioral family counseling, and 
contingency management and community reinforcement approaches or some combination of 
these.  Each of these approaches share similar elements.  They encourage goal setting and the 
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development of self-efficacy through ‘practicing’ sobriety. They also encourage proactive 
restructuring of an individual’s lifestyle.  These include changes to work and social 
environments as well as developing alternative leisure activities.  An individual is also 
encouraged to simultaneously treat mental or physical illness.  Each approach seeks to 
change motivations by changing perceived social norms and reiterating the consequences of 
consumption, promoting positive social reinforcement and accountability (either from the 
family, a mentor or the clinician) and highlighting the positive value gained from alternative 
activities.   They teach mechanisms for coping with stress and temptation, which include pre-
commitment strategies (e.g., requesting hotel rooms without mini-bars) and contemporaneous 
coping strategies (e.g., cognitive tools for overcoming periods of temptation) (Moos 2007; 
Project Match Research Group, 1997).   
Self-help groups, e.g., Alcoholics Anonymous (AA), are similar to OPC in several 
ways.  Although they mostly employ some version of 12-step facilitation, the two modalities 
share many active ingredients as described in the preceding paragraph.  Frequency of 
sessions can be much higher for SH groups than for OPC, especially since they are virtually 
free.  The culture of the therapy is the largest difference.  SH groups are almost entirely 
composed of other individuals who are in recovery themselves (Peers) and usually have no 
formal clinical training.  Despite some professional antagonism between SH organizations 
and clinical counselors, SH is often encouraged as a complement to formal specialty 
treatment or an alternative when an individual does not have the desire or means. 
 
 
Pharmacotherapy for Alcohol Use Disorders 
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Pharmacotherapies are often prescribed in conjunction with inpatient treatment 
and OPC.  Moreover, some of these medications are increasingly prescribed by primary 
care physicians for individuals with varying AUD severity and who may not otherwise be 
engaged in specialty substance abuse treatment.  The medications commonly associated 
with AUDs typically fall into three categories: medications that alleviate withdrawal 
symptoms, medications that enhance overall mental health (MH), and medications that 
support recovery by directly influencing an individual’s preferences for drinking 
(Williams, 2005).  The last group is the focus of this study. Medications for withdrawal 
are prescribed for a short period of time to reduce the mental and physical effects of sharp 
reductions in alcohol consumption.  The broadest class used is benzodiazepines which 
have anxiolytic and anticonvulsant properties.  It should be noted that the availability of 
medically facilitated detoxification and medications to make withdrawal less unpleasant 
can have a perverse effect on long run recovery as it reduces the disincentives to relapse 
and escalation of consumption.  Moderate and severe MH problems are commonly co-
occurring with AUDs, with anxiety and moderate depression having the highest 
prevalence at all degrees of AUD severity.  Regardless of the causal relationship between 
AUDs and MH, treating MH is expected to facilitate recovery indirectly by improving the 
individual’s overall wellbeing, his ability to cope, and by reducing the ‘pain’ of poor MH 
that leads to self-medication with alcohol.  In other words, the intent is for these 
medications to be pharmacological analogues to many of the proximal outcomes of the 
counseling therapies described above.  Selective Serotonin Re-uptake Inhibitors (SSRIs) 
and benzodiazepines (for longer run anxiety rather than detoxification) are among the 
most commonly prescribed medications to individuals with AUDs or who are in recovery 
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(Berglund et al., 2006; Grant et al., 2004; Sher, 2004; Watkins et al., 2006).  Their use is 
complicated by contraindications with drinking and, in the case of benzodiazepines, the 
specific concern of exposing individuals to new addictive substance.  There is ample 
evidence that individuals seek these medications regardless of any intent to alter their 
alcohol consumption and that primary care physicians prescribe them without knowledge 
of an existing AUD.  Because of this confounding and substantial use in the COMBINE 
sample, use of antidepressants, principally SSRIs, is included as a treatment consumption 
choice separate from other alcohol-specific treatments. 
  Medications in the third category are intended to support recovery directly and are 
usually prescribed specifically for the AUD.  They theoretically aid recovery by reducing 
cravings, preventing compulsive relapse, or causing nausea or discomfort from drinking. 
There are currently three US Food and Drug Administration (FDA)-approved medications 
for relapse prevention during recovery from alcohol dependence: Disulfiram (Antabuse), 
Naltrexone and Acamprosate.  As post-withdrawal pharmacotherapies, they function in a 
similar fashion as some of the counseling strategies.  Disulfiram, which causes nausea and 
discomfort if alcohol is also consumed, is a pre-commitment device.  The two drugs studied 
in the COMBINE trial, Naltrexone and Acamprosate, both normalize brain functioning by 
affecting neurotransmitters that may be unregulated due to chronic alcohol consumption.  
They both reduce alcohol cravings.  Naltrexone’s mechanism of action is dopaminergic, 
improving impulse control, reducing the intensity of cravings and reducing the pleasure of 
alcohol.  Naltrexone has been found to reduce the amount of alcohol consumed in a single 
setting with patients noting a reduced desire to drink to excess.  Acamprosate’s mechanism 
of action is not yet understood although it operates through the glutamate and gamma-
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aminobutyric acid (GABA) system.  Acamprosate does not alter the effects of consumed 
alcohol.  Acamprosate is the newest of the three drugs and was approved by the FDA in 
2005.  Several additional medications with similar pharmacology are either currently being 
studied for efficacy in managing drinking or are known to be prescribed off-label.  These 
include quetiapine, topiramate, gabapentin, levetiracetam, baclofen, tiapride, bromocriptine 
and aripiprazole.  Because certain benzodiazepines are γ-aminobutyric acid (GABA)ergic 
there is ongoing interest in their use as a longer run RxT for alcohol dependence despite the 
challenges described above (Bankole, 2005).  Finally, serotonergic medications continue to 
be studied explicitly for treating alcoholism.  There is some evidence that SSRIs are effective 
for controlling alcohol consumption especially for late-onset dependents.  However, there is 
conflicting evidence as to whether the reduced preference for alcohol observed is due to a 
general effect on consumption and satiety with respect to food and liquids or a selective 
effect on alcohol.  Moreover, there is little evidence that SSRIs are more beneficial for 
individuals with co-morbid depression than placebo in reducing alcohol abuse.  Ondansetron 
is a serotonin antagonist (rather than an SSRI) with growing evidence of efficacy for drinking 
outcomes and also reported reductions in the cravings for alcohol and enjoyment of drinking.    
Naltrexone, Acamprosate and this latter group of medications can have a proximal 
effect on alcohol consumption-both the decision to engage in drinking and the intensity of 
drinking.  There is no set recommendation for how long Naltrexone and Acamprosate should 
be prescribed.  The COMBINE trial dispensed medications for 4 months, while some 
clinicians have recommended 6-12 months (Fatemi and Clayton, 2008).  Disulfiram is 
usually prescribed for shorter periods.  For all of them, there is an understanding that 
additional prescriptions may be necessary as boosters, similar to traditional counseling.  The 
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longer run influence on recovery is expected to operate indirectly.  Short run reductions in 
consumption allow the brain and physiological adaptations of addiction to heal and 
normalize.  While on the medications, lifestyle changes and habit formation may occur more 
easily and individuals may develop coping strategies.  Their influence can function in a way 
dissimilar to counseling therapy alone.  While on the medications, an individual may be able 
to manage his drinking while not altering his lifestyle, an often infeasible challenge.  He can 
thus be reconditioned to not drink in response to the cues and routines of daily life.   
Economic Models of Treatment for Alcohol Use Disorders 
Any attempt to model an individual’s drinking, and treatment decisions must 
recognize that they are not made in ignorance of future consequences.  An individual 
knows that abusive drinking can lead to near term and long term productivity loss, labor 
market challenges, poorer health and, most importantly, to severe dependence, a 
proclivity for continuing abuse or withdrawal effects.  The latter consequence, that 
individuals know that drinking today influences the value of drinking later, is a key 
component of Becker and Murphy (1988)’s rational addiction (RA) framework for 
modeling substance use. This framework is a useful starting place for analyzing drinking 
choices jointly with other economic choices.  Drinking decisions today may be 
influenced by expectations about productivity losses, employment probabilities and 
health.  Moreover, individuals may recognize that consuming specialty treatment for 
AUDs can be an effective tool for moderating their drinking and its ultimate 
consequences.   
Theorists have expanded the original RA model in an attempt to make it better 
explain observed substance use and, to a limited extent, treatment seeking behaviors.  The 
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original theory did not explicitly make the case for treatment seeking.  Orphanides and 
Zervos (1996) provided a rationale for a posterior demand for treatment, after an 
individual discovered if they were an addictive personality type.  Analogous justifications 
come from present-biased preferences (Gruber and Koszegi, 2001) and “projection bias” 
(Lowenstein, 1999) in which individuals assume that their current and future preferences 
will be similar. Several observed phenomena were still lacking theoretical justification, 
including relapse to AUDs, ongoing treatment seeking even after achieving abstinence, 
the tendency for some individuals’ convergence to moderate drinking patterns rather than 
abstinence.  Bernheim and Rangel (2004), building on Laibson (2001), incorporate the 
neuroscience on substance use behavior into a traditional RA framework.  A key 
component is that individuals can find themselves seemingly randomly in a ‘hot’ mental 
state in which their instantaneous marginal utility of a substance leads to behavioral 
‘mistakes’ and a reduction in total lifetime utility.  The ‘hot’ states are brought on by 
environmental cues that trigger brain mechanisms that are manifested as a compulsive 
desire to consume the substance.  In the Bernheim and Rangel model, individuals in 
recovery manage this challenge in part by choosing safe environments in which the flow 
of cues is reduced.  The most extreme example of this behavior is checking into a 
residential treatment facility.  A second role of treatment that their model recognizes is 
learning to deal with cues, a common objective of most counseling therapy.  Although 
they do not discuss RxT, it can be justified in a similar way as counseling.   
In the traditional RA framework, treatment has primarily been presented as an 
investment in future outcomes at the expense of current utility from leisure and 
alternative consumption.  Some forms of treatment may provide their own per se utility, 
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e.g., through social interactions or self-empowerment.  As described above, treatment 
may alter the immediate marginal utility of drinking or time preferences (Yoon et al., 
2007).  It may similarly alter the experience of and thus preferences for leisure and other 
consumption.  For example, Naltrexone has been reported to reduce the enjoyment of 
shopping.  Gul and Pesendorfer (2007) provide an alternative model of addiction that 
subsumes these latter effects of treatment on utility.  In their framework, utility is a 
function of both actual consumption and the individual’s remaining choice set.  Although 
this framework somewhat ignores how treatment alters the utility of all other 
consumption and leisure, it clearly justifies including treatment as an input to current 
utility.   
In summary, recent theoretical literature has developed models of the demand for 
treatment that fit better with observed data.  They are consistent with several stylized 
facts and with findings in the clinical literature:  individuals vary in their substance use 
patterns.  The behaviors of some individuals are consistent over long periods of time, 
while others are dynamic, cycling through dependence, moderation, and abstinence.  
Individuals seek treatment all along the continuum between dependence and abstinence. 
Almost all of the models of addiction are underidentified by available data.  Nonetheless, 
the economic models are consistent in their implication that under certain assumptions 
individuals may seek treatment.
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The policy relevance of studying treatment is threefold.  First, there are 
externalities from AUDs, including decreased employment and lost productivity, 
accidents, public health care costs, and crime.  Second, the existing treatment system is 
largely a public system.  Given that some individuals are willing to seek treatment, it is 
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 For this study, I ignore legally mandated treatment. 
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worthwhile to study the relative effectiveness of different portfolios of treatment to 
inform policies that promote treatment.  Interest in RxT is particularly high because it is a 
passive and convenient form of treatment that can be prescribed by primary care 
physicians which reduces the overall stigma of receiving treatment (Bankole, 2005).
8
  
Finally, as synopsized by Bernheim and Rangel (2004) individuals may suffer from 
unanticipated compulsion to consume sub-optimally (internalities).  Studying the 
effectiveness of alternative treatments is worthwhile for improving their welfare. 
                                                 
8
 Nonetheless, it is recommended that pharmacotherapy be combined with traditional counseling therapy.   
  
 
CHAPTER III. THEORETICAL MOTIVATION 
 
In this section I present a dynamic, theoretical model of the behavior of 
individuals who have had an AUD and who have previously sought formal specialty 
treatment for the AUD.  Chapter 4 will provide greater detail concerning the study 
sample, but two characteristics of the data provide useful context for the theoretical 
model.  First, each time period in the data is roughly four calendar months which is the 
time between data collection interviews.   Second, at the time of the interview, questions 
about employment, outpatient counseling and self-help sessions are reported as totals for 
the entire period, whereas drinking and pharmacotherapy to manage drinking and 
depression are reported for each day within the period. The model focuses on their 
employment, drinking, ongoing AUD treatment decisions and the use of antidepressants. 
 In each period t, an individual maximizes his remaining lifetime expected utility 
by choosing per-period hours of general leisure, tl , levels of alcohol consumption, ta , 
types of therapy to manage drinking and the AUD (including no therapy), tm , whether or 
not to consume antidepressants, ts , and amount of consumption, tc .  He begins each 
period with a set of state variables accounting for his previous decisions and experiences:  
work history prior to the current period, Qt; drinking history, At; past treatment choices, 
Mt; past antidepressant use, St; and, Dt, the current level of severity of his AUD.  A 
positive drinking history (At) does not have a direct negative effect on utility but 
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influences the marginal utilities of the choice variables in the immediate period.  
The individual receives negative utility from experiencing any level of AUD (Dt), which 
can be conceptualized as the subjective disutility of having a high addictive stock, 
negative psychic consequences of alcohol abuse, or guilt and frustration over drinking 
behaviors.  An individual’s work, alcohol use, treatment, and antidepressant stocks at the 
beginning of period t are functions of the respective stocks at the beginning of the 
previous period and his employment, alcohol use, AUD treatment, and antidepressant use 
in period t-1 
His AUD, Dt, is a function of all his current-state variables, particularly drinking 
history (At), and the previous level of AUD, Dt-1, 
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Dt may also influence the marginal utilities of the choice variables.    
The marginal utility of drinking (at) is conditional on the current treatment 
consumption ( tm ) which reduces the marginal utility of alcohol; drinking history (At), a 
standard feature in rational addiction models; previous treatment that forms a stock of 
capacity to moderate drinking (Mt); past antidepressant use (St); and the current severity 
of the AUD (Dt).  Thus past drinking (At) affects the current drinking choice through the 
typical addiction/habit formation mechanism as well as indirectly through the AUD for 
which an individual may drink to cope or relieve the psychic distress.   
The vector tZ  includes observable local environmental characteristics  such as  
wages by sector, prices, and local treatment capacity. tX is a vector of observable 
individual characteristics and   represents permanent individual differences.  t  is an 
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unobserved time varying factor and ti , is the idiosyncratic error.   For notational ease in 
the utility function, i subscripts for individual are left out of the model.  Also, let tK  be 
the vector of all the state endogenous variables: ),,,,( ttttt DSMAQ . 
At each time period t, the individual selects tl , ta , tm , ts , and tc  to maximize expected 
discounted utility realizing that in the future the individual will make the optimal choice 
given the realized values of the random variables, with T being the last period of the 
individual’s life. 
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subject to a maximum number of hours (3), four laws of motion (4-7), a production function 
for the AUD severity (8), a budget constraint that does not include borrowing (8), and a wage 
offer (10): 
 Ω- lt = ht (3)  
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 pa,t * at  +  pm,t * mt + ps,t * st + ct  =  wt*( ht) +  Nt (9)  
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The variable β is a constant discount factor. Ω is the maximum hours available to the 
individual in each time period.  The j  in equations 4-8 are depreciation rates for their 
respective state variables.  pa,t, pm,t, and ps,t are the prices of alcohol, AUD treatment and 
antidepressants, respectively.  wt is the individual’s wage if working, and Nt is any non-
labor income.  tU  is a concave function of current drinking, leisure, treatment, 
antidepressant use and other consumption.   For a large range of drinking levels, tU  is an 
increasing function of ta , though it is possible that the marginal effect of alcohol 
eventually becomes negative.   Assuming that utility is an increasing, concave function of 
ta , the signs of the partial derivatives are 
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All of the state variables are increasing functions of their respective past outcomes and they 
depreciate.  Consistent with the standard rational addiction framework, current drinking (at) 
influences the marginal utility of future drinking via an increment in the state variable At+1 
used in the following period.  AUD severity, Dt, is a function of past AUD severity, as well 
as the drinking, treatment, and antidepressant use history state variables.  
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By assumption, an individual’s marginal utility of alcohol consumption increases 
with the drinking history state variable ( tA ):    
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and decreases with past treatment  (Mt): 
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The drinking component of the model is consistent with Becker and Murphy’s (BM) 
rational addiction theory of substance use in that preferences are conditional on an 
individual’s previous alcohol consumption. The model allows the individual to influence the 
optimal value of future drinking through current drinking and current consumption of 
treatment. Specifically, current treatment reduces the marginal utility of future drinking, 
conditional on the drinking history state variable. Thus, the individual uses current treatment 
to manage the tradeoff between the future utility from drinking and the future disutility of the 
AUD.  Antidepressant use enters the utility function similar to alcohol-specific treatment and 
decreases the marginal utility of alcohol, though the theoretical mechanism are not entirely 
the same.  As described in Chapter II, antidepressants may be a substitute for alcohol in 
improving mood (alleviating underlying psychic distress) and they may reduce compulsive 
behavior.  Because many SSRIs are contraindicated by alcohol, their use acts an additional 
constraint (regardless of whether an individual recognizes their use as a type of pre-
commitment).   
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In the BM model, the motivation to reduce consumption is based primarily on the 
secondary consequences of chronically high levels of drinking such as health, productivity, 
crime, or changes in the price of alcohol.  By emphasizing the per se disutility of having an 
AUD, the model diverges from BM conceptually but is not inconsistent in its general 
predictions.  The labor market is the only consequence that I explicitly include in the model 
and is described below.  As noted earlier, I am allowing current treatment to directly enter an 
individual’s utility function.  
Clinical treatment, self-help, and pharmacotherapy as well as antidepressant use are 
special cases of the general effort spent to reduce drinking introduced by BM.  In this model I 
ignore any non-formal treatment for three reasons.  First, I do not observe any informal 
efforts.  Second, all of the study subjects have engaged in formal treatment at some point in 
their lives.  Almost all formal treatment has some component of therapy that teaches 
individuals behaviors and habits to help them control their drinking and prevent relapse.  All 
treatment requires a component of personal effort and encourages ongoing personal effort.
9
  
Therefore, it becomes difficult to disentangle pure personal effort from any ongoing 
treatment effect.  Finally, because consumption of formal treatment, and especially 
pharmacotherapy, can be more easily encouraged by policy-makers, estimates of its effect are 
of greater interest.    
As described in Chapter 2, the Becker and Murphy and Orphanides and Zervos 
rational addiction frameworks do not by themselves predict several observed drinking and 
treatment seeking behaviors, especially over shorter periods of time.  The models of 
Bernheim and Rangel and Gul and Pesendorfer offer better face validity; however, neither 
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 Arguably, all personal effort after treatment is more productive because of the ‘technology’ acquired in 
treatment. 
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would significantly change the empirical model that I describe in Chapter 5 and that is 
supported by the data.  Finally, this model does not explicitly include any learning or 
Bayesian updating by an individual concerning his addiction or treatment efficacy.        
Timing
10
 
At the beginning of each period, t, the individual has complete information about 
his past and also about his current market environment: 
 past behaviors ( tttt SMAQ ,,, ),  
 the current severity of the AUD (Dt), 
 current preferences which are influenced by past behaviors and a random 
preference shock,  
 current prices for alcohol, treatment, antidepressants, and consumption 
goods (Zt),   
 a current wage offer , tw , (including no offer) which is also a function of 
the state variables. 
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 I considered as alternative theoretical model in which individuals choose employment at the beginning of a 
period which remains fixed throughout the remainder of the period.   All alcohol and other consumption during 
the period would be chosen conditional on the employment decision. Employment framed as a period-long 
commitment would be chosen in response to current wage offers and state variables but also with the 
knowledge of the within-period prices and preferences for consumption.   The empirical advantage of this 
model is that it allowed estimation of the one-way contemporaneous effects of employment on drinking and 
other consumption.   Though this model is theoretically viable, it requires a very strong assumption about the 
timing of decisions and the nature of employment ‘commitments’.  Some employment decisions are literally 
contractual commitments. Moreover, on any given day, an individual may intend to remain employed for the 
foreseeable future.  However, labor supply is just as easily characterized as a daily decision, especially when 
made jointly with drinking which has a complementarity with leisure and, especially among this population, is 
associated with short term consequences for labor supply (e.g., productivity shocks or absences due to adverse 
health event or accidents.  The identification strategy to validate and use such a model required exogenous 
predictors of employment (at the beginning of a period) that were excludable from the within period decisions.   
Within the general framework I describe in Chapter 6, I estimated models in which market wages were used to 
predict per-period employment but were excluded from all other per-period equations.  This identification 
strategy was not statistically supported.  I have focused instead on the simpler framework of simultaneous 
determination of all per-period choices which does not require the strong assumption about the timing of 
employment decisions.   
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The values of the state variables, current preferences (after the preference shock is 
known), prices and the wage offer remain constant throughout the entire period.  During 
the period, he simultaneously chooses employment status, how much to drink, how much 
AUD treatment to consume, antidepressant use, and other consumption.  At the end of the 
period, state variables are updated based on those decisions.   
The individual knows that the decisions made during the current period affect 
future preferences, particularly the future marginal utility of alcohol, through his state 
variables. He also knows that current decisions will affect future productivity, the 
probabilities of receiving future wage offers, the distribution of future wage offers, and 
the severity of the AUD in the future.  The individual’s per-period decision making can 
be described by the following value function framework.  Recall that tK is the vector of 
state variables which represent four laws of motion for employment, drinking, AUD 
treatment decisions and the use of antidepressants (Equations 4-7) and the AUD severity.   
In the final period T of an individual’s life, consumption is chosen to maximize 
current utility with no consideration of future periods.    
 
 
),,,,,;,,,,(max),,(
,,,,
TTTTTTTTTT
csmla
TTT ZXKcsmlaUKV
TTTTT
   (15)  
 
In each period t<T, conditional on state variables (Kt) and the period t specific 
shocks, the individual makes consumption choices that maximize the sum of current 
utility and the expected future value (integrating over the future error terms) conditional 
on how those consumption choices change Kt+1. 
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Since the per-period choices are made jointly, they are all functions of the same 
set of state variables, prices and community-level characteristics, individual 
characteristics and heterogeneity.     In each period, the employment decision (leisure 
demand), and demand for alcohol, AUD therapies, and antidepressants are 
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Wages unconditional on employment are functions of the same variables except w
t
Z  only 
includes market wages and excludes prices for consumption goods contained in 
t
Z .   
w
tX  excludes non-labor income. 
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CHAPTER IV. DATA 
COMBINE Study Sample 
The COMBINE trial randomized 1,383 adult participants to nine different 
combinations of two pharmacotherapies (Acamprosate and Naltrexone) and a CBI.  The 
trial also included Medication Management for all but one group that received no pills or 
placebos.  Randomization took place within eleven different treatment sites in the United 
States between 2001 and 2003 (Medical University of South Carolina, Boston 
Consortium, University of Washington, University of Texas, Brown University, 
University of Miami, University of New Mexico, Yale University, University of 
Pennsylvania, Harvard University, University of Wisconsin). Trial treatment lasted for 
sixteen weeks after which the individuals’ only interaction with trial staff was 
incentivized follow-up data collection. Data collection continued at four-month intervals 
for three years after randomization for a subset of willing participants whose data were 
collected for an economic study of COMBINE.  Nine of the original eleven sites chose to 
continue data collection for the economic study. 
The main inclusion criterion for the study was a DSM-IV diagnosis of alcohol 
dependence.  Participants were excluded if another substance was deemed to be the primary 
drug of dependence, had a severe psychiatric illness or had certain serious physical 
conditions (COMBINE Protocol).  Other inclusion criteria were that “participants must have 
been drinking a minimum of > 14 drinks (females) or > 21 drinks (males) on average per 
week over a consecutive 30-day period in the 90-day period prior to initiation of abstinence, 
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and have two or more days of heavy drinking (defined as 4 drinks for females and 5 
drinks for males) in the 90-day period prior to initiation of abstinence.   Participants must 
have had a minimum of 4 consecutive days (96 hours) of abstinence.  Participants can be 
abstinent for a maximum of 21 days prior to randomization.”  Participants were also 
excluded if they intended to engage in any other treatment for alcohol-related problems 
during the 16 week study period, if they had used one of the study medications in the past 30 
days or if they had had inpatient substance use treatment in the past 30 days.   
In this study I focus on outcomes following the end of the 16 week trial for several 
reasons.  Participation in a clinical trial artificially influences outcomes due to 
inclusion/exclusion criteria, time commitments and frequent interactions with clinical staff.  
The study required up to four visits per month to the research site during the trial treatment.  
Second, I am using the trial’s randomization of individuals to treatment arms as an 
identification strategy for the initial drinking and treatment conditions.  Participation in the 
trial represents a reset of many  individuals’ drinking profiles and also initiates them to 
different experiences with RxT.   
Appendix Table A.1 describes the sample size and observations of the original 
COMBINE study.  Of the 991 participants who completed 16 weeks of treatment in the 
nine sites that continued the study, 792 chose to participate in the three-year economic 
study and completed 6,138 interviews including an interview at randomization and at the 
end of 16 weeks of trial treatment. Attrition within this group was limited.
11
 Moreover, 
there were relatively few missing interviews because the data collection instruments were 
                                                 
11
 The reasons for the low attrition rate include the frequency of follow-up interviews, incentives, the 
rapport established between the study participants and the study staff during the main study period, and 
the amount of grant resources provided to the study sites to support data collection.  Finally, the 
participants eligible for the follow-up study had successfully completed 16 weeks of study treatment and 
thus may have been selected on unobserved characteristics that were correlated with study participation. 
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designed to capture outcomes since the previous interview.  The clinical staff conducting 
the interviews were trained in techniques to improve recollection (COMBINE Protocol).  
In accordance with the original study, if too much time passed between interviews, the 
clinical staff attempted to reconstruct the outcomes as of the time of the missed interview.  
Although this approach to data collection increases the likelihood of recall bias, it has the 
advantage of removing intermittent missing information.  Fortunately, less than 6% of 
interviews occurred outside of 60 days of the intended interview date.  Finally, there was 
virtually no non-response to any particular question in the primary data collection 
instrument other than logical survey skips.  The current analysis sample is 775 
individuals with 4,994 post trial interviews after removing 17 individuals with a large 
number of inconsistent or missing observations or individuals with fewer than four of the 
eight possible follow-up interviews.  Of these, 601 interviews were flagged as having 
been reconstructed.  Appendix Table A.2 provides definitions for key model covariates. 
One of the strengths of this study is the quality of its measures.  The data were 
collected using the Economic Form 90 instrument (Bray et al., 2007) which asked about 
labor market outcomes, substance use and MH treatment seeking and health since the last 
interview. All treatment information collected by the Form 90 refers to self reported 
treatment seeking and is unrelated to COMBINE study treatment. The Form 90 also 
collected detailed daily alcohol use in standard drinking units using a calendar follow-
back method which is considered an accurate survey method for certain types of 
substance use.  Finally, a concomitant medications file recorded daily use of over-the-
counter and prescription medications of participants as well as the reason for the use. The 
length of the time since the previous interview averages four months. This relatively short 
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interval time is useful because it not only supports a longitudinal and dynamic statistical 
model but it also supports a theory-driven statistical model that depends on simultaneous 
alcohol consumption and treatment decisions. In other words, it supports modeling the 
key behaviors that theory would predict. No other survey contains such detailed measures 
of treatment use, substance use, and employment outcomes over such fine periods of 
time.   
Appendix Table A.3 describes the characteristics of the 775 individuals in the 
analysis sample.  Marital status and education variables are both mutually exclusive 
categorical variables.  Of note, this sample is fairly well educated with fewer than 7% not 
having achieved a high school degree or better, and over 40% having a college degree or 
higher.  Marital status and education are only collected at the beginning of the trial, 
therefore I do not observe any changes over time.  
Appendix Table A.4 provides detail on the main measures of employment.  These 
employment categories were based on two questions from the Form-90: the number of 
weeks worked since the previous data collection interview and the typical number of 
hours worked per week.  Although the Form 90 asks about current employment status, I 
chose to use the measures that represent the employment experience over the entire 
period up to the interview rather than a snapshot at the end of the reporting period.  
Current employment or unemployment is a less comprehensive outcome than the extent 
to which an individual actually worked during the time before the snapshot of status.    
From the individual’s perspective increased labor market success (conditional on wanting 
to work) due to improved AUD outcomes is a net positive. From a particular societal 
perspective any increase in employment is considered a positive outcome, regardless of 
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whether it happened due to improvements in job search success or due to a stronger 
preference or capacity to supply labor.  In the COMBINE sample, 96% (not reported in 
Appendix Table A.4) report either being employed or looking for employment in at least 
one time period.  In any period a little over half of the sample is employed full-time for 
almost the whole period and another 12-13% are employed part-time for most of the 
period. The final three columns provide evidence of the variation in employment status 
over the three years of the study.  Post-trial 75% of the sample was employed full-time 
for >90% of the period at least once.  Thirty-three percent of the sample did not work at 
all during at least one period of reporting.  Alternatively, only 40% of the sample did not 
change employment status.  The largest group that remained the same was full-time for 
>90% of the period at 29%, followed by 8% who did not work the entire time.  Although 
not reported in the table, over half of those claimed to have looked for work during at 
least one period.   These facts are consistent with the inclusion/exclusion criteria which 
admitted a relatively high functioning group of individuals with AUDs. 
Alcohol consumption was recorded in US standard drinking units (14 grams of 
alcohol) for each day during the look-back period.  From these daily amounts I define a 
problem drinking week as either a week with at least one heavy drinking day (4+ drinks 
for women, 5+ drinks for men) or a week of overall high consumption (14+ drinks for 
men or women).  As described in Chapter 2, for someone in recovery, a heavy drinking 
day is usually considered a relapse. Similarly, it is possible for someone to drink at 
hazardous levels without necessarily exceeding the heavy drinking threshold within a 
single day. Therefore, I use both of these measures to define a general episode of 
problematic drinking.  Appendix Table A.5 reports four drinking outcomes for a given 
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period. The first is no drinking at all; the second is moderate or controlled drinking in 
which alcohol is consumed, but no problem weeks are reported. Among those who 
reported any problem weeks, I divide the group into those for whom less than half of the 
period was consumed of problem weeks and those who reported more than half of the 
period as problem weeks.  Because of the inclusion criteria of the study, everyone in the 
sample was in a problem drinking category at Period 1. During the period of treatment, 
21% of the sample remained abstinent with most individuals having problem weeks more 
than half of the period (36.9%). This latter category increased to 44.0% in Period 3, eight 
months after study treatment ended. Over time, the number of individuals reporting 
abstinence increases to 35.3% in Period 9, while the number of patients with any problem 
drinking decreases.  Although some of this is due to sample attrition, some of it is due to 
recognized patterns of natural and treatment-supported recovery. The final column of 
Appendix Table A.5 demonstrates the drinking dynamics within individuals with 47.9% 
reporting at least one period of abstinence and 63.4% reporting at least one period of 
problem drinking greater than half the period. 
 The Form-90 asked the number of visits to alcohol SH groups during the previous 
period including AA and other groups. Similarly, the Form-90 asked for the number of 
visits for outpatient treatment to help reduce or control drinking. I currently only include 
a period as a period in which SH was consumed if the individual attended more than 7 
visits. Likewise, I only include a period as a period in which outpatient treatment was 
consumed if the individual attended more than 3 sessions during the period. The first 
reason for these decisions was that ensure a meaningful dose of each treatment modality 
and these levels reveal a more than passive engagement in treatment seeking. The second 
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reason is supported by the observed data. For example, 46 SH observations were 
eliminated of which 37 were periods in which only one SH visit was reported. Similarly, 
for RxT, I included only periods in which more than 14 days of RxT were consumed. 
This amount ensured that the effects of any of the medications could have been in place 
based on known titration levels. Moreover, because there is evidence that individuals 
often choose to consume pharmacotherapies for discrete time periods either in response 
to AUD concerns or in anticipation of circumstances or events. This is most common 
with Disulfiram, but is also true for Naltrexone. Sixteen observations were not included 
as RxT, of which all had less than five days of consumption.  
 Since all of these modalities can be consumed simultaneously, I constructed a 
categorical variable that is reported in Appendix Table A.6. Because cell sizes were small 
for some combinations, the categorical variable was reduced to four categories: No 
treatment, SH only, OPC or OPC + SH, and RxT alone or in combination with OPC 
and/or SH. The non-mutually exclusive outcomes for each of the three treatment 
modalities are also reported in Appendix Table A.6. SH was the most common treatment 
before and after the trial. In the periods after treatment, 38.5% of individuals had at least 
one period with SH consumption, followed by 28.3% for OPC and 18.2% for RxT. When 
including the trial treatment, 66.2% of individuals consumed OPC and 70.3% consumed 
RxT (only including non-placebo pill use). Following study treatment, about 86% of the 
sample experienced at least one period in which they consumed no treatment. Appendix 
Table A.7 shows the same outcomes for antidepressant use. Twenty-three percent of the 
sample used an antidepressant during at least one period following the Trial.   
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 Appendix Table A.8 presents transition probabilities for each of the dependent 
variables to further demonstrate variability over time. For employment, full-period full-
time employment was the most persistent category with 84.5% remaining in this category 
across Periods 3-9. For alcohol, abstinence was the most persistent with 81.3% remaining 
abstinent if they were abstinent in the previous period. Very few individuals go from 
problem drinking (>50% of the period) to abstinence or moderate drinking in a single 
period. Similarly, only 3.8% of moderate drinking periods are followed by problem 
drinking (>50% of the period). Periods with no treatment are usually followed by periods 
with no treatment (89.6%).  
 Mood disorders such as moderate depression and anxiety are common among 
individuals with AUDs and such moderate MH problems were not part of COMBINE’s 
exclusion criteria.   Study participants reported prescription and non-prescription 
medication use in a Concomitant Medication interview that was administered alongside 
the Form 90.  Because of the possibly substantial role in AUD recovery, I extracted all 
SSRIs, tri-cyclic antidepressants and any other medication which an individual claimed 
was prescribed (even if off-label) for depression.  Although SSRIs are not strictly 
prescribed for depression (anxiety disorders being the next most common rationale), I 
counted all SSRIs as antidepressants.  Of SSRI users, 73% of the sample listed depression 
as the primary reason for the prescription.  Of the remaining 27%, slightly less than half 
claimed anxiety and depression.  Even if depression is not listed as the primary reason, 
SSRIs have a high probability of influencing moods.  If an individual possessed any of 
these medications on more than 45 days in a period (larger than the titration and initial 
efficacy period) then I coded them as using an antidepressant that period.   
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Secondary Data 
Prices for beer and several other consumption goods are gathered from the American 
Chamber of Commerce Research Association (ACCRA) cost of living index dataset. Since 
1968, volunteers from the Council for Community and Economic Research (C2ER) have 
recorded the local prices for specific brands, makes, and sizes of different products, which 
are then used to create this index. During the years used in our analysis (2000 to 2007 to 
include lag prices), the number of markets reporting prices in each quarter range from 274 to 
321 markets. All real prices are calculated using the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
Consumer Price Index for all urban consumers, all items index for regions. These prices can 
be merged on for each quarter and metropolitan area reported within the study sample. I only 
used beer prices because the way wine prices were collected changed during the study 
period. Likewise, liquor prices were not collected after 2004. I also include the price for a 
gallon of gas, average home price, and the price of a visit to a primary care physician.  
Average sector wages come from the Quarterly Economic Census of Wages collected 
by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. I include wages for retail, construction, and manufacturing 
sectors according to the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS). These data 
are merged onto my sample at the quarterly, Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) level.  
Data on the formal specialty treatment landscape in any given community is available 
from the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) via the 
National Survey of Substance Abuse Treatment Services (N-SSATS). This is a census of 
outpatient, inpatient, and residential treatment providers.   I use the ratio of utilized outpatient 
slots, calculated as the number of total outpatient counts during the 12-month reporting year 
across all providers divided by the total regular capacity of outpatient slots.   Also, I use the 
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proportion of providers who have a sliding scale fee structure and the interaction of these two 
variables. Finally, I divide these variables by annual, statewide number of individuals who 
either needed or received treatment for alcohol abuse or dependence provided by the 
National Survey on Drug Use and Health (NSDUH).  These data are merged at the 
community and year level. 
Prices for medications are drawn from Medicaid fee-for-service drug claim data for 
each state and quarter (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2007).  The 
representative price for antidepressants is for a 20-mg pill (most common dosage in the 
COMBINE sample) of Fluoxetine (Prozac) the most commonly recorded antidepressant in 
the COMBINE sample. Fluoxetine was also the first blockbuster SSRI in the US and it 
became generic in 2001 providing a large price drop during the COMBINE enrollment 
period.  I use Naltrexone (50mg) prices to represent RxT for alcohol.  Although Disulfiram is 
the most well-known medication in general, COMBINE participants were familiar with 
Naltrexone and Naltrexone was consumed 6 times as often as Disulfiram following the trial.  
Acamprosate did not become available in the US until 2005 and only 9 individuals used it 
outside of the trial itself. I use 30-day supply prices for both medications. 
Appendix Table A.9 reports means and standard deviations for the time-varying 
individual and community-level variables used in estimation. Appendix Table A.9 also 
reports state-level and local-level variables described above, including exclusion restrictions 
for the initial condition (IC) equations which are described in Chapter 5.  
 
  
 
CHAPTER V. EMPIRICAL MODEL 
In this chapter, I define the empirical approach I use to estimate the dynamic 
relationships among the employment, drinking, AUD treatment choices, and 
antidepressant use among the COMBINE sample based on the theoretical model 
described in Chapter 3. In addition, I estimate a per-period model of log wages 
conditional on being employed. I begin by describing the specifications for these per-
period equations. First, I define how state variables (lagged endogenous outcomes) are 
calculated and evolve over time. I describe the exogenous prices and other environmental 
variables that enter each equation and individual-level covariates. Next, I describe the 
discrete factor random effects method which I use to jointly estimate these equations 
while incorporating permanent and time-varying unobserved heterogeneity. Finally, I 
describe the identification strategy for the endogenous right-hand side variables which 
includes reduced form estimation of initial conditions. 
I define Qt, employment history, as a vector of three different measures of 
outcomes accumulated up to the current period: the number of periods employed <90% of 
the period, the number of periods employed part time >90% of the period, and the 
number of periods employed full time >90% of the period.   I define drinking history At to 
be a vector of different drinking measures that capture different consumption patterns up 
to the current period. These include total number of periods of non-problem drinking and 
the two levels of problem drinking.  I define tM  as the number of periods since the last 
time an AUD treatment [SH only, OPC (no RxT) and any RxT] was chosen. If an AUD 
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treatment was chosen in the previous period, then its respective state variable assumes a 
value of zero. tS is the total number of periods of antidepressant use to period t.  AUD 
severity is not observed is not explicitly included in the empirical model.  Thus, in 
addition to representing addictive stock, past drinking behaviors, At, is also a key proxy 
for AUD severity (along with unobserved heterogeneity and the remaining state 
variables).  The vector tZ contains quarterly local (county) wages for construction and 
manufacturing sectors, prices for beer, gas, housing, naltrexone, and fluoxetine at period 
t. Also included are local specialty substance use treatment system variables by year.  
They are counts of unused OPC sessions. Then, I divide them by the number of people 
receiving or claiming to need specialty treatment for AUDS according to NSDUH state 
and year estimates. I also separately count the unused OPC sessions which were available 
to patients who need a sliding scale fee. Finally, I include self-reported travel times to 
treatment or other medical facilities.  The vector tX  contains individual characteristics of 
gender, age, education, and non-labor income.  
 
Estimation Strategy 
I estimate the five main equations jointly using the discrete factor random effects model 
(DFRE), a flexible random effects estimation technique (Heckman and Singer, 1984; 
Mroz and Guilkey, 1992; Mroz, 1999).  In DFRE,  an individual’s time varying and time 
invariant unobserved heterogeneity enters each equation and are correlated across  across 
all equations.  Specifically,  
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where the j are permanent unobserved individual heterogeneity, jt  are individual time 
varying heterogeneity and the jte are the idiosyncratic errors.   
As described in Chapter 4, the employment outcome in each period, et=e is 
defined by four mutually exclusive categories e, e=0,1,2,3. 
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As explained in Chapter 3 theory suggests that the employment outcome depends on the 
history of all choice variables and exogenous policy variables that affect the jointly made 
decisions.
12
  It also depends on preferences for consumption and the prices of 
consumption.   
Assuming that the ete ,1  in Equation 18 are additively separable, mutually 
independent, and Type-I Extreme Value distributed error terms, the log odds ratio of et = 
e relative to the outcome et = 0, conditional on 
e
t
e
11   is. 
                                                 
12
 As mentioned in the Chapter 3, a previous version of my model separated the employment and consumption 
decisions within each period.  Assuming an individual committed to period-long employment in the beginning 
of a period created the opportunity to estimate the effect of employment status on drinking and other outcomes 
during the period.  The identification strategy to support this was to include exogenous market wages in the 
employment equation but exclude them from the within period outcome equations.   However, wages were 
weak instruments for employment and the strategy was not found to be viable.  
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yielding a multinominal logit estimation specification.   
Similarly, the alcohol consumption choice 
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jointly depends on the same set of theoretically relevant variables as employment.     
The multinomial logit model of engaging in each type of drinking behavior conditional 
on a2  and 
a
t2  is  
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In accordance with the theoretical framework, current drinking is a function of past 
employment (Qt), past drinking (At) a proxy for addictive stock and AUD severity, and 
previous treatment (Mt), which has ongoing behavioral effects independent of the stock of 
drinking.  Drinking is dependent on prices and the current wage if employed.  In addition, 
employment has an effect on drinking independent of the wage.  Employment’s effect 
subsumes several possible effects that cannot be separately observed or identified.  
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Employment might be a protective factor as a relatively safe, cue-free environment.  It 
might shift preferences for drinking by increasing self-esteem and reducing general 
anxiety about livelihood.  Alternatively, employment could increase preferences for 
drinking to relieve stress.  
AUD treatment can be one of four mutually exclusive categories, m, where 
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During the period, the individual chooses to consume treatment to alter the long run 
preferences for drinking.   
     Similar to alcohol and employment, the log odds of each treatment choice is  
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The logit model for whether antidepressants are consumed is  
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Finally, the per-period log wage is treated as a continuous variable but does not use the 
same specification as all other per-period outcomes.  The distribution of wages offered in 
the labor market is a function of an individual’s human capital (including all their state 
variables and other characteristics) and of industry wages.  w
t
Z  includes these wages and 
excludes prices for consumption goods contained in 
t
Z .   
w
tX  excludes non-labor 
income.   
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Attrition 
In Chapter 4, I describe the COMBINE sample and note the attrition over time of 
a portion of the participants.  Whether or not an individual leaves the study is likely 
correlated with his employment, alcohol and treatment outcomes.  Therefore, I include an 
equation to estimate the probability of attriting, 1tO  . The equation is estimated jointly 
with the other equations in the model and uses a similar specification as other per-period 
choices as well as permanent and time-varying unobservables.  Attrition is defined as an 
individual not completing all nine possible interviews.  However, it is modeled as though 
it is determined at the end of period t after all other period t behaviors have occurred.  
Thus attrition, tO , is modeled as a function of state variables that have been updated for 
period t+1. 
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An individual’s likelihood contribution is thus 
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where  is the vector of variables that will be estimated. The distribution of t is  
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where L is the number of time varying mass points.  Then 
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And the distribution of the permanent unobserved heterogeneity is  
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Initial Conditions 
The initial period contributions to the likelihood function, )|ePr( 71
ee  ,
)|aPr( 81
aa  , )|mPr( 91
mm   and )|sPr( 101
ss  , show that beginning employment, 
drinking, alcohol treatment, and antidepressant choices are functions of permanent 
heterogeneity.  Since I do not observe an individual’s choices prior to data collection, I 
estimate them within the likelihood function above as reduced form functions of variables 
observed prior to and during period 1 and permanent heterogeneity.  In addition to these 
four initially-observed behaviors, I also considered initial marriage and education status 
which, though static within my study, may be endogenous. The inclusion of exogenous 
marriage did not substantially change any of my primary marginal effects estimates.  
Treating education as exogenous led to large enough differences in estimates that I chose 
to also include an IC equation for years of education which is correlated with initially-
observed behaviors and subsequent behaviors through observed individual 
characteristics, as well as permanent unobserved heterogeneity.    
To achieve consistent causal estimates, I estimate the IC equations with plausibly 
exogenous variables that should influence an individual’s initial state variables, but not 
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be correlated with (i.e., excludable from) subsequent per-period outcomes, conditional on 
the inclusion of the state variables.  Hereafter, I describe the exclusion restrictions I use 
for initial employment, drinking, treatment for AUDs, antidepressants and marriage and 
results of their statistical testing.  Appendix A.9 lists the specific exclusion restrictions.  I 
include the full set of exclusion restrictions in all IC equations.  Appendix B.8-B.12 
provides results for exclusion restrictions. Wald tests of excludability in the per-period 
outcome equations are reported in Appendix Table B.13. Wald tests were calculated 
using the covariance matrix estimated from the unrestricted version of my full DFRE 
model that modeled permanent and time-varying unobserved heterogeneity.  
For initial employment, I use local period 1 construction and manufacturing 
wages and the interaction of current period gas prices, the individual’s travel time to the 
COMBINE study site and Treatment Arm 5 in a multinomial logit model. At least one of 
these wages statistically significantly explains each level of employment relative to “No 
Employment” or between other employment outcomes. A joint test of their significance 
in the IC equation has a p of .045.  None of the historical wages are significant in these 
models and they are jointly insignificant using a Wald test (p=.716).   
As my analyses focus on the periods following study treatment, I observe two 
distinct “initial” periods: the time before randomization and the time during randomized 
treatment. The distinction between the periods is particularly relevant for alcohol.  
Because of the inclusion criteria of the study, everyone in Period 1 experienced weeks 
with problem drinking.  Therefore, I only estimate a logit model of whether problem 
weeks occurred more or less than 50% of the period and do not include covariates 
relevant only to Period 2 (e.g., COMBINE treatment arms).  The key exclusion 
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restrictions are an interaction of average number of unused OP sessions and sliding scale 
fee and whether a parent of the individual also had an AUD X patient age. These are 
individually significant and jointly significant (p=.043). For Period 2 drinking, I use three 
variables: the interaction of average number of unused OP sessions and sliding scale fee, 
the interaction of Arm5, gas price at Time 1, and travel time to study site, and the 
interaction of Arm 7 with gas price at Time 1 and travel time to study site.  At least one 
of these variables is significant for each drinking outcome relative to abstinence.  Note 
then that for initial alcohol, I have four exclusion restrictions across two time periods. I 
test all four of these jointly in the dynamic per period alcohol equation and find them 
insignificant (p=.949). For SH visits in Period 1, I use the manufacturing wage and the 
average number of unused OP sessions interacted with the sliding scale fee.  These are 
individually and jointly significant in the IC equation and jointly insignificant in the per- 
period alcohol treatment equations. For antidepressant use, I use the interaction between 
an indicator of parent AUD and average home price and the construction wage which are 
individually and jointly significant in the IC equation and jointly insignificant in the per-
period antidepressant equation (p=.185). The equation for years of education uses the 
indicator of a parent with AUD and that indicator interacted with patient age as exclusion 
restrictions. I test these individually for five per-period outcome equations: employment, 
alcohol, treatment, antidepressants, and log wages. They are jointly insignificant for all of 
these, although in the log wage equation there was a strong correlation at p=.101. 
 I did not estimate IC models for OPC and RxT during study treatment (Period 2) 
since randomization almost definitionally predicts their consumption with adherence 
(>14 days of pill use and >3 OPC visits) with measurement error being only a marginal 
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source of variation.  Conceptually, randomization is an ideal exclusion.  It is an 
exogenous predictor of OPC and RxT.  The main concerns with relying on randomization 
are participant compliance and attrition from the study which would induce a degree of 
endogeneity. Fortunately, during the four months of treatment, attrition in COMBINE 
and adherence to medication was limited (Anton, 2006). Moreover, among the 
COMBINE economics study participants that I use in this study, no individuals failed to 
meet my minimum threshold for OPC and RxT use. In fact, over 98% of my sample used 
the OPC and RxT more than half of the four month study period. Period 2 COMBINE 
treatment is included in the per-period model as part of the state variables for past 
treatment.  Although randomization (e.g., an actual coin flip) should have no correlation 
with subsequent outcomes other than through the Period 2 treatment, I do include 
indicators of study arms in all IC and per-period equations. I do not estimate a Period 1 
IC for RxT use because only 9 out of 775 individuals consumed any RxT during that 
period.   
Identification for the effects I am analyzing comes from several sources.  First, the 
exclusion restrictions for the initial conditions are the foundation for removing endogeneity 
from estimates for my lagged dependent variables (which are manifested through 
accumulated history of behavior).  Next, both the initial condition equations and the dynamic 
per-period equations include a large set of exogenous prices and environmental 
characteristics which vary over time and across geography.  Though not formally tested, 
prices (and other covariates) from prior periods are excluded from the outcome equations for 
later periods (which use the current values of these variables).  Inasmuch as all of these 
exogenous variables influence outcomes in a given period, the estimates for the state 
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variables (updated based on those outcomes) in later periods are even better identified 
(Arellano and Bond, 1991).  Finally, timing itself is a key component in my empirical model.  
Estimates of the effect of an endogenous history (e.g., representing recent drinking) on a 
current outcome (e.g., employment), should be free of any simultaneity bias (especially when 
based on a theoretical model that has made clear assumptions about the sequence of forward-
looking choices and their subsequent consequences.)   
The identification strategy above is conceptually similar to IV and generalized 
method of moments estimators.  Nonetheless, I focus on estimates that I describe as 
“marginal effects” rather than more typical IV language like “local average treatment effect” 
(LATE). First, LATE is a somewhat narrow term that focuses formally on “treatment effects” 
and does not reflect the dynamic system of multiple related outcomes and the multiple 
sources of identification.  For example, LATE might appropriately apply to coefficient 
estimates of the effect of COMBINE alcohol treatment (instrumented using randomization 
and the same exclusion restrictions I present above) on contemporaneous drinking.  
However, my estimates reflect how changes in such initial (and per-period) behaviors 
influence outcomes over multiple discrete time periods and through all the other related 
behaviors conditional on covariates and unobserved heterogeneity.  More importantly, my 
framework is not to simply instrument treatment.  In fact, actual treatment received is a 
function not only of randomization but of other variables like travel time to the study site and 
gas prices and unobserved heterogeneity (correlated with other outcomes), all of which create 
a reasonable proxy for compliance.    In addition, all of the behaviors besides treatment are 
also modeled as initial conditions such that subsequent outcomes are not simply functions of 
instrumented treatment.   
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Model Specification 
The per-period demand behaviors are functions of endogenous variables representing 
past behaviors.  Since these variables are the main theoretical drivers of outcomes over time, 
I explore alternative specifications of these variables as determinants depending on explicit 
assumptions about the timing of individual behaviors in the theoretical model. The 
specifications also allow for different inclusion of variants of the history of behavior. For 
example, a state variable constructed as the total number of past periods in which an outcome 
occurred such as work experience or total treatment episodes has the appeal of capturing a 
‘dose effect’.  It also crudely captures the effect of having ever experienced a particular 
outcome.  A key drawback though is that the range of its values in the first period following 
COMBINE treatment would be [0, 2] while in the last outcome period (7 periods after 
COMBINE treatment) the range would be [0, 8].  Model estimates will not perfectly reflect 
any effect of the recency of past outcomes.  Two individuals might enter the final outcome 
period with exactly 1 past period of a particular outcome.  The model would be naïve about 
whether their outcome of “1” had occurred in the previous period or 7 periods in the past.    
An alternative to the accumulation stock variable is the sum of periods since a 
particular outcome occurred.  This construction better represents any differential effect of 
recency as well as tenure (i.e., periods since unemployed).  However, it ignores any effect of 
persistence in outcomes or a dose effect.  It should be noted that the accumulation and the 
“time since” state variables are linear combinations of each other when they take on extreme 
values (and when a continuous time covariate is included in the model); having an outcome 
in every past period is a value of 8 for the accumulation stock and a value of 0 for the “time 
since” state.  These state variables are thus fairly equivalent for individuals who tend toward 
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path dependence.  For less path dependent individuals who switch outcomes over time, there 
is no a priori reason to favor either construction.   
A third type of state variable representing past behaviors is rolling lagged outcomes 
limited to a specific timeframe (e.g., outcomet-1 or 


kti
ti
ioutcome
1
). This type of state variable 
has less ‘memory’ and can thus have the same range of values regardless of time period. To 
the extent that longer patterns of past outcomes are important drivers of current outcomes, 
less memory is a drawback. Less memory is arguably a more important consideration in this 
study.  The initial study period is not simply a first wave of data collection but a large shock 
or reset to the course of an individual’s drinking outcomes.  An individual enters treatment at 
a particular point in his natural history (e.g., a nadir or on a long run plateau) expecting some 
change in his trajectory.  There is even more reason to expect a nontrivial initial shock for a 
COMBINE patient.  He has detoxed and remained abstinent for at least 4 days and has a high 
probability of receiving at least one efficacious treatment (only 1/9
th
 received neither active 
medication nor CBI).  Being a randomized controlled trial (RCT), there is an intensity and 
level of engagement above what most treatment seekers experience in non-research 
settings.  In contrast to observational panel data, the course of outcomes over time is 
appropriately kept in the context of "starting with COMBINE treatment" and evolving from 
that point.  In such a context, "8 consecutive periods" of an outcome is meaningful, whereas 
in an observational study, such an accumulation would seem more arbitrary and would 
misrepresent the true but unobserved state variables in the early waves of data collection.   
 Given the potential advantages of each of the three state variable constructions, I 
estimate models with combinations of each. However, many possible combinations were 
either not possible or not computationally feasible due to multicollinearity.  There simply is 
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not enough variation within and across individuals to support constructing state variables 
more than one or two ways at a time.  This is particularly problematic in the case of the 
mutually exclusive multinomial outcomes I use for employment, alcohol use, and alcohol 
treatment whose state variables are already partially correlated by definition.  A similar 
problem exists when interacting the state variables for drinking history and alcohol treatment 
history. In almost every case, these saturate the models. In the few cases where “cherry-
picked” interactions are able to be estimated, their impact on overall marginal effects is 
negligible.  
Based on feasibility and model fit, my preferred model is one that uses one state 
variable for each unique multinomial outcome (ignoring the reference category). For all 
outcomes except for alcohol treatment, I use on the total number of past periods in which the 
outcome occurred. For alcohol treatment, model fit for per-period treatment choices is 
improved with “time since” variables. I do not use any state variables that are indicators of 
behaviors in the last period only. With the exception of slightly improved fit when looking at 
outcomes over time in the first one or two periods after COMBINE treatment, lagged state 
variables decreased overall fit. Final model specification, coefficient estimates, and standard 
errors are available in Appendix Tables B.1-B.12.  
  
 
 
CHAPTER VI. RESULTS 
Estimates and Fit 
I estimate a model of employment and alcohol use outcomes during the 2.5 years 
following treatment for alcohol dependence in the COMBINE randomized control trial. In 
this model I jointly estimate equations for per-period (every 4 month) employment status, 
conditional log wages, drinking status, treatment for alcohol dependence, pharmacotherapy 
for mental health, and attrition from the study.  Along with these per-period outcomes the 
model includes equations for initial employment, drinking status, and self-help therapy for 
alcohol dependence (occurring immediately before and during COMBINE treatment) as well 
as lifetime years of education at the beginning of the study.  The correlated structure of the 
errors in these equations incorporates permanent and time varying unobserved individual 
heterogeneity that is modeled using Discrete Factor Random Effects (DFRE) method.   
 
Model Fit 
To assess the accuracy of my model, I compared actual sample values of outcomes to 
those predicted by the empirical model for the analysis periods following COMBINE 
treatment. Predictions from my model are produced by multiplying coefficient estimates by 
observed explanatory variable values except for the endogenous right-hand side state 
variables described above. Rather than original sample values, these state variables are 
updated during each period of the model based on the previous period’s predictions (and 
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initial values). Also, the empirical predictions account for unobserved heterogeneity which is 
an important part of estimation. Given the estimated, discrete distribution of unobserved 
heterogeneity, individuals in the simulated sample draw both their permanent type as well as 
the shock each period. Appendix Tables C.1 and C.2 show the comparisons between these 
simulated values and the observed outcomes. Row 1 of Appendix Table C.1 shows the 
observed values for employment, log wage, alcohol and alcohol treatment outcomes. Moving 
down from Row 1 are simulated values based on incrementing the points of support for 
permanent and time-varying heterogeneity. The final model uses seven and five mass points 
for permanent and time-varying heterogeneity, respectively. I increased mass points as long 
as the overall likelihood did not decrease and the weight for any given mass point was not 
less than .01. For all outcomes, simulated values are very close to observed values, 
suggesting strong model fit. All simulated values are within one percentage point of observed 
values. Appendix Table C.2 shows model fit over time. Simulated values have a narrower 
range than observed values. Nonetheless, they do track the overall direction of movement in 
observed outcomes over time. Appendix Figures E.1, E.2, and E.3 illustrate model fit over 
time for employment, alcohol consumption, and alcohol treatment consumption.  
 
Simulations for Marginal Effects and Policy Experiment Effects 
 Both marginal effects and policy experiment effects are presented two ways---first, as 
the average effects across all periods after COMBINE treatment and second, as the effects by 
time since the end of COMBINE treatment.  For some relationships being evaluated, I focus 
on the aggregated over time outcome while for others the long run outcomes or trend make 
more sense.  Estimates of marginal effects and policy experiment effects rely on a similar 
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method.  A ‘margin’ must be defined, e.g., a one-unit increase in an independent variable or 
the alternative categories of a multinomial variable.  This margin must have a meaningful 
relationship with the outcome of interest in terms of the theoretical model, their sequencing, 
and the time frame of outcome measurement.  The margin should not be so extreme in 
magnitude that it does not make sense within the empirical model and the identification 
strategy.  I estimate the effect of three alternative behavioral outcomes on predicted model 
behaviors. These include:  
1. Alternative drinking outcomes during COMBINE treatment (in Period 2): Abstinent, 
Non-Problem Drinking Only (NPD), Problem Drinking <50% of Period (PDL), and 
Problem Drinking >50% of Period (PDH).   
2. Alternative one period lagged employment outcomes: Not employed, Employed 
<90% of period, Employed Part-time >90% of Period, and Employed Full-time >90% 
of Period. 
3. Each of the nine COMBINE treatment arms: Medication Management (MM) Only, 
Acamprosate + MM, Naltrexone + MM, Acamprosate + Naltrexone + MM, MM + 
CBI, Acamprosate + MM + CBI, Naltrexone +MM + CBI, and CBI only. 
 
To implement these (and also later to perform policy experiments) I use the same 
simulation procedure used to evaluate model fit, I change, however, the value of the relevant 
state variables in the relevant time periods.  For example, for the marginal effects of drinking 
outcomes during COMBINE treatment, I adjust the drinking history state variables so that 
individuals enter period 3 (the first period after COMBINE treatment) with a history that 
reflects the imposed period 2 outcome.  After this adjustment, outcomes are simulated for 
61 
 
periods 3-9 as normal, with no more artificial adjustments.  Period 2 drinking affects 
subsequent outcomes both through the initial changes in state variables (which remains as a 
+/-1 in the state variables over all time periods) and through cumulative secondary effects.  
For example, abstinence in period 2 means that subsequent drinking state variables are lower 
by 1.  In addition, abstinence in period 3 is now likelier (due to the adjusted state variables), 
leading to drinking state variables that favor abstinence even more in period 4, etc.   
I repeat this step for the remaining three drinking outcomes and calculate pairwise 
mean differences in periods 3-9 outcomes between all four period 2 drinking outcomes.  In 
order to test the statistical significance of differences, I use parametric bootstrapping in 
which I repeatedly perturb the coefficients from the variance-covariance matrix estimated by 
the DFRE 100 times.   
During each period from 3 to 9, the employment state variables are changed to reflect 
the imposed employment outcome in the preceding period. For example, for the one-period 
effect of no employment, current period outcomes are simulated  using state variables that 
were updated based on prior period outcomes except that the employment state variables are 
revised to reflect no employment in the previous period. The original employment state 
variables are preserved to be used for end-of-period updating. After current period outcomes 
are simulated, state variables are updated normally except for the employment state variables. 
The no employment-adjusted state variables are discarded and the original employment state 
variables are used. This maintains the “per period” nature of the experiment and avoids the 
artificial accumulation of imposed lagged employment outcomes.  
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Marginal Effects 
In Appendix Table D.1, I present the marginal effects of drinking in COMBINE 
treatment on subsequent outcomes. Any drinking (NPD, PDL, and PDH) relative to 
abstinence during the COMBINE treatment has a dramatic negative impact on subsequent 
abstinence, ranging from 15.4 percentage points for PDL to 20.4 percentage points for NPD 
(p<.001 for all three cases). For PDH versus abstinence, 17.0 percentage point decrease in 
abstainers corresponds to an 18.1 percentage point increase in subsequent PDH but virtually 
no increase in PDL. Likewise, PDL versus abstinence during COMBINE treatment has a 
relatively small impact on PDH (<4 percentage points) and only a 1 percentage point increase 
in NPD.   NPD relative to abstinence increases subsequent NPD by 13.7 percentage points 
and PDL by 9.8 percentage points, but has limited impact on PDH. Any drinking relative to 
abstinence resulted in a decrease in log wages of .045 to .06 (p<.001 for all). 
Focusing on abstinence in the individual periods following COMBINE, non-
abstinence drinking outcomes during COMBINE treatment have greater effects in the first 
one to three periods than in later periods (see Appendix Tables D.3-D.8 or Figure 4 in 
Appendix E). For example in Appendix D.4, NPD reduces abstinence in Period 3 by 12.5 
percentage points and in Period 4 by 16.7 percentage points. In Periods 7, 8, and 9, the effect 
has reached a steady state of around -25 percentage points. A similar pattern is seen for PDH 
and PDL, although both of those reach a steady marginal difference in abstinence of around -
17 percentage points.  
Only heavy drinking outcomes during COMBINE treatment have measureable and 
significant effects on subsequent employment. PDL increases unemployment by 3.8 
percentage points (p<.001) and PDH by 1.9 percentage points (p=.075). They both increases 
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the < 90% employment outcome by about 3.8 percentage points (p<.001). Greater than 90% 
full-time employment is 7.5 percentage points lower for PDL and 5.6 percentage points 
lower for PDH (p<.01 for both). (See Appendix Table D.1.) From Appendix E Figure 5 
effects on employment are initially small and reach their largest size by the later periods. The 
magnitudes in the later periods are roughly equivalent in size to the overall post-treatment 
averages described in Appendix Table D.1.   
Comparisons to marginal effects of drinking in Time 2 without controlling for unobserved 
heterogeneity 
I compare the estimates of the marginal effects of Time 2 drinking outcomes, based 
on models with and without UH (Appendix Tables D.1 and D.2). Whereas we found a 20.4 
percentage point (pp) decrease in long-run abstinence for NPD in a model that accounts for 
UH, in the models without UH, there was a 28.8 pp decrease. The no-UH models 
overestimate the negative impact of NPD on long-run abstinence by 8 pp. Similarly, the no-
UH model overestimated the increase in long-run NPD and PDL.  Comparing among the 
drinking outcomes at Time 2, the UH model would finds positive effects on long-run 
abstinence of problem drinking (both PDL and PDH) versus NPD during the treatment 
period. However, the model without UH finds PDH relative to NPD to be a significant -6.8 
pp on long-run abstinence.  Changes in employment outcomes following COMBINE 
treatment were overestimated by the no-UH model by when comparing PDL and PDH to 
abstinence. For example, PDH has a negative effect of 3.8 pp on employed full time >90% 
for the UH model, while the no-UH model estimate was a 5.6 pp decrease. The no-UH 
models also underestimates the impact of NPD at Time 2 (v. abstinence) on log wages, 
finding no effect. No UH estimates for PDL and PDH are slightly higher than UH estimates.  
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Marginal effects of the alternative COMBINE treatment arms 
For the COMBINE treatment arms, the approach was similar to that for COMBINE 
treatment alcohol in that the treatment history variables were adjusted to reflect the 
imposition of one of nine treatment arms. However, since my model includes treatment arms 
as time invariant indicator variables, when estimating outcomes in periods 3-9, these also 
were updated.  In the first period following COMBINE treatment, all of the treatment arms 
except for Medication Management Only (MMO) predict abstinence for approximately 24% 
of the population (see Appendix Figure E.6). A similar pattern is seen for PDH. Following 
the first post-COMBINE treatment period, Acamprosate + Naltrexone + Medication 
Management (ANMM) is the arm that shows the greatest difference over time in drinking 
outcomes. The highest levels of abstinence are achieved by this arm as well as the lowest 
levels of PDH over the remaining periods. All of the increase in abstinence and decrease in 
PDH occur by the sixth period following COMBINE treatment, after which the population 
averages remain stable. As shown in Appendix Table D.11, ANMM increased abstinence 
overall by 8.3 percentage points (p=.016) relative to Acamprosate + Medication Management 
+ Cognitive Behavioral Intervention (AMMC) and 8.8 percentage points (p=.009) relative to 
Naltrexone + Medication Management + Cognitive Behavioral Intervention (NMMC). 
Though predicted abstinence was higher for ANMM than all other treatment arms, 
magnitudes were smaller and were not significant. Although ANMM predicted consistently 
lower rates of PDH over time, the only significant effect was relative to NMMC (-7.5 
percentage points, p=.01).  Cognitive Behavioral Intervention Only (CBI) decreased 
predicted use of pharmacotherapy relative to all other treatment arms. These differences were 
not significant for MMO, AMMC, and Medication Management + Cognitive Behavioral 
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Intervention (MMC). Naltrexone + Medication Management predicted the lowest use of any 
treatment, with all differences being significant at the .05 level or better.  
 
Marginal effects of lagged employment status.  
Being employed (<90% of period, part time >90% of period, or full time >90% of 
period) in the previous period predicts a 6-9 pp decrease in being unemployed in the current 
period (all significant at the .001 level). Being employed full time >90% of the period in the 
previous period predicts a 13.3 pp increase in being employed full time >90% of the period 
in the current period. The effect of one-period lagged employment on drinking outcomes in 
the current period is small. Employed <90% of period led to a 2.7 percentage point decrease 
in PDH (p=.007) and a 2.3 percentage points increase in abstinence (p=.006). Employed 
>90% of the period part-time) decreased PDH by 1.5 percentage points (p<.001). Lagged 
employment status had little notable impact on current treatment use.. (See Appendix Table 
D.9.) 
 
Comparisons to marginal effects of lagged employment status without controlling for 
unobserved heterogeneity 
Estimates of the marginal effects on employment status of lagged employment from 
the no-UH model were very similar to those of the UH models. Marginal effects of the 
lagged employment outcomes relative to each other were virtually the same between the UH 
and no-UH models. In the no-UH model, being employed >90% of the previous period (part-
time or full-time) had large and significant effects on the current period log wage (.068 and 
.076, respectively). However, when controlling for UH, the effect of full-time employment 
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was smaller (.047).   The UH model estimated a positive .026 (p<.01) effect on log wages of 
being employed <90% of the period while the no UH model found no effect.  (See Appendix 
Tables D.9 and D.10.)  
 
Policy Simulations 
The first policy simulations involve changes in the prices of gasoline, beer, and 
Naltrexone. These simulations increment prices by 5 and 10% and compare outcomes over 
periods 3-9 to simulate outcomes using the original prices on which the models are 
estimated. For Naltrexone, there is virtually no effect and the results are not presented in this 
study. Although beer prices had the same direction of effect as gasoline prices, none of the 
results are significant and the magnitudes are smaller than gasoline prices. These results are 
not reported in this study. The second type of policy simulation focuses on increasing 
adherence to different alcohol treatment and increasing the dosage in terms of four-month 
periods. Forcing adherence both in COMBINE treatment (Period = 2) and by changing the 
thresholds of measurement during per period outcomes does not change outcomes in any 
meaningful way and are not reported in this study. 
Marginal Effects of Increased Gasoline Prices 
For this experiment, I vary the existing gasoline prices, increasing them by 5 and 10% 
to proxy for the potential policy of increasing gasoline taxes. Ten percent higher gasoline 
prices predict 3.5 percentage points higher abstinence (p=.005). This increase in abstinence 
corresponds to a 1.4 pp decrease in PDL (p=.033) and a 2.2 pp decrease in PDH (p=.031). 
Changes in gas prices have no effect on PDH. Though significantly different, the effects for a 
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5% increase in gas prices are of a lesser magnitude than those for the 10% increase. (See 
Appendix Table D.14 and Appendix Figure E.9). 
Marginal Effects of Extended Pharmacotherapy  
The motivation for this experiment is based around the conventions and 
recommended dosages for Naltrexone and other RxTs for AUDs. Currently common practice 
for Naltrexone is a 60-90 day prescription which corresponds to the length in most RCTs.  
However, given the nature of AUDs as “chronic relapsing disorders” and the fact that the 
mechanisms of action of these modern RxTs is to decrease craving and “maintain recovery,” 
a relevant consideration for primary care physicians and addition science is the extension or 
ongoing use of these medications. This experiment also has relevance for alternative RxT 
delivery systems. Vivitrol was approved by the FDA in 2005. It is injectable Naltrexone and 
delivers a dose lasting 30 days, and there is exploration into longer term injections. In this 
policy experiment, during any given period in which an individual consumed 
pharmacotherapy, I impose RxT as their outcome in the next period regardless of what they 
actually consumed. Their state variables going into the next period are incremented 
according to this. Whenever this “second period of RxT’ was imposed, it did not trigger a 
third RxT in the following period. However, I did record actual treatment outcomes during 
periods in which RxT was imposed artificially. If the actual second period treatment for an 
individual was RxT, then they did get the third period RxT.  
 The two-period RxT rule has an unequivocally positive effect on drinking outcomes. 
Abstinence increases by 4.6 pp (p<.001). PDH decreases by 2.6 pp (p=.005). There are small 
and not significant differences in NPD and PDL. There is no effect on employment for this 
experiment. As expected, alcohol treatment use is changed by the experiment. Notably, the 
68 
 
decrease in SH visits and OPC are not large (.03 and .01, respectively). Correspondingly, the 
increase in RxT periods replaced periods with no treatment. (-12.5 pp, p<.001). Interestingly, 
antidepressant use increases by 3.5pp (p<.001). (See Appendix Table D.15.) 
  
 
CHAPTER VII. CONCLUSION 
 
In this study, I estimate the direct impact of drinking and treatment outcomes from a 
randomized control trial (RCT) of therapies for Alcohol Use Disorders (AUDs) on 
subsequent drinking and employment outcomes.  The trial, COMBINE, randomized patients 
into one of nine treatment arms to study the effect of two pharmacotherapies and a cognitive 
behavioral intervention. The original COMBINE study found inconsistent and only weak 
effects of the different therapies on short-term drinking outcomes. In this study, I use a larger 
set of data from the COMBINE economics study that collected longitudinal outcomes for an 
additional three years following a trial. In addition to drinking, the supplemental data 
collection included employment outcomes and ongoing therapies for AUDs that were not 
part of the original trial therapies. I estimate a dynamic model of changes in drinking and 
employment outcomes over time that incorporated the role of treatment seeking and 
disentangles the endogeneity of simultaneous outcomes. I achieve this by estimating the 
outcomes jointly using the Discrete Factor Random Effects (DFRE) method and modeled 
permanent and time-varying unobserved heterogeneity. While these data are not completely 
representative of all individuals with AUDs, the goals of this study went beyond evaluating 
the COMBINE trial therapies to better understand how outcomes evolve over time. 
COMBINE provide rich and unique data which allow not only a revisit to COMBINE 
treatment, but also a window into the interaction of employment, drinking, and treatment 
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choices.  It also provides an opportunity to explore the effects of policies targeting a 
population with AUDs.  
 My primary results are that drinking outcomes during treatment (in this case, the 
COMBINE trial) have large and lasting effects on subsequent drinking, though the effects 
stabilize over the long term. If abstinence was achieved during the trial, then the probability 
of being abstinent in the periods following the trial is at least 0.15. In evaluating the effects 
of non-problem drinking (NPD) and problem drinking <50% of period (PDL) as treatment 
outcomes, care must be taken when the long-run outcome of interest is abstinence. PDL 
during treatment is associated with 5.0 percentage point (pp) higher abstinence relative to 
NPD during treatment. However, it appears that a portion of non-problem drinkers at the time 
of treatment, though not abstinent, maintain NPD. In contrast, PDL at the time of treatment 
does not lead to future NPD and sees a 0.119 increase in the probability of PDH. Problem 
drinking relative to abstinence resulted in modest increases to not being employed and 
sizable decreases to being employed full-time >90% of the period (4-6 pp). Wages were 
higher for those who achieved abstinence during COMBINE treatment on the order $.90 - 
$1.05 per hour.  When comparing these results to the same marginal effects from a naïve 
model that ignores unobserved heterogeneity, I find that the latter estimates are generally 
biased. The no-UH model underestimates the impact of drinking outcomes during treatment 
on subsequent drinking and overestimates the effects on employment outcomes. 
Not being employed is associated with less abstinence and slightly more problem 
drinking.  Full time employment over 90% of the period leads to a slight increase in problem 
drinking greater than 50% of the period when compared to being employed part time or 
<90% of the period. In many observational studies, there is a commonly found association 
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between problem drinking and employment outcomes. Moreover, a common 
conceptualization of this is that individuals that are both high functioning and drink heavily 
due to some unobserved characteristic (e.g. a risk-seeking personality or a social elixir). 
However, in this study, by modeling permanent unobserved heterogeneity, I exclude such 
characteristics in an attempt to isolate the effect of employment on drinking. The period-to-
period effect of employment on levels of drinking is likely due to an income effect. It is also 
important to note, though, that the time frame used in my study reflect a narrow range of 
employment outcomes and heavy drinking behaviors. Over a longer time horizon, the 
positive effect of employment on PDH is not likely sustainable by individuals. 
 I also simulate how increases in the prices of gasoline and beer and decreases in the 
price of Naltrexone might influence drinking outcomes. Although changes in beer price of 5 
and 10% had the correct sign, they are not significant for changing any outcome.  It is of note 
that beer prices may not reflect the products most used by every drinker in the COMBINE 
study and thus understate the influence of prices on consumption behavior. Changes in the 
price of Naltrexone had virtually no effect on outcomes. It is arguable that the price of 
Naltrexone may be undetectable for both theoretical and empirical reasons. Given that I do 
not observe insurance status, nor what individuals actually paid for their medications, it is 
possible that the proxy price for Naltrexone is simply not relevant. Similar to beer prices, 
though, gas prices are arguably a better proxy for real costs faced by these patients in the 
quarter and community in which they reside. Moreover, during this time period, gas prices 
are highly variable both across geographic location and over time (2001-2007). In contrast to 
beer prices, gas prices have a clear and consistent income effect across all alcohol outcomes. 
The income effect from changes in beer prices is variable depending on how much someone 
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drinks. Gas prices relate to employment in a different way than beer prices. While someone 
chooses to work in order to drink, gas prices affect both the cost of general consumption as 
well as the cost of employment (leading to a lower real wage income).  Gas prices also 
influence the cost of treatment regardless of insurance status. Ten percent higher gasoline 
prices predicted 3.5 percentage points higher abstinence (p=.004).  
 Returning to RxT as a policy lever for drinking, rather than relying on price effects, I 
imposed a two-period (~8 months) minimum for any RxT.  The two-period RxT rule had an 
unequivocally positive effect on drinking outcomes. Abstinence increased by 4.6 pp (p<.001) 
and PDH decreased by 2.6 pp (p=.005).  This experiment relies in part on the fact that I 
defined my treatment variables such that RxT superseded SH and OPC.  It is thus important 
to note that this artificial the increase in treatment came primarily at the expense of “No 
Treatment” periods; displacement of SH and OPC periods was minimal. This extension 
reflects a key policy and clinical opportunity since the conventions and recommended 
dosages for Naltrexone and other RxTs for AUDs are currently 60-90 day prescription.   
However, given the nature of AUDs as “chronic relapsing disorders” and the fact that the 
mechanisms of action of these modern RxTs is to decrease craving and “maintain recovery,” 
a relevant consideration for primary care physicians and addition science is the extension or 
ongoing use of these medications.  
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Appendix A. Main Tables 
 
Appendix Table A.1. Determination of Sample 
Criteria 
 
Number of Individuals 
in Sample 
Number of 
Observations  
Randomized into COMBINE Study Groups 
 
1,383 
 Completed COMBINE Study Treatment 
 
1,226 
 
Completed COMBINE Study Treatment in the 9 Continuing Sites 
 
991 
 Participated in 3 Year Economic Data Collection 
 
792 
 
    Time Periods 
   0 - Prior to Randomization 
 
775 775 
1 - Randomization to End of Study Treatment 
 
775 775 
2 - After Study Treatment - Data Collection Only 
 
775 775 
3 - After Study Treatment - Data Collection Only 
 
775 775 
4 - After Study Treatment - Data Collection Only 
 
775 775 
5 - After Study Treatment - Data Collection Only 
 
745 745 
6 - After Study Treatment - Data Collection Only 
 
704 704 
7 - After Study Treatment - Data Collection Only 
 
650 650 
8 - After Study Treatment - Data Collection Only 
 
570 570 
    Final Analysis Sample Time 3-9 
 
775 4,994 
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Appendix Table A.2. Variable Definitions 
Variable Detail 
Employment Outcomes 
 
 
Not Employed Reported no days of work during entire period. 
 
Employed Less Than 90% of Period Employed less than 90% of the length of the period 
 
Employed Part Time > 90% of Period Employed more than 90% of the length of the period, < 35 hours per week 
 
Employed Full Time > 90% of Period Employed more than 90% of the length of the period, ≥ 35 hours per week 
   
Current Alcohol Consumption Outcomes 
Note: Problem drinking is defined as a week in which at least one day of Problem Drinking occurred (5+ drinks for men, 
4+ for women) or in which 14+ total drinks were consumed. 
   
 
Abstinent No days of drinking were reported during the period. 
 
Non-Problem Drinking Only 
Days of drinking were reported during the period, but no problem drinking occurred. Problem drinking includes either a 
week in which a problem drinking day occurred (5+ drinks for men, 4+ for women) or a week in which 14 or more 
drinks were consumed. 
 
Problem Drinking Less than 50% of Period At least one problem drinking week occurred but not more than 50% of the period were problem drinking weeks.   
 
Problem Drinking More than 50% of Period More than 50% of the period were problem drinking weeks.   
   
Current Treatment for Managing Drinking 
 Note:  Outcomes were counted for a period when quantities were above specific levels: Self-Help Visits - >7 in period, 
Outpatient Counseling Visits - > 3 in period, Pharmacotherapy Consumed to Prevent or Control Drinking - >14 days in 
period.  Pharmacotherapies include Naltrexone, Acamprosate, Disulfiram, Quetiapine, Topiramate, Gabapentin and 
Neurontin when prescribed for alcohol use. 
   
 
No Treatment No treatment modalities were reported during the period 
 
Self Help Visits Only self-help visits were reported during the period 
 
Outpatient Therapy (No RxT) Outpatient counseling visits or outpatient counseling and self-help visits were reported in the period. 
 
RxT Pharmacotherapy reported during the period (may also include OP or SH). 
   
Antidepressants 
Use of antidepressants >14 days in period. Antidepressants include Paxil, Effexor, Fluoxetine, Celexa, Lexapro, Zoloft, 
Serzone, Wellbutrin, and/or Unspecified Antidepressant.                                                                  (Continued on next page) 
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Appendix Table A.2. Variable Definitions (Continued) 
Variable Detail 
State Variables  
 
 
# of periods employed <90% of period Number of periods employed less than 90% of period 
 
# of periods employed part-time >90% of period Number of periods employed part-time for greater than 90% of period, <35 hours per week 
 
# of periods employed full-time >90% of period  Number of periods employed full-time for greater than 90% of period, ≥ 35 hours per week 
 
--- --- 
 
# Periods Non-Problem Drinking Only Number of periods with drinking reported, but no Problem Drinking days. 
 
# Periods Problem Drinking <50% of Period 
Number of periods where at least one problem drinking week occurred but not more than 50% of the period were 
problem drinking weeks.  
 
# Periods Problem Drinking >50% of Period Number of periods where more than 50% of the period were problem drinking weeks.   
 
--- --- 
 
# Periods Since Pharmacotherapy for Alcohol Use Number of periods since period with pharmacotherapy for alcohol use 
 
# Periods Since Outpatient Therapy (No RxT) Number of periods since period with outpatient therapy (where no RxT was reported) 
 
# Periods Since Self-help Visits for Alcohol Use Number of periods since period with self-help visit for alcohol use 
 
# Periods Antidepressants Number of periods with antidepressant use 
 
Notes: Employment, Self-help visits and Outpatient Counseling visits were reported in the aggregate for the entire period.  Drinking and pharmacotherapies were reported for each day in the period.   
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Appendix Table A.3. Sample Summary Statistics at Time of Enrollment in COMBINE Trial 
Variable      Mean (Std. Dev.) 
N 
  
775 
Female 
  
.302 
  
(.459) 
Age 
  
44.9 
  
(10.4) 
Black 
  
.106 
  
(.308) 
Other Race 
  
.046 
  
(.211) 
Married of Living with Partnera 
  
.455 
  
(.498) 
Divorced, Separated, or Widoweda 
  
.250 
  
(.433) 
High School Degreea 
  
.526 
  
(.500) 
Undergraduate Degreea 
  
.200 
  
(.400) 
Graduate Degreea 
  
.206 
    
(.405) 
Notes: a. Although marriage and education are collected over time, less than 1% of the sample reports any changes in them. 
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Appendix Table A.4. Employment Proportions (St. Err.):  By Time Period and Aggregated for Full Analysis Samplea 
  
  Time  
 
Proportion of Individuals  in 
Employment Category During 
One or More Periods 
 
Proportion of Individuals 
Who Remain in Employment 
Category During All Periods 
Variable   1 2b 3 4 5 6 7 8 9   All Periods 
Periods  
3-9c 
  Periods 3-9c 
N 
 
775 775 775 775 775 745 704 650 570 
 
5769 4994 
 
4994 
                
Not Employed  .124 .159 .132 .170 .178 .173 .169 .172 .207 
 
.361 .332 
 
.080 
 
(.012) (.013) (.012) (.014) (.014) (.014) (.014) (.015) (.017) (.020) (.020) (.017) 
Employed Less Than 
90% of Period 
 .321 .164 .223 .169 .163 .177 .168 .148 .139 
 
.609 .496 
 
.009 
 
(.017) (.013) (.015) (.013) (.013) (.014) (.014) (.014) (.014) (.020) (.021) (.018) 
Employed Part Time > 
90% of Period 
 .119 .135 .119 .120 .124 .128 .128 .132 .121 
 
.351 .302 
 
.023 
 
(.012) (.012) (.012) (.012) (.012) (.012) (.013) (.013) (.014) (.020) (.019) (.017) 
Employed Full Time > 
90% of Period 
 .502 .542 .526 .541 .535 .522 .536 .548 .533 
 
.772 .753 
 
.292 
  
(.018) (.018) (.018) (.018) (.018) (.018) (.019) (.020) (.021)   (.018) (.018)   (.016) 
Notes: a. Sample includes individuals who did not complete all interview waves.  b. Time period 2 covers from study randomization through the end of COMBINE study treatment.  c. Represents 
outcomes of individuals during the period after the COMBINE treatment ended.   
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Appendix Table A.5. Proportions and Conditional Proportions of Period (St. Err) of Drinking Outcomes: By Time and Aggregated for Full Analysis Samplea 
 
Time 
Proportion of Individuals  in 
Drinking Category During One 
or More Periods 
Variable 1 2b 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 All Periods Periods 3-9c 
N 775 775 775 775 775 745 704 650 570 6544 4994 
Abstinent 
0.000 0.210 0.205 0.248 0.271 0.277 0.320 0.332 0.353 0.508 0.479 
(0.000) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.018) (0.020) (0.018) (0.018) 
Non-Problem Drinking Only 
0.000 0.105 0.084 0.099 0.097 0.086 0.099 0.103 0.104 0.293 0.261 
(0.000) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.016) (0.016) 
Problem Drinking Less than 50% of Period 
0.232 0.316 0.283 0.213 0.204 0.217 0.188 0.198 0.196 0.719 0.579 
(0.015) (0.017) (0.016) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.018) 
Problem Drinking More than 50% of Period 
0.768 0.369 0.428 0.440 0.428 0.420 0.393 0.366 0.347 0.863 0.634 
(0.015) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.020) (0.012) (0.017) 
Notes: a. Sample includes individuals who did not complete all interview waves.  b. Time period 2 covers from study randomization through the end of COMBINE study treatment.  c. 
Represents drinking outcomes of individuals during the period after the COMBINE treatment ended.   
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Appendix Table A.6. Proportions (St. Err) of Self-help (SH), Outpatient Counseling (OPC) and Pharmacotherapy (RxT) to Support Recovery: By Time and Aggregated for Full Analysis Samplea 
 
Time 
Proportion of Individuals  in 
Treatment Category During One 
or More Periods 
Variable 1 2b 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 All Periods Periods 3-9c 
N 775 775 775 775 775 745 704 650 570 6544 4994 
SH Visits (>7 in Period)  
.067 .195 .239 .206 .221 .221 .227 .234 .235 .414 .385 
(.009) (.014) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.016) (.017) (.018) (.018) (.017) 
Outpatient Therapy (>3 in Period) 
.058 .552 .106 .075 .092 .089 .074 .077 .091 .662 .283 
(.008) (.018) (.011) (.009) (.010) (.010) (.010) (.010) (.012) (.017) (.016) 
RxTd (>14 days of Period) .012 .665 .089 .077 .089 .083 .080 .097 .096 .703 .182 
(.004) (.017) (.010) (.010) (.010) (.010) (.010) (.012) (.012) (.016) (.014) 
                        
No Treatment 
.876 .174 .661 .712 .693 .687 .693 .671 .654 .957 .863 
(.012) (.014) (.017) (.016) (.017) (.017) (.017) (.018) (.020) (.007) (.012) 
SH Visits 
.061 .026 .170 .164 .156 .170 .180 .177 .182 .355 .337 
(.009) (.006) (.014) (.013) (.013) (.014) (.015) (.015) (.016) (.017) (.017) 
Outpatient Therapy (No RxT) 
.058 .262 .092 .065 .074 .070 .061 .066 .077 .465 .254 
(.008) (.016) (.010) (.009) (.009) (.009) (.009) (.010) (.011) (.018) (.016) 
RxT  
.005 .538 .077 .059 .077 .072 .065 .086 .086 .591 .161 
(.003) (.018) (.010) (.008) (.010) (.010) (.009) (.011) (.012) (.018) (.013) 
Notes: a. Sample includes individuals who did not complete all interview waves.  b. Time period 2 covers from study randomization through the end of COMBINE study treatment. Note consumption 
of outpatient therapy and Rxt was therefore higher than in any other period. c. Represents self-sought treatment of individuals during the period after COMBINE treatment ended.  d. Includes 
Naltrexone, Acamprosate, Disulfiram, Quetiapine, Topiramate, Gabapentin and Neurontin when prescribed for alcohol use. 
  
 
8
0 
Appendix Table A.7. Use of Antidepressant (St. Err.):  By Time Period and Aggregated for Full Analysis Samplea 
  
  Time  
 
Proportion of Individuals  with any 
antidepressant use During One or More 
Periods 
Variable   1 2b 3 4 5 6 7 8 9   All Periods Periods 3-9c 
N 
 
775 775 775 775 775 745 704 650 570 
 
5769 4994 
              
Any use of 
Antidepressants  
.048 .063 .114 .138 .165 .168 .186 .182 .184 
 
.293 .233 
 
(.008) (.009) (.011) (.012) (.013) (.014) (.015) (.015) (.016) (.006) (.005) 
Notes: a. Sample includes individuals who did not complete all interview waves.  b. Time period 2 covers from study randomization through the end of COMBINE study treatment.  c. 
Represents outcomes of individuals during the period after the COMBINE treatment ended.   
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Appendix Table A.8. Transition Probabilities in Primary Outcome Categories within Individuals of Over Timea 
. 
 
Proportion of Individuals in Outcome Category in Period t + 1 Conditional on Category in Period t 
  
      
Outcome Category in Period t (%) 
 
Not Employed Employed Less Than 90% of Period 
Employed Part Time > 90% of 
Period 
Employed Full Time > 90% of 
Period 
      Not Employed (16.4) 
 
0.771 0.163 0.033 0.033 
Employed Less Than 90% of Period (17.4) 
 
0.168 0.393 0.141 0.298 
Employed Part Time > 90% of Period  (12.6) 
 
0.051 0.175 0.590 0.184 
Employed Full Time > 90% of Period (53.5) 
 
0.015 0.102 0.038 0.845 
      
  
Abstinent Non-Problem Drinking Only 
Problem Drinking, Less than 
50% of Period 
Problem Drinking, More than 50% 
of Period 
      
Abstinent (26.4) 
 
0.813 0.057 0.128 0.002 
Non-Problem Drinking Only (9.6) 
 
0.153 0.504 0.305 0.038 
Problem Drinking, Less than 50% of Period 
(23.3)  
0.143 0.073 0.560 0.223 
Problem Drinking, More than 50% of Period 
(40.8)  
0.008 0.018 0.271 0.703 
      
  
No Treatment Modality Self Help Visits Outpatient Therapy (No RxT) RxT 
      No Treatment Modality (59.5) 
 
0.895 0.049 0.038 0.018 
Self Help Visits (14.5) 
 
0.195 0.711 0.075 0.019 
Outpatient Therapy (No RxT) (8.7) 
 
0.445 0.194 0.299 0.062 
RxT (8.2) 
 
0.447 0.124 0.055 0.374 
            
Notes: a. The sample is 775 individuals.  Calculations are based on 4,994 observations. The t periods are 1 through 7; t + 1 are 2 through 8. b. Problem drinking includes either a week in which a Problem 
Drinking day occurred (5+ drinks for men, 4+ for woman) or a week in which 14 or more drinks were consumed.  
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Appendix Table A.9. Means and Std. Dev. Of Model Covariates, State Variables and Exclusion Restrictions 
  
Mean Std. Dev. 
Per Period Time Varying Covariates, All Equations 
  
 
Construction Wage  (Weekly Income/40) 10.058 1.417 
 
Manufacturing Wage  (Weekly Income/40) 24.285 4.507 
 
Price of Fluoxetine 16.254 4.844 
 
Price of Naltrexone 93.869 15.100 
 
Price of Beer 8.419 0.834 
 
((Average # of Unused OP Sessions)/ (# People receiving or claiming to need specialty treatment for AUDS))*1000 
91.608 13.334 
 
Price of Gasoline 2.409 1.233 
 
Average Home Price/100,000 1.938 0.352 
 
Non-Labor Income/1000 2.029 1.038 
 
Length of Period in Months 4.264 1.714 
 
Periods Since Randomization 4.815 2.787 
  
  
Per Period Time Invariant Covariates 
  
 
Female   0.302   0.459 
 
Age 44.909 10.394 
 
Age x Female 13.760 21.605 
 
Married of Living with Partner   0.455   0.498 
 
Education 14.160 2.595 
  
  
Per Period State Variables 
  
 
# Periods employed <90% of period 0.842 1.220 
 
# Periods employed part-time >90% of period 2.274 2.313 
 
# Periods employed full-time >90% of period 0.532 1.230 
 
# Periods Non-problem Drinking Only 0.302 0.837 
 
# Periods Problem Drinking <50% of Period 2.132 2.241 
 
# Periods Problem Drinking >50% of Period 1.559 2.149 
 
# Periods Since Pharmacotherapy for Alcohol Use 2.699 2.367 
 
 
Continued on next page 
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 Appendix Table A.9 (Continued). Means and Std. Dev. Of Model Covariates, State Variables and Exclusion Restrictions 
  Mean Std. Dev. 
 # Periods Since Outpatient Therapy (No Rx Therapy) 2.954 2.446 
 
# Periods Since Self-help Visits for Alcohol Use 2.944 2.555 
 
# Periods Antidepressants 0.459 1.191 
  
  
 
Manufacturing Wage 6.528 1.023 
 
Construction Wage 9.791 1.231 
 
Retail Wage 22.759 4.033 
 
((Average # of Unused OP Sessions x Sliding Scale Fee/ (# People receiving or claiming to need specialty treatment for 
AUDS))*1000 
23.470 4.286 
 
Indicator of Parent with AUD 0.680 0.517 
Female x Indicator of Parent with AUD 0.228 0.420 
 
Age x Indicator of Parent with AUD 33.800 20.860 
 
Indicator of Parent with AUD x Average Home Price 1.571 1.292 
 
Note: All prices are in 2008 dollars. 
 84 
 
Appendix B 
Appendix Table B.1. Estimates for Per Period Employment Status 
 
Multinomial Logit v. Not employed 
 
Employed < 90% of 
Period 
Employed Part Time > 
90% of Period 
Employed Full Time > 90% 
of Period 
 
Estimate St.Err. Estimate St.Err. Estimate St.Err. 
# Periods Employed <90% of Period 0.726*** (0.067) 0.884*** (0.097) 0.798*** (0.078) 
# Periods Employed Part-time >90% of Period 0.783*** (0.058) 0.990*** (0.081) 1.556*** (0.064) 
# Periods Employed Full-time >90% of Period 0.800*** (0.078) 1.614*** (0.121) 0.966*** (0.086) 
# Periods Non-Problem Drinking Only 0.121*** (0.109) 0.002*** (0.130) 0.052*** (0.112) 
# Periods Problem Drinking <50% of Period -0.120*** (0.071) -0.300*** (0.089) -0.356*** (0.074) 
# Periods Problem Drinking >50% of Period -0.008*** (0.066) -0.131*** (0.081) -0.196*** (0.068) 
# Periods Since Pharmacotherapy for Alcohol Use -0.062*** (0.092) -0.102*** (0.113) -0.074*** (0.094) 
# Periods Since Outpatient Therapy (No RxT) -0.033*** (0.118) -0.013*** (0.148) -0.230*** (0.123) 
# Periods Since Self-help Visits for Alcohol Use -0.100*** (0.063) -0.068*** (0.085) -0.108*** (0.067) 
# Periods Antidepressants -0.024*** (0.066) 0.035*** (0.082) 0.012*** (0.069) 
Construction Wage -0.003*** (0.169) 0.070*** (0.204) -0.162*** (0.173) 
Manufacturing Wage 0.168*** (0.181) 0.235*** (0.221) 0.200*** (0.185) 
Price Fluoxetine -0.002*** (0.003) -0.007*** (0.003) -0.006*** (0.003) 
Price Naltrexone 0.002*** (0.010) -0.004*** (0.012) 0.005*** (0.010) 
Price of Beer 0.029*** (0.142) 0.099*** (0.177) 0.167*** (0.144) 
Average # of Unused OP Sessions -0.009*** (0.008) -0.013*** (0.010) -0.012*** (0.008) 
Price of Gasoline -0.129*** (0.331) 0.059*** (0.428) -0.076*** (0.351) 
Average Home Price 0.040*** (0.079) 0.184*** (0.091) 0.140*** (0.079) 
Non-Labor Income/1000 -0.160*** (0.020) -0.242*** (0.024) -0.351*** (0.019) 
Female -1.468*** (0.689) 0.841*** (0.819) 0.420*** (0.696) 
Age -0.394*** (0.092) 0.147*** (0.113) -0.093*** (0.092) 
Age x Female 0.745*** (0.315) -0.278*** (0.374) -0.234*** (0.324) 
Married or Living With Partner -0.401*** (0.149) -0.201*** (0.185) -0.305*** (0.152) 
Years of Education 0.010*** (0.082) 0.058*** (0.102) 0.204*** (0.083) 
Length of Period in Months -2.607*** (0.351) -3.850*** (0.462) -4.036*** (0.372) 
Periods Since Randomization 1.010*** (0.241) 0.273*** (0.305) 0.514*** (0.242) 
Center 2 0.290*** (0.453) 0.288*** (0.545) 0.441*** (0.463) 
Center 3 0.023*** (0.618) 0.334*** (0.717) 0.373*** (0.636) 
Center 4 -0.628*** (0.505) -0.373*** (0.614) -0.692*** (0.520) 
Center 5 -0.501*** (0.336) -0.377*** (0.421) -0.298*** (0.340) 
Center 6 0.660*** (0.397) 0.486*** (0.490) 0.641*** (0.427) 
Center 7 -0.032*** (0.653) -0.777*** (0.768) 0.196*** (0.661) 
Center 8 -0.540*** (0.632) -0.433*** (0.726) -0.130*** (0.641) 
Acam + MM 0.056*** (0.293) 0.528*** (0.353) 0.166*** (0.297) 
Nalt + MM -0.329*** (0.301) -0.160*** (0.377) -0.446*** (0.304) 
Acam + Nalt + MM -0.241*** (0.297) -0.514*** (0.389) -0.385*** (0.303) 
 MM + CBI 0.130*** (0.321) 0.106*** (0.417) 0.299*** (0.334) 
 Acam + MM + CBI -0.262*** (0.288) -0.364*** (0.362) -0.204*** (0.290) 
Nalt + MM + CBI -0.114*** (0.304) 0.284*** (0.368) 0.129*** (0.301) 
Acam + Nalt + MM + CBI 0.471*** (0.321) 0.365*** (0.434) 0.771*** (0.322) 
CBI Only -0.104*** (0.306) -0.073*** (0.394) 0.145*** (0.320) 
Constant 10.372*** (1.971) 18.720*** (2.538) 22.037*** (2.047) 
   
(Continued on next page) 
 
 
  
 85 
 
Appendix Table B.1 (continued). Estimates for Per Period Employment Status 
 
Multinomial Logit v. Not employed 
 
Employed < 90% of Period 
Employed Part Time > 90% 
of Period 
Employed Full Time > 90% of 
Period 
Points of Support Estimate St.Err. Estimate St.Err. Estimate St.Err. 
Permanent UH 
      
1.000 Normalized to 0 Normalized to 0 Normalized to 0 
2.000 -0.148***       (0.455) 0.468*** (0.488) 0.850*** (0.748) 
3.000 -0.203*** (0.322) 0.317*** (0.376) 0.980*** (0.328) 
4.000 0.269*** (0.359) -0.077*** (0.428) 0.621*** (0.389) 
5.000 -1.327*** (0.365) -1.479*** (0.469) -0.704*** (0.367) 
6.000 -0.413*** (0.296) -0.732*** (0.360) -0.210*** (0.314) 
7.000 -0.291*** (0.505) 0.222*** (0.576) 0.478*** (0.513) 
Time Varying UH 
      
1.000 Normalized to 0 Normalized to 0 Normalized to 0 
2.000 1.401*** (0.487) -1.945*** (0.314) -2.344*** (0.581) 
3.000 2.118*** (0.788) 5.600*** (0.514) 0.766*** (0.808) 
4.000 2.229*** (0.748) 6.382*** (0.467) 1.339*** (0.772) 
5.000 0.167*** (0.328) 4.119*** (0.788) 0.063*** (0.317) 
       
Notes: ***indicates significance at 1%, **5%, and *10%. Indicators for quarter of interview, study location, and year of entering the study 
are not reported. Estimates are for time periods 2-8, after the end of the COMBINE treatment. Estimated jointly with employment, 
alcohol use, treatment and self-help visits, wages, attrition, and initial condition equations. 
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Appendix Table B.2. Log Wages Conditional on Any Employment 
 
Estimate Standard Error 
# Periods Employed <90% of Period 0.031*** (0.007) 
# Periods Employed Part-time >90% of Period 0.052*** (0.006) 
# Periods Employed Full-time >90% of Period 0.073*** (0.006) 
# Periods Non-Problem Drinking Only -0.041*** (0.006) 
# Periods Problem Drinking <50% of Period -0.041*** (0.004) 
# Periods Problem Drinking >50% of Period 0.026*** (0.004) 
# Periods Since Pharmacotherapy for Alcohol Use 0.001*** (0.005) 
# Periods Since Outpatient Therapy (No RxT) -0.021*** (0.007) 
# Periods Since SH Visits for Alcohol Use -0.022*** (0.005) 
# Periods Antidepressants -0.020*** (0.004) 
Construction Wage -0.005*** (0.010) 
Manufacturing Wage 0.041*** (0.009) 
Female -0.201*** (0.028) 
Age 0.099*** (0.032) 
Age x Female -0.019*** (0.022) 
Married or Living With Partner 0.099*** (0.018) 
Years of Education 0.222*** (0.023) 
Length of Period in Months -0.094*** (0.040) 
Periods Since Randomization 0.003*** (0.034) 
Center 2 0.158*** (0.019) 
Center 3 -0.153*** (0.021) 
Center 4 -0.295*** (0.021) 
Center 5 0.121*** (0.023) 
Center 6 -0.228*** (0.021) 
Center 7 -0.106*** (0.021) 
Center 8 -0.023*** (0.021) 
Acam + MM -0.004*** (0.029) 
Nalt + MM -0.109*** (0.024) 
Acam + Nalt + MM -0.063*** (0.022) 
MM + CBI -0.139*** (0.018) 
Acam + MM + CBI -0.011*** (0.020) 
Nalt + MM + CBI -0.069*** (0.026) 
Acam + Nalt + MM + CBI -0.065*** (0.020) 
CBI Only -0.138*** (0.021) 
Constant 2.317*** (0.033) 
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Appendix Table B.2 (Continued). Log Wages Conditional on Any Employment  
    
Points of Support 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
Permanent UH  
 
1 Normalized to 0 
2 1.257*** (0.022) 
3 0.911*** (0.018) 
4 0.579*** (0.019) 
5 1.266*** (0.026) 
6 0.470*** (0.020) 
7 1.655*** (0.021) 
Time Varying UH  
 
1 Normalized to 0 
2 0.016*** (0.033) 
3 -1.207*** (0.031) 
4 1.219*** (0.044) 
5 0.087*** (0.039) 
 
 
Notes:***indicates significance at 1%, **5%, and *10%. Indicators for quarter of interview, study location, and year  
of entering the study are not reported. Estimates are for time periods 2-8, after end of COMBINE Treatment.  
Estimated jointly with employment, alcohol use, treatment and SH visits, wages, attrition, and initial condition equations. 
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Appendix Table B.3. Estimates for Per Period Antidepressant Use 
 
Logit v. No Antidepressant Use 
 
Antidepressant Use 
 
Estimate 
 
St.Err. 
# Periods Employed <90% of Period -0.190*** 
 
(0.077) 
# Periods Employed Part-time >90% of Period -0.042*** 
 
(0.048) 
# Periods Employed Full-time >90% of Period -0.025*** 
 
(0.068) 
# Periods Non-Problem Drinking Only -0.156*** 
 
(0.106) 
# Periods Problem Drinking <50% of Period 0.186*** 
 
(0.069) 
# Periods Problem Drinking >50% of Period 0.123*** 
 
(0.058) 
# Periods Since Pharmacotherapy for Alcohol Use 0.441*** 
 
(0.077) 
# Periods Since Outpatient Therapy (No RxT) 0.327*** 
 
(0.104) 
# Periods Since Self-help Visits for Alcohol Use -0.102*** 
 
(0.072) 
# of Period of Antidepressants 2.825*** 
 
(0.109) 
Construction Wage 0.360*** 
 
(0.172) 
Manufacturing Wage -0.285*** 
 
(0.187) 
Price Fluoxetine -0.005*** 
 
(0.003) 
Price Naltrexone -0.005*** 
 
(0.010) 
Price of Beer 0.534*** 
 
(0.183) 
Average # of Unused OP Sessions -0.002*** 
 
(0.008) 
Price of Gasoline 0.040*** 
 
(0.309) 
Average Home Price -0.040*** 
 
(0.072) 
Non-Labor Income/1000 0.064*** 
 
(0.019) 
Female 1.956*** 
 
(0.784) 
Age -0.113*** 
 
(0.101) 
Age x Female -0.588*** 
 
(0.368) 
Married or Living With Partner 0.292*** 
 
(0.147) 
Education 0.177*** 
 
(0.075) 
Length of Period in Months -1.101*** 
 
(0.361) 
Periods Since Randomization 0.552*** 
 
(0.230) 
Center 2 0.221*** 
 
(0.396) 
Center 3 -1.004*** 
 
(0.602) 
Center 4 -1.309*** 
 
(0.634) 
Center 5 0.494*** 
 
(0.324) 
Center 6 0.192*** 
 
(0.385) 
Center 7 -1.171*** 
 
(0.622) 
Center 8 -0.440*** 
 
(0.586) 
Acam + MM 0.021*** 
 
(0.342) 
Nalt + MM 0.051*** 
 
(0.353) 
Acam + Nalt + MM -0.167*** 
 
(0.367) 
 MM + CBI 0.047*** 
 
(0.354) 
 Acam + MM + CBI -0.107*** 
 
(0.342) 
Nalt + MM + CBI 0.044*** 
 
(0.337) 
Acam + Nalt + MM + CBI 0.503*** 
 
(0.332) 
CBI Only -0.147*** 
 
(0.352) 
Constant -17.118*** 
 
(2.793) 
 
(Continued on Next Page) 
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Appendix Table B.3 (Continued). Estimates for Per Period Antidepressant Use 
 
Logit v. No Antidepressant Use 
 
Antidepressant Use 
Points of Support Estimate 
 
St.Err. 
Permanent UH 
   
1  
 
 
2 0.759*** 
 
(0.348) 
3 0.648*** 
 
(0.280) 
4 0.110*** 
 
(0.326) 
5 1.095*** 
 
(0.358) 
6 1.867*** 
 
(0.297) 
7 0.567*** 
 
(0.349) 
Time Varying UH 
   
1 
   
2 8.253*** 
 
(0.841) 
3 11.342*** 
 
(0.797) 
4 13.349*** 
 
(0.804) 
5 11.340*** 
 
(0.705) 
Notes: ***indicates significance at 1%, **5%, and *10%. Indicators for quarter of interview, study location, and year of entering the study are 
not reported. Estimates are for time periods 2-8, after the end of COMBINE treatment. Estimated jointly with employment, alcohol use, 
treatment and self-help visits, wages, attrition, and initial condition equations. 
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Appendix Table B.4. Estimates for Per Period Treatment or Self-Help Visits for Alcohol Use 
 
Multinomial Logit v. No Treatment or SH Visits 
 
Self Help Visits 
Outpatient Therapy (No 
RxT) RxT 
 
Estimate St.Err. Estimate St.Err. Estimate St.Err. 
# Periods Employed <90% of Period -0.199*** (0.063) -0.231*** (0.085) -0.031*** (0.096) 
# Periods Employed Part-time >90% of 
Period 
-0.061*** (0.043) -0.056*** (0.053) -0.130*** (0.068) 
# Periods Employed Full-time >90% of 
Period 
-0.040*** (0.061) -0.019*** (0.076) -0.035*** (0.087) 
# Periods Non-Problem Drinking Only -0.379*** (0.105) -0.090*** (0.111) 0.081*** (0.135) 
# Periods Problem Drinking <50% of 
Period 
0.109*** (0.058) 0.313*** (0.077) 0.500*** (0.101) 
# Periods Problem Drinking >50% of 
Period 
0.109*** (0.048) 0.206*** (0.068) 0.354*** (0.087) 
# Periods Since Pharmacotherapy for 
Alcohol Use 
0.685*** (0.103) 0.781*** (0.117) 2.274*** (0.117) 
# Periods Since Outpatient Therapy (No 
RxT) 
1.004*** (0.088) 1.414*** (0.094) 1.018*** (0.129) 
# Periods Since Self-help Visits for 
Alcohol Use 
1.471*** (0.062) 1.004*** (0.085) 0.709*** (0.116) 
# of Period of Antidepressants 0.040*** (0.055) 0.239*** (0.060) 0.075*** (0.074) 
Construction Wage -0.070*** (0.141) 0.016*** (0.176) 0.274*** (0.194) 
Manufacturing Wage 0.107*** (0.146) 0.438*** (0.196) -0.023*** (0.217) 
Price Fluoxetine 0.000*** (0.002) -0.002*** (0.003) -0.002*** (0.003) 
Price Naltrexone 0.002*** (0.008) -0.017*** (0.011) 0.052*** (0.014) 
Price of Beer 0.093*** (0.120) 0.526*** (0.166) 0.195*** (0.199) 
Average # of Unused OP Sessions 0.002*** (0.006) 0.002*** (0.008) -0.009*** (0.009) 
Price of Gasoline 0.094*** (0.255) 0.374*** (0.322) 0.328*** (0.398) 
Average Home Price 0.104*** (0.058) 0.194*** (0.071) -0.004*** (0.092) 
Non-Labor Income/1000 0.034*** (0.017) 0.063*** (0.022) -0.060*** (0.028) 
Female -0.665*** (0.807) -0.515*** (0.855) 1.786*** (0.884) 
Age -0.021*** (0.079) -0.147*** (0.110) 0.335*** (0.118) 
Age x Female 0.167*** (0.374) 0.318*** (0.395) -0.747*** (0.407) 
Married or Living With Partner -0.020*** (0.121) 0.193*** (0.161) 0.034*** (0.176) 
Years of Education -0.134*** (0.067) -0.013*** (0.089) 0.048*** (0.094) 
Length of Period in Months -2.133*** (0.291) -2.924*** (0.397) -3.228*** (0.477) 
Periods Since Randomization 0.639*** (0.182) 0.972*** (0.240) 1.050*** (0.295) 
Center 2 0.085*** (0.303) -0.047*** (0.357) -0.629*** (0.454) 
Center 3 -0.047*** (0.541) 0.248*** (0.622) -2.907*** (0.674) 
Center 4 -0.549*** (0.441) -1.194*** (0.562) -2.913*** (0.670) 
Center 5 -0.052*** (0.259) -0.247*** (0.335) -0.439*** (0.358) 
Center 6 0.292*** (0.334) -0.449*** (0.431) -0.821*** (0.477) 
Center 7 -0.531*** (0.564) -1.274*** (0.648) -2.507*** (0.695) 
Center 8 -0.090*** (0.533) -0.544*** (0.610) -2.599*** (0.613) 
Acam + MM -0.677*** (0.296) -0.733*** (0.356) -2.179*** (0.340) 
Nalt + MM 0.107*** (0.290) -0.765*** (0.377) -1.883*** (0.342) 
Acam + Nalt + MM -0.236*** (0.293) -0.578*** (0.367) -2.398*** (0.380) 
 MM + CBI -0.883*** (0.287) -1.735*** (0.366) -1.811*** (0.387) 
 Acam + MM + CBI -0.383*** (0.286) -0.673*** (0.342) -3.208*** (0.419) 
Nalt + MM + CBI -0.985*** (0.309) -0.885*** (0.339) -2.175*** (0.330) 
Acam + Nalt + MM + CBI -1.020*** (0.304) -0.768*** (0.329) -2.885*** (0.390) 
CBI Only -0.693*** (0.282) -1.260*** (0.332) -2.043*** (0.407) 
Constant 4.550*** (1.787) 0.945*** (2.137) -3.472*** (2.844) 
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Appendix Table B.4. (Continued) Estimates for Per Period Treatment or Self-Help Visits for Alcohol Use 
 
Multinomial Logit v. No Treatment or SH Visits 
 
Self Help Visits Outpatient Therapy (No RxT) RxT 
 
Estimate St.Err. Estimate St.Err. Estimate St.Err. 
Permanent UH   
    1 Normalized to 0 
    
2 0.863*** (0.325) 0.491*** (0.318) -0.577*** (0.508) 
3 1.149*** (0.246) 0.999*** (0.479) -0.185*** (0.385) 
4 0.911*** (0.273) 0.553*** (0.421) 0.353*** (0.727) 
5 1.273*** (0.278) 0.989*** (0.346) 0.545*** (0.559) 
6 2.096*** (0.259) 1.274*** (0.429) 0.946*** (0.557) 
7 0.322*** (0.281) -0.218*** (0.520) -5.268*** (0.761) 
Time Varying UH 
      
1 Normalized to 0 
    
2 0.723*** (0.366) 2.425*** (0.367) 7.614*** (1.039) 
3 1.047*** (0.328) 1.488*** (0.430) 6.892*** (0.809) 
4 2.747*** (0.462) 6.191*** (0.694) 9.807*** (0.972) 
5 1.187*** (0.472) 2.020*** (0.567) 6.420*** (0.688) 
Notes: ***indicates significance at 1%, **5%, and *10%. Indicators for quarter of interview, study location, and year of entering the 
study are not reported. Estimates are for time periods 2-8, after the end of COMBINE treatment. Estimated jointly with 
employment, alcohol use, treatment and self-help visits, wages, attrition, and initial condition equations. 
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Appendix Table B.5. Estimates of Per Period Alcohol Use 
 
Multinomial Logit v. Abstinent 
 
Non-Problem Drinking 
Only 
Problem Drinking Less than 50% of 
Period 
Problem Drinking More 
than 50% of Period 
 
Estimate St.Err. Estimate St.Err. Estimate St.Err. 
# Periods Employed <90% of Period -0.043*** (0.084) -0.101*** (0.068) -0.204*** (0.077) 
# Periods Employed Part-time >90% of 
Period 
-0.007*** (0.051) -0.042*** (0.046) -0.067*** (0.051) 
# Periods Employed Full-time >90% of 
Period 
-0.098*** (0.073) -0.031*** (0.062) -0.094*** (0.068) 
# Periods Non-Problem Drinking Only 1.366*** (0.086) 1.037*** (0.090) 0.650*** (0.111) 
# Periods Problem Drinking <50% of 
Period 
0.765*** (0.072) 1.204*** (0.064) 1.048*** (0.071) 
# Periods Problem Drinking >50% of 
Period 
0.647*** (0.068) 1.061*** (0.060) 1.641*** (0.063) 
# Periods Since Pharmacotherapy for 
Alcohol Use 
-0.381*** (0.095) -0.284*** (0.074) -0.412*** (0.082) 
# Periods Since Outpatient Therapy (No 
RxT) 
-0.173*** (0.103) -0.267*** (0.090) -0.441*** (0.100) 
# Periods Since Self-help Visits for 
Alcohol Use 
-0.353*** (0.070) -.0219*** (0.051) -0.491*** (0.067) 
# Periods Antidepressants -0.051*** (0.068) -0.017*** (0.056) 0.005*** (0.062) 
Construction Wage 0.287*** (0.170) 0.102*** (0.149) 0.110*** (0.154) 
Manufacturing Wage -0.058*** (0.200) -0.112*** (0.166) -0.120*** (0.171) 
Price Fluoxetine -0.002*** (0.003) -0.005*** (0.002) -0.004*** (0.002) 
Price Naltrexone -0.011*** (0.010) 0.005*** (0.008) 0.009*** (0.008) 
Price of Beer 0.112*** (0.161) -0.055*** (0.122) -0.029*** (0.129) 
Average # of Unused OP Sessions 0.005*** (0.008) 0.001*** (0.006) 0.009*** (0.006) 
Price of Gasoline -0.501*** (0.339) -0.771*** (0.289) -0.803*** (0.300) 
Average Home Price -0.016*** (0.073) 0.048*** (0.063) 0.037*** (0.065) 
Non-Labor Income/1000 0.022*** (0.023) -0.007*** (0.019) -0.010*** (0.019) 
Female 0.132*** (0.778) -0.195*** (0.624) -0.403*** (0.695) 
Age 0.142*** (0.099) -0.052*** (0.083) 0.009*** (0.089) 
Age x Female 0.091*** (0.348) 0.232*** (0.290) 0.257*** (0.321) 
Married or Living With Partner 0.288*** (0.153) -0.036*** (0.128) -0.037*** (0.140) 
Years of Education 0.174*** (0.082) -0.023*** (0.072) 0.060*** (0.078) 
Length of Period in Months -2.313*** (0.361) -3.357*** (0.322) -4.190*** (0.357) 
Periods Since Randomization 0.599*** (0.233) 1.232*** (0.191) 0.780*** (0.191) 
Center 2 -0.104*** (0.419) -0.295*** (0.363) -0.140*** (0.375) 
Center 3 -0.525*** (0.600) -0.836*** (0.555) -0.442*** (0.557) 
Center 4 -0.169*** (0.524) -0.243*** (0.445) -0.150*** (0.455) 
Center 5 0.047*** (0.332) -0.078*** (0.274) 0.036*** (0.290) 
Center 6 0.533*** (0.411) -0.319*** (0.375) 0.462*** (0.391) 
Center 7 -0.808*** (0.641) -0.286*** (0.585) -0.072*** (0.612) 
Center 8 -0.429*** (0.578) -1.116*** (0.554) -0.668*** (0.555) 
Acam + MM 0.276*** (0.345) -0.046*** (0.278) 0.323*** (0.297) 
Nalt + MM 0.113*** (0.369) 0.458*** (0.280) 0.442*** (0.314) 
Acam + Nalt + MM -0.006*** (0.352) 0.099*** (0.281) 0.176*** (0.313) 
MM + CBI 0.099*** (0.378) 0.185*** (0.294) 0.624*** (0.312) 
Acam + MM + CBI 0.442*** (0.348) 0.482*** (0.275) 0.621*** (0.309) 
Nalt + MM + CBI 0.558*** (0.356) 0.372*** (0.278) 0.743*** (0.302) 
Acam + Nalt + MM + CBI 0.344*** (0.358) 0.178*** (0.293) 0.539*** (0.327) 
CBI Only 0.079*** (0.390) 0.355*** (0.292) 0.660*** (0.321) 
Constant 7.688*** (2.437) 13.926*** (1.962) 20.304*** (2.185) 
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Appendix Table B.5. (Continued) Estimates for Per Period Alcohol Use 
 
Multinomial Logit v. Abstinent 
 
Non-Problem Drinking Only 
Problem Drinking Less than 
50% of Period 
Problem Drinking More than 
50% of Period 
 
Estimate St.Err. Estimate St.Err. Estimate St.Err. 
Permanent UH   
    1 Normalized to 0 
    
2 -0.320*** (0.498) -0.074*** (0.333) -0.364*** (0.711) 
3 -0.141*** (0.323) -0.005*** (0.297) -0.738*** (0.361) 
4 -0.383*** (0.346) -0.184*** (0.386) 0.028*** (1.159) 
5 0.392*** (0.374) 0.169*** (0.241) -0.086*** (0.513) 
6 -0.462*** (0.511) 0.258*** (0.328) -0.735*** (0.493) 
7 -1.147*** (0.376) 0.415*** (0.310) -0.653*** (0.318) 
Time Varying UH 
      
1 Normalized to 0 
    
2 -0.605*** (0.398) -0.047*** (0.327) -0.253*** (1.225) 
3 -0.748*** (0.245) -0.311*** (0.295) -0.665*** (0.538) 
4 0.977*** (0.268) 2.496*** (1.178) -0.428*** (0.520) 
5 -0.721*** (0.316) 0.647*** (0.750) 0.230*** (0.324) 
Notes: ***indicates significance at 1%, **5%, and *10%. Indicators for quarter of interview, study location, and year of entering the 
study are not reported. Estimates are for time periods 2-8, after the end of COMBINE treatment. Estimated jointly with 
employment, alcohol use, treatment and self-help visits, wages, attrition, and initial condition equations. 
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Appendix Table B.6. Estimate for Per Period Attrition 
 
Logit v. Still in Study 
 
Left Study 
 
Estimate 
 
St.Err. 
# Periods Employed <90% of Period -0.495 
 
(1.451) 
# Periods Employed Part-time >90% of Period -0.374 
 
(4.387) 
# Periods Employed Full-time >90% of Period -0.142 
 
(4.491) 
# Periods Non-Problem Drinking Only 0.179 
 
(3.767) 
# Periods Problem Drinking <50% of Period -0.400 
 
(6.026) 
# Periods Problem Drinking >50% of Period -0.063 
 
(1.271) 
# Periods Since Pharmacotherapy for Alcohol Use 0.133 
 
(0.461) 
# Periods Since Outpatient Therapy (No RxT) 0.468 
 
(9.014) 
# Periods Since Self-help Visits for Alcohol Use 0.070 
 
(1.080) 
# of Period of Antidepressants 0.095 
 
(1.372) 
Construction Wage 0.616 
 
(2.145) 
Manufacturing Wage 1.705 
 
(8.882) 
Price Fluoxetine -15.41 
 
(1.034) 
Price Naltrexone -0.708 
 
(0.424) 
Price of Beer 7.059 
 
(7.949) 
Average # of Unused OP Sessions 1.047 
 
(4.342) 
Price of Gasoline -3.448 
 
(6.341) 
Average Home Price 3.346 
 
(4.572) 
Non-Labor Income/1000 -0.146 
 
(2.483) 
Female 0.375 
 
(1.629) 
Age 0.056 
 
(8.245) 
Age x Female 0.138 
 
(9.683) 
Married or Living With Partner -0.559 
 
(9.415) 
Years of Education -0.336 
 
(6.977) 
Length of Period in Months 2.585 
 
(4.096) 
Periods Since Randomization 3.569 
 
(2.260) 
Center 2 0.183 
 
(1.006) 
Center 3 -2.270 
 
(7.435) 
Center 4 -2.979 
 
(8.647) 
Center 5 1.922 
 
(1.093) 
Center 6 1.147 
 
(1.040) 
Center 7 1.257 
 
(1.061) 
Center 8 -0.526 
 
(1.000) 
Acam + MM -0.279 
 
(6.169) 
Nalt + MM 0.101 
 
(8.880) 
Acam + Nalt + MM 0.359 
 
(7.831) 
MM + CBI -0.405 
 
(9.354) 
Acam + MM + CBI 0.548 
 
(7.602) 
Nalt + MM + CBI -0.006 
 
(3.168) 
Acam + Nalt + MM + CBI 0.152 
 
(3.217) 
CBI Only -0.045 
 
(2.992) 
Constant 0.790 
 
(2.852) 
  
(Continued on Next Page) 
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Appendix Table B.6 (Continued). Estimate for Per Period Attrition 
 
Logit v. Still in Study 
 
Left Study 
 
Estimate . St.Err 
Points of Support 
 
 
Permanent UH 
 
 
 
1 Normalized to 0 
 
2 0.224*** 
 
(6.326) 
3 -1.038*** 
 
(8.034) 
4 -1.466*** 
 
(4.068) 
5 -0.186*** 
 
(5.186) 
6 -0.310*** 
 
(8.391) 
7 1.956*** 
 
(1.066) 
Time Varying UH 
   
1 Normalized to 0 
 
2 1.499*** 
 
(0.029) 
3 2.031*** 
 
(0.124) 
4 2.466*** 
 
(2.578) 
5 -2.582*** 
 
(3.807) 
Notes: ***indicates significance at 1%, **5%, and *10%. Indicators for quarter of interview, study location, and year of entering the study are not 
reported. Estimates are for time periods 2-8, after the end of COMBINE treatment. Estimated jointly with employment, alcohol use, treatment 
and self-help visits, wages, attrition, and initial condition equations. 
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Appendix Table B.7: Unobserved Heterogeneity Probability Weights 
 
Probability Weight 
Points of Support 
 
Permanent UH   
1 0.092 
2 0.124 
3 0.269 
4 0.141 
5 0.128 
6 0.158 
7 0.087 
  Time Varying UH   
1 0.242 
2 0.036 
3 0.025 
4 0.024 
5 0.672 
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Appendix Table B.8. Initial Condition: Number of Years of Education at Beginning of COMBINE Study 
 
Estimate 
 
Standard Error 
Manufacturing Wage 0.033***  (0.014) 
Construction Wage 0.011***  (0.062) 
Retail Wage 0.100***  (0.008) 
Average # of Unused OP Sessions x Sliding Scale Fee 0.031***  (0.063) 
Indicator of Parent AUD x Average Home Price 0.001***  (0.041) 
Indicator of Parent with AUD -0.089***  (0.001) 
Female X Indicator of Parent with AUD -0.033***  (0.027) 
age X Indicator of Parent with AUD 0.076***  (0.043) 
Price Fluoxetine 0.008***  (0.024) 
Price Naltrexone 0.002***  (0.003) 
Price of Beer -0.312***  (0.004) 
Price of Private PCP Visit -0.004***  (0.167) 
Price of Gasoline -0.850***  (0.005) 
Average Home Price 0.271***  (0.603) 
Non-Labor Income/1000 0.004***  (0.191) 
Female 0.657***  (0.012) 
Age 0.068***  (0.347) 
Age x Female -0.212***  (0.052) 
Married or Living with Partner 0.240***  (0.155) 
Center 2 0.200***  (0.067) 
Center 3 0.257***  (0.164) 
Center 4 -0.147***  (0.339) 
Center 5 0.094***  (0.339) 
Center 6 0.358***  (0.268) 
Center 7 1.114***  (0.264) 
Center 8 -0.226***  (0.462) 
Constant -0.146***  (0.374) 
Points of Support 
   Permanent UH  
  1 Normalized to 0*** 
2 0.245*** 
 
(0.155) 
3 0.195*** 
 
(0.144) 
4 0.322*** 
 
(0.154) 
5 -0.033*** 
 
(0.160) 
6 -0.113*** 
 
(0.154) 
7 0.646*** 
 
(0.167) 
Notes:***indicates significance at 1%, **5%, and *10%. Indicators for quarter of interview, study location, and 
year of entering the study are not reported. Outcomes are combined between Time Periods 0 and 1. 
 
 98 
 
Appendix Table B.9. Initial Condition: Employment Status at Beginning of COMBINE Study 
 
Multinomial Logit, v. Not employed during Period 
 
Employed <90% of period 
Employed Part Time >90% of 
period 
Employed Full Time 
>90% of period 
 
Estimate St. Err. Estimate St. Err. Estimate St. Err 
Manufacturing Wage -0.615*** (0.323) -0.220*** (0.336) -0.124*** (0.278) 
Construction Wage 0.060*** (0.056) -0.005*** (0.073) 0.177*** (0.055) 
Retail Wage -0.421*** (0.318) 0.305*** (0.337) -0.319*** (0.293) 
Average # Unused OP Sessions x      
Sliding Scale Fee 
0.036*** (0.190) 0.327*** (0.197) 0.280*** (0.167) 
Indicator of Parent AUD x Average 
Home Price 
-0.004*** (0.008) -0.011*** (0.009) -0.026*** (0.007) 
Arm 5 x Gas Price at Time 1 x Travel 
Time to Study Site 
-2.479*** (0.699) -2.950*** (0.744) -1.262*** (0.634) 
Arm 7 x Gas Price at Time 1 x Travel 
Time to Study Site 
-0.498*** (0.428) -0.176*** (0.434) -0.085*** (0.369) 
Indicator of Parent with AUD -0.066*** (0.184) -0.284*** (0.196) 0.000*** (0.164) 
Female X Indicator of Parent with 
AUD 
-0.086*** (0.248) -0.007*** (0.263) -0.204*** (0.222) 
Age X Indicator of Parent with AUD -0.290*** (0.114) -0.045*** (0.120) -0.141*** (0.103) 
Price Fluoxetine -0.007*** (0.008) -0.009*** (0.009) -0.008*** (0.007) 
Price Naltrexone 0.007*** (0.018) 0.028*** (0.020) 0.002*** (0.016) 
Price of Beer -0.143*** (0.509) -0.633*** (0.475) -0.868*** (0.400) 
Average # of Unused OP Sessions -0.037*** (0.019) -0.041*** (0.019) -0.025*** (0.016) 
Price of Gasoline -0.013*** (1.916) 0.930*** (1.999) 3.647*** (1.711) 
Average Home Price -0.510*** (0.464) -0.308*** (0.462) -1.082*** (0.394) 
Non-Labor Income/1000 -0.052*** (0.050) 0.026*** (0.050) -0.179*** (0.043) 
Female 1.913*** (1.046) 3.752*** (1.044) 1.637*** (1.018) 
Age 0.480*** (0.238) 0.818*** (0.411) 0.451*** (0.217) 
Age x Female -0.773*** (0.505) -1.139*** (0.495) -0.669*** (0.476) 
Married or Living With Partner -0.721*** (0.387) -0.062*** (0.403) -0.022*** (0.345) 
Years of Education 0.974*** (0.190) 0.846*** (0.191) 1.079*** (0.168) 
Center 2 0.307*** (0.785) 0.897*** (0.862) 0.974*** (0.698) 
Center 3 -0.899*** (1.423) -2.566*** (1.520) -0.907*** (1.317) 
Center 4 6.384*** (1.500) 5.988*** (1.532) 8.413*** (1.361) 
Center 5 2.009*** (1.181) 2.456*** (1.268) 0.524*** (1.053) 
Center 6 0.705*** (1.094) -0.328*** (1.182) 0.554*** (1.014) 
Center 7 1.120*** (1.884) 0.170*** (2.027) -1.768*** (1.696) 
Center 8 8.565*** (1.675) 5.936*** (1.759) 7.351*** (1.514) 
Acam + MM -0.509*** (0.611) -1.300*** (0.662) -1.363*** (0.593) 
Nalt + MM -0.108*** (0.659) -0.389*** (0.696) -0.965*** (0.598) 
Acam + Nalt + MM -0.266*** (0.715) -0.174*** (0.714) -0.985*** (0.609) 
MM + CBI 2.139*** (0.830) 2.374*** (1.133) 2.944*** (0.702) 
Acam + MM + CBI 0.028*** (0.667) 0.302*** (0.713) -0.781*** (0.581) 
Nalt + MM + CBI -0.574*** (0.790) -0.339*** (0.871) -0.969*** (0.716) 
Acam + Nalt + MM + CBI 0.252*** (0.680) -0.261*** (0.764) -0.391*** (0.614) 
CBI Only 0.959*** (0.653) -0.022*** (0.773) -0.090*** (0.594) 
Constant 25.204*** (9.397) 15.138*** (8.105) 10.197*** (8.695) 
Points of Support       
Permanent UH 
      1 Normalized to 0 Normalized to 0 Normalized to 0 
2 -1.953*** (0.737) -2.983*** (0.590) -3.453*** (1.000) 
3 -1.029*** (0.568) -1.139*** (1.311) -0.559*** (1.000) 
4 0.530*** (0.595) -0.693*** (0.641) 1.274*** (1.000) 
5 -1.984*** (0.737) -2.638*** (0.517) -3.059*** (1.000) 
6 -1.667*** (0.599) -2.764*** (0.534) -2.522*** (1.000) 
7 2.573*** (1.441) 2.103*** (0.556) 1.532*** (1.000) 
Notes: ***Indicates significance at 1%, **5%, and 10%. Indicators for quarter of interview, study location, and year of entering the study are not 
reported. Outcomes are combined between Time Periods 0 and 1 
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Appendix Table B.10. Initial Condition: Alcohol Use at Beginning of COMBINE Study 
 
Logit v. Problem Drinking During Less than 50% of 
Period 
 
Problem Drinking More than 50% of Period 
 
Estimate 
 
St.Err. 
Manufacturing Wage -0.399*** 
 
(0.260) 
Construction Wage -0.022*** 
 
(0.027) 
Retail Wage 0.356*** 
 
(0.195) 
Average # of Unused OP Sessions x Sliding Scale Fee 0.570*** 
 
(0.145) 
Indicator of Parent AUD x Average Home Price -0.003*** 
 
(0.004) 
Indicator of Parent with AUD -0.044*** 
 
(0.087) 
Female X Indicator of Parent with AUD 0.006*** 
 
(0.143) 
age X Indicator of Parent with AUD 0.125*** 
 
(0.008) 
Price Fluoxetine -0.021*** 
 
(0.007) 
Price Naltrexone -0.007*** 
 
(0.013) 
Price of Beer 0.948*** 
 
(0.628) 
Average # of Unused OP Sessions -0.023*** 
 
(0.014) 
Price of Gasoline 4.629*** 
 
(1.294) 
Average Home Price -1.686*** 
 
(0.613) 
Non-Labor Income/1000 0.062*** 
 
(0.038) 
Female 0.184*** 
 
(0.935) 
Age -0.389*** 
 
(0.166) 
Age x Female -0.041*** 
 
(0.416) 
Married of Living with Partner 0.084*** 
 
(0.216) 
Years of Education 0.047*** 
 
(0.116) 
Center 2 -0.725*** 
 
(0.717) 
Center 3 -4.287*** 
 
(0.759) 
Center 4 -0.881*** 
 
(0.862) 
Center 5 -2.538*** 
 
(0.824) 
Center 6 -4.060*** 
 
(0.730) 
Center 7 -4.118*** 
 
(0.984) 
Center 8 -2.974*** 
 
(0.965) 
constant -5.550*** 
 
(1.673) 
Points of Support  
  Permanent UH 
   1 Normalized to 0 
2  0.298**** (0.557)** 
3  -0.245**** (0.434) * 
4  0.020**** (0.472) * 
5  -0.298**** (0.484) * 
6  -0.512**** (0.559) * 
7  -0.862**** (0.662) * 
Notes: ***indicates significance at 1%, **5%, and *10%. Indicators for quarter of interview, study location, and year of entering 
the study are not reported. Outcomes are combined between Time Periods 0 and 1 
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Appendix Table B.11. Initial Condition: Alcohol Use During COMBINE Treatment  
 
Multinomial Logit v. Abstinent 
 
Non-Problem Drinking 
Only 
Problem Drinking Less 
than 50% of Period 
Problem Drinking More 
than 50% of Period 
 
Estimate St.Err. Estimate St.Err. Estimate St.Err. 
Manufacturing Wage 0.296*** (0.356) -0.226*** (0.252) 0.178*** (0.258) 
Construction Wage 0.025*** (0.071) 0.028*** (0.054) 0.021*** (0.055) 
Retail Wage 0.518*** (0.359) -0.058*** (0.250) 0.351*** (0.255) 
Average # of Unused OP Sessions x Sliding Scale Fee -0.080*** (0.207) -0.293*** (0.148) 0.005*** (0.146) 
Indicator of Parent AUD x Average Home Price 0.002*** (0.010) 0.006*** (0.006) 0.005*** (0.007) 
Arm 5 x Gas Price at Time 1 x Travel Time to Study 
Site 
-0.017*** (0.791) 0.990*** (0.609) 1.201*** (0.620) 
Arm 7 x Gas Price at Time 1 x Travel Time to Study 
Site 
0.506*** (0.438) 0.321*** (0.324) 0.690*** (0.331) 
Indicator of Parent with AUD -0.083*** (0.129) -0.060*** (0.095) -0.048*** (0.099) 
Female X Indicator of Parent with AUD 0.397*** (0.224) 0.251*** (0.180) 0.148*** (0.187) 
age X Indicator of Parent with AUD -0.067*** (0.119) 0.060*** (0.099) 0.190*** (0.101) 
Price Fluoxetine 0.000*** (0.008) -0.011*** (0.006) -0.013*** (0.006) 
Price Naltrexone -0.013*** (0.021) -0.019*** (0.014) -0.002*** (0.015) 
Price of Beer -0.941*** (0.511) -0.088*** (0.376) -0.158*** (0.372) 
Average # of Unused OP Sessions 0.016*** (0.020) -0.014*** (0.015) 0.000*** (0.015) 
Price of Gasoline -0.524*** (1.841) -0.064*** (1.441) -1.174*** (1.469) 
Average Home Price 1.133*** (0.470) 0.217*** (0.377) 0.177*** (0.372) 
Non-Labor Income/1000 0.075*** (0.053) 0.000*** (0.043) 0.079*** (0.043) 
Female -3.347*** (1.154) -1.434*** (0.980) -0.716*** (0.990) 
Age 0.171*** (0.253) -0.302*** (0.206) -0.610*** (0.213) 
Age x Female 1.409*** (0.495) 0.804*** (0.449) 0.507*** (0.462) 
Married or Living With Partner 0.375*** (0.349) -0.213*** (0.259) -0.073*** (0.268) 
Education 0.218*** (0.179) 0.299*** (0.138) 0.066*** (0.142) 
Center 2 0.629*** (0.818) 0.621*** (0.642) 0.585*** (0.658) 
Center 3 -0.500*** (1.644) 0.986*** (1.132) -0.452*** (1.152) 
Center 4 -1.301*** (1.535) 0.251*** (1.133) -2.176*** (1.164) 
Center 5 0.742*** (1.299) 0.461*** (0.982) -1.319*** (1.007) 
Center 6 -0.379*** (1.285) -0.364*** (0.891) -1.830*** (0.923) 
Center 7 -0.741*** (1.976) 0.204*** (1.407) -0.786*** (1.434) 
Center 8 -0.546*** (1.892) 0.978*** (1.302) -2.162*** (1.328) 
Acam + MM -0.021*** (0.720) 0.082*** (0.505) -0.029*** (0.513) 
Nalt + MM 0.769*** (0.649) 0.531*** (0.528) -0.296*** (0.552) 
Acam + Nalt + MM 0.548*** (0.665) -0.082*** (0.529) -0.436*** (0.534) 
 MM + CBI -0.138*** (0.920) -0.127*** (0.641) -0.481*** (0.659) 
 Acam + MM + CBI 0.595*** (0.620) -0.112*** (0.512) -0.564*** (0.529) 
Nalt + MM + CBI -0.877*** (0.902) -0.806*** (0.655) -0.837*** (0.635) 
Acam + Nalt + MM + CBI -0.014*** (0.664) -0.314*** (0.532) -0.495*** (0.547) 
CBI Only 0.951*** (0.726) 0.948*** (0.581) 0.437*** (0.608) 
constant -6.758*** (10.217) 2.843*** (6.821) -8.495*** (7.003) 
Points of Support           
 Permanent UH      
 1 Normalized to 0    
 2 -2.132*** (0.871) 0.899*** (0.626) 0.378*** (0.395) 
3 -0.083*** (0.716) 0.697*** (0.594) -0.017*** (11.080) 
4 0.482*** (0.742) 0.753*** (0.591) 0.467*** (0.484) 
5 0.351*** (0.705) 0.900*** (0.427) 0.424*** (0.617) 
6 0.047*** (0.865) 0.990*** (0.524) 0.125*** (0.562) 
7 -0.055*** (0.866) 0.941*** (0.560) -6.908*** (0.527) 
Notes: ***indicates significance at 1%, **5%, and *10%. Indicators for quarter of interview, study location, and year of entering the study are not 
reported. 
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Appendix Table B.12. Initial Condition: Use of Antidepressants and  Self  Help Visits at Beginning of COMBINE Study 
  
Logit v. No Use of 
Antidepressants 
Logit v. No Self Help 
Visits 
 
Use of Antidepressants No Self Help Visits 
 
Estimate St.Err. Estimate St.Err. 
Manufacturing Wage -0.342*** (0.289) 0.595*** (0.179) 
Construction Wage 0.249*** (0.106) 0.019*** (0.039) 
Retail Wage -0.168*** (0.298) -0.440*** (0.165) 
Average # of Unused OP Sessions x Sliding Scale Fee -0.302*** (0.194) -0.288*** (0.131) 
Indicator of Parent AUD x Average Home Price  -0.033*** (0.018) 0.007*** (0.005) 
Arm 5 x Gas Price at Time 1 x Travel Time to Study Site 0.514*** (0.771) -1.100*** (0.517) 
Arm 7 x Gas Price at Time 1 x Travel Time to Study Site -0.330*** (0.386) -0.639*** (0.238) 
Indicator of Parent with AUD -0.141*** (0.150) 0.124*** (0.079) 
Female X Indicator of Parent with AUD -0.227*** (0.225) -0.072*** (0.131) 
age X Indicator of Parent with AUD -0.120*** (0.130) -0.118*** (0.075) 
Price Fluoxetine 0.012*** (0.011) 0.013*** (0.006) 
Price Naltrexone -0.018*** (0.020) 0.000*** (0.011) 
Price of Beer -0.398*** (0.496) 0.212*** (0.324) 
Average # of Unused OP Sessions -0.012*** (0.021) -0.018*** (0.013) 
Price of Gasoline 0.186*** (1.637) -3.632*** (0.956) 
Average Home Price 0.392*** (0.487) 0.447*** (0.292) 
Non-Labor Income/1000 -0.028*** (0.053) 0.023*** (0.034) 
Female -0.510*** (0.993) -1.625*** (0.934) 
Age -0.305*** (0.257) 0.081*** (0.165) 
Age x Female 0.887*** (0.457) 0.698*** (0.420) 
Married or Living With Partner 0.290*** (0.316) -0.082*** (0.210) 
Years of Education 0.216*** (0.174) -0.172*** (0.114) 
Center 2 0.998*** (0.879) -0.937*** (0.654) 
Center 3 1.165*** (1.702) 0.183*** (0.781) 
Center 4 2.342*** (1.103) 0.379*** (0.889) 
Center 5 4.035*** (1.201) 2.096*** (0.736) 
Center 6 1.519*** (1.225) 1.444*** (0.681) 
Center 7 2.860*** (1.656) 2.848*** (0.784) 
Center 8 3.343*** (1.614) 1.703*** (0.881) 
Acam + MM -0.120*** (0.595) -0.716*** (0.456) 
Nalt + MM 0.241*** (0.569) -0.380*** (0.444) 
Acam + Nalt + MM -0.549*** (0.826) -0.135*** (0.436) 
MM + CBI 1.488*** (0.860) -0.121*** (0.580) 
Acam + MM + CBI -0.534*** (0.684) -0.393*** (0.434) 
Nalt + MM + CBI -0.210*** (0.767) -0.236*** (0.584) 
Acam + Nalt + MM + CBI -0.016*** (0.572) -0.422*** (0.435) 
CBI Only -0.043*** (0.586) 0.059*** (0.427) 
Constant -4.938*** (4.162) 17.649*** (2.562) 
Points of Support         
Permanent UH 
 
      
1 Normalized to 0 Normalized to 0 
2 -1.076*** (0.624) 1.019*** (0.490) 
3 0.249*** (0.528) 1.452*** (0.415) 
4 -0.646*** (0.619) 1.294*** (0.440) 
5 -0.405*** (0.567) 1.528*** (0.451) 
6 0.074*** (0.581) 2.839*** (0.462) 
7 -6.141*** (3.701) -4.902*** (0.546) 
Notes: ***indicates significance at 1%, **5%, and *10%. Indicators for quarter of interview, study location, and year of entering the 
study are not reported. Outcomes are combined between Time Periods 0 and 1. 
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Appendix Table B.13. Wald Test Results 
   IC Equations Per-Period Equations 
Initial Conditions Exclusion Restrictions Wald p-value* Outcome Wald p-value* 
Employment 
Manufacturing Wage 
8.01 0.045 Employment 6.42 0.716 Construction Wage 
Arm 5 x Gas Price at Time 1 x Travel Time to Study Site 
  
 
          
Alcohol Period 1 
Average # of Unused OP Sessions x Sliding Scale Fee 
6.17 0.043 
Alcohol 7.70 0.949 
Age X Indicator of Parent with AUD 
        
Alcohol Period 2 
Average # of Unused OP Sessions x Sliding Scale Fee 
8.53 0.037 Arm 5 x Gas Price at Time 1 x Travel Time to Study Site 
Arm 7 x Gas Price at Time 1 x Travel Time to Study Site 
              
Self-Help 
Manufacturing Wage 
6.48 0.039 Treatment 5.16 0.574 
Average # of Unused OP Sessions x Sliding Scale Fee 
              
Antidepressants 
Indicator of Parent AUD x Average Home Price 
9.03 0.011 Antidepressants 3.53 0.185 
Construction Wage 
              
Education 
Indicator of Parent with AUD 
8.84 0.013 
Employment 4.28 0.645 
Alcohol 3.93 0.687 
Treatment 6.10 0.421 
Age X Indicator of Parent with AUD 
Antidepressants 2.69 0.262 
Log wage 4.19 0.101 
*p-values calculated as 2-tailed chi square with r-df's 
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Appendix C 
Appendix Table C.1. Model Fit for All Outcomes: Comparison of Predicted Means Over Analysis Periods 3-9 
 
# Mass 
Points Employment 
Log 
Wage Antidepressants Alcohol Treatment Alcohol 
  
UH 
Perm, 
TV Base 1 2 3     Base 1 2 3 Base 1 2 3 
 Observed Means na 0.170 0.171 0.124 0.534 2.795 0.161 0.683 0.171 0.072 0.074 0.282 0.096 0.216 0.407 
Stata Pred Values na 0.170 0.171 0.124 0.534 2.838 0.161 0.683 0.171 0.072 0.074 0.282 0.096 0.216 0.407 
Fortran Pred 
Values 
1, 1 0.170 0.176 0.118 0.535 2.837 0.152 0.692 0.165 0.075 0.067 0.279 0.097 0.227 0.397 
Fortran/Update 1, 1 0.161 0.176 0.121 0.541 2.820 0.152 0.692 0.165 0.075 0.068 0.28 0.098 0.225 0.398 
DFRE with 
Updating 
2, 2 0.166 0.176 0.12 0.538 2.821 0.152 0.700 0.161 0.072 0.066 0.274 0.100 0.223 0.403 
DFRE with 
Updating 
3, 3 0.157 0.178 0.126 0.539 2.826 0.164 0.688 0.168 0.074 0.07 0.276 0.098 0.226 0.400 
DFRE with 
Updating 
4, 4 0.164 0.178 0.120 0.538 2.810 0.158 0.684 0.17 0.076 0.071 0.279 0.101 0.224 0.397 
DFRE with 
Updating 
5, 5 0.163 0.178 0.123 0.537 2.822 0.160 0.688 0.163 0.075 0.074 0.279 0.098 0.22 0.404 
DFRE with 
Updating 
6, 5 0.172 0.173 0.122 0.533 2.825 0.161 0.689 0.164 0.077 0.069 0.281 0.098 0.223 0.398 
DFRE with 
Updating 
7, 5 0.170 0.171 0.124 0.534 2.795 0.161 0.683 0.171 0.072 0.074 0.282 0.096 0.216 0.407 
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Appendix Table C.2 Comparison Over Time (Analysis Periods 3-9) of Actual Observed Outcomes, Predicted Outcomes, and Predicted Outcomes Based on Updating  
 
 
Base Outcome 0 Outcome 2 Outcome 3 Outcome 4 
time   
Original 
Values 
Stata 
Single 
Equation 
Predictions 
DFRE 
With 
Updating 
Predictions 
Original 
Values 
Stata 
Single 
Equation 
Predictions 
DFRE 
With 
Updating 
Predictions 
Original 
Values 
Stata 
Single 
Equation 
Predictions 
DFRE With 
Updating 
Predictions 
Original 
Values 
Stata 
Single 
Equation 
Predictions 
DFRE 
With 
Updating 
Predictions 
3 
Employ-ment 
0.132 0.127 0.120 0.223 0.215 0.220 0.119 0.118 0.119 0.526 0.539 0.541 
4 0.170 0.177 0.165 0.169 0.177 0.181 0.120 0.126 0.125 0.541 0.519 0.528 
5 0.178 0.183 0.168 0.163 0.184 0.192 0.124 0.118 0.120 0.535 0.514 0.523 
6 0.173 0.184 0.167 0.177 0.162 0.171 0.128 0.123 0.124 0.522 0.531 0.537 
7 0.169 0.173 0.158 0.168 0.156 0.162 0.128 0.126 0.127 0.536 0.545 0.552 
8 0.172 0.172 0.156 0.148 0.148 0.153 0.132 0.128 0.129 0.548 0.552 0.563 
9 0.207 0.178 0.157 0.139 0.143 0.153 0.121 0.133 0.133 0.533 0.546 0.559 
3 
Conditional 
Wage 
2.805 2.838 2.802 
         4 2.818 2.810 2.805 
         5 2.843 2.813 2.805 
         6 2.841 2.825 2.814 
         7 2.851 2.844 2.835 
         8 2.848 2.835 2.854 
         9 2.868 2.850 2.862                   
3 
Antidepressants 
0.114 0.130 0.117 
         4 0.138 0.132 0.125 
         5 0.165 0.143 0.147 
         6 0.168 0.157 0.164 
         7 0.186 0.172 0.181 
         8 0.182 0.195 0.203 
         9 0.184 0.215 0.213                   
 
 
        
Continued on Next Page 
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Appendix Table C.2 (Continued) Comparison Over Time (Analysis Periods 3-9) of Actual Observed Outcomes, Predicted Outcomes, and Predicted Outcomes Based on Updating  
 
 
Base Outcome 0 Outcome 2 Outcome 3 Outcome 4 
time   
Original 
Values 
Stata Single 
Equation 
Predictions 
DFRE 
With 
Updating 
Predictions 
Original 
Values 
Stata Single 
Equation 
Predictions 
DFRE 
With 
Updating 
Predictions 
Original 
Values 
Stata Single 
Equation 
Predictions 
DFRE 
With 
Updating 
Predictions 
Original 
Values 
Stata Single 
Equation 
Predictions 
DFRE 
With 
Updating 
Predictions 
3 
Alcohol 
0.205 0.175 0.176 0.084 0.082 0.079 0.283 0.275 0.278 0.428 0.468 0.467 
4 0.248 0.277 0.270 0.099 0.097 0.092 0.213 0.218 0.222 0.440 0.408 0.417 
5 0.271 0.288 0.286 0.097 0.101 0.097 0.204 0.224 0.228 0.428 0.387 0.388 
6 0.277 0.315 0.316 0.086 0.099 0.100 0.217 0.197 0.210 0.420 0.388 0.377 
7 0.320 0.314 0.312 0.099 0.097 0.102 0.188 0.195 0.209 0.393 0.395 0.377 
8 0.332 0.315 0.304 0.103 0.096 0.104 0.198 0.191 0.206 0.366 0.398 0.386 
9 0.353 0.306 0.299 0.104 0.098 0.103 0.196 0.198 0.205 0.347 0.397 0.392 
3 
Alcohol 
Treatment 
0.661 0.648 0.658 0.262 0.180 0.179 0.045 0.088 0.092 0.032 0.084 0.072 
4 0.712 0.726 0.722 0.228 0.148 0.152 0.036 0.066 0.068 0.023 0.060 0.058 
5 0.693 0.711 0.710 0.230 0.157 0.157 0.046 0.070 0.069 0.031 0.062 0.064 
6 0.687 0.704 0.710 0.240 0.164 0.159 0.043 0.067 0.064 0.030 0.066 0.067 
7 0.693 0.680 0.688 0.241 0.175 0.168 0.040 0.069 0.067 0.026 0.076 0.078 
8 0.671 0.657 0.659 0.243 0.186 0.176 0.058 0.071 0.070 0.028 0.086 0.090 
9 0.654 0.639 0.642 0.260 0.195 0.182 0.058 0.073 0.081 0.028 0.093 0.101 
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Appendix D. Marginal Effects Tables 
  Appendix Table D.1. Marginal Effect of Drinking Status During COMBINE Treatment (T=2) 
 Drinking Outcome 
During COMBINE 
Treatment 
Not 
Em-
ployed 
Employed    
< 90% of 
Period 
Employed 
Part Time    
> 90% of 
Period 
Employed 
Full Time    
> 90% of 
Period 
Conditional 
Log Wage 
Anti-
Depress-
ant Use 
No  
Treat-
ment 
Self 
Help 
Visits 
Out- 
patient 
Therapy 
(No 
RxT) RxT Abstinent  
Non-   
Problem 
Drinking 
Only 
Problem 
Drinking 
Less 
than 
50% of 
Period 
Problem 
Drinking 
More 
than 
50% of 
Period 
Average Outcome 
              
 
Abstinence 
 
0.155 0.150 0.129 0.566 2.867 0.157 0.731 0.145 0.072 0.052 0.415 0.085 0.178 0.322 
 
Non-
Problem 
Drinking 
Only 
 
0.143 0.172 0.125 0.561 2.805 0.140 0.773 0.091 0.069 0.067 0.211 0.222 0.275 0.292 
 
Problem 
Drinking 
<50% of 
Period 
 
0.194 0.180 0.116 0.509 2.805 0.172 0.656 0.176 0.087 0.082 0.261 0.095 0.286 0.358 
 
Problem 
Drinking 
>50% of 
Period 
 
0.172 0.178 0.122 0.528 2.823 0.161 0.666 0.189 0.073 0.072 0.245 0.067 0.185 0.503 
Marginal Effects 
              
  
Relative To 
              
 
Non-
Problem 
Drinking 
Only 
Abstinence 
-0.012 0.022 -0.004 -0.005 -0.063 -0.017 0.042 -0.055 -0.003 0.016 -0.204 0.137 0.098 -0.030 
 
(0.010) (0.013) (0.012) (0.018) (0.008) (0.014) (0.019) (0.014) (0.009) (0.011) (0.015) (0.015) (0.018) (0.019) 
 
p=.224 p=.108 p=.705 p=.775 p=.000 p=.206 p=.033 p=.000 p=.790 p=.177 p=.000 p=.000 p=.000 p=.107 
 
Problem 
Drinking 
<50% of 
Period 
0.039 0.031 -0.013 -0.057 -0.063 0.015 -0.075 0.030 0.015 0.030 -0.154 0.010 0.109 0.036 
 
(0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.006) (0.010) (0.014) (0.010) (0.007) (0.008) (0.013) (0.007) (0.011) (0.013) 
 
p=.000 p=.001 p=.154 p=.000 p=.000 p=.145 0.000 p=.003 p=.042 p=.000 p=.000 p=.187 p=.000 p=.007 
 
Problem 
Drinking   
> 50% of 
Period 
0.017 0.029 -0.007 -0.038 -0.045 0.004 -0.065 0.044 0.001 0.020 -0.170 -0.018 0.007 0.181 
 
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.011) (0.006) (0.009) (0.015) (0.010) (0.007) (0.008) (0.013) (0.008) (0.009) (0.013) 
  p=.017 p=.000 p=.344 p=.001 p=.000 p=.678 0.000 p=.000 p=.830 p=.013 p=.000 p=.020 p=.419 p=.000 
 
 
 
            
Continued on next page 
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  Appendix Table D.1. (Continued)  Marginal Effect of Drinking Status During COMBINE Treatment (T=2) 
 Drinking Outcome 
During COMBINE 
Treatment 
Not 
Employed 
Employed    
< 90% of 
Period 
Employed 
Part Time    
> 90% of 
Period 
Employed 
Full Time    
> 90% of 
Period 
Conditional 
Log Wage 
Anti-
Depress-
ant Use 
No 
Treatment 
Self 
Help 
Visits 
Out- 
patient 
Therapy 
(No 
RxT) RxT Abstinent  
Non-   
Problem 
Drinking 
Only 
Problem 
Drinking 
Less 
than 
50% of 
Period 
Problem 
Drinking 
More 
than 
50% of 
Period 
 
Problem 
Drinking 
Less 
than 
50% of 
Period 
Non-
Problem 
Drinking 
Only 
0.052 0.009 -0.008 -0.052 0.000 0.032 -0.117 0.085 0.018 0.015 0.050 -0.127 0.011 0.066 
 
(0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.017) (0.008) (0.012) (0.019) (0.014) (0.009) (0.012) (0.013) (0.017) (0.017) (0.019) 
 
p=.000 p=.459 p=.494 p=.002 p=.989 p=.010 p=.000 p=.000 p=.062 p=.217 p=.000 p=.000 p=.515 p=.001 
 
Problem 
Drinking 
More 
than 
50% of 
Period 
0.029 0.007 -0.003 -0.033 0.018 0.021 -0.107 0.099 0.004 0.004 0.034 -0.155 -0.090 0.211 
 
(0.010) (0.013) (0.012) (0.016) (0.007) (0.012) (0.019) (0.014) (0.009) (0.012) (0.014) (0.018) (0.016) (0.019) 
 
p=.006 p=.595 p=.837 p=.044 p=.011 p=.075 p=.000 p=.000 p=.670 p=.715 p=.013 p=.000 p=.000 p=.000 
Marginal Effects 
  
            
 
Problem 
Drinking 
>50% of 
Period 
Problem 
Drinking 
<50% 
of 
Period 
-0.022 -0.002 0.006 0.019 0.018 -0.011 0.011 0.013 -0.014 -0.010 -0.016 -0.028 -0.101 0.145 
 
(0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.010) (0.005) (0.007) (0.010) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.006) (0.008) (0.011) 
 
p=.001 p=.791 p=.360 p=.057 p=.001 p=.134 p=.307 p=.092 p=.017 p=.114 p=.100 p=.000 p=.000 p=.000 
  
 
1
0
8
 
  Appendix Table D.2. Marginal Effect of Drinking Status During COMBINE Treatment (T=2) - Estimated without controlling for unobserved heterogeneity 
 
Drinking Outcome During 
COMBINE Treatment 
Not 
Em-
ployed 
Employed    
< 90% of 
Period 
Employed 
Part Time    
> 90% of 
Period 
Employed 
Full Time    
> 90% of 
Period 
Conditional 
Log Wage 
Anti-
Depress-
ant Use 
No  
Treat-
ment 
Self 
Help 
Visits 
Out- 
patient 
Therapy 
(No 
RxT) RxT Abstinent  
Non-   
Problem 
Drinking 
Only 
Problem 
Drinking 
Less 
than 
50% of 
Period 
Problem 
Drinking 
More 
than 
50% of 
Period 
Average Outcome 
              
 
Abstinence 
 
0.152 0.148 0.119 0.581 0.499 0.132 0.729 0.167 0.061 0.043 0.533 0.089 0.155 0.223 
 
Non-
Problem 
Drinking 
Only 
 
0.142 0.168 0.123 0.567 0.481 0.125 0.767 0.105 0.066 0.063 0.245 0.240 0.276 0.239 
 
Problem 
Drinking 
<50% of 
Period 
 
0.190 0.185 0.118 0.507 0.418 0.167 0.660 0.175 0.086 0.079 0.242 0.096 0.308 0.354 
 
Problem 
Drinking 
>50% of 
Period 
 
0.171 0.184 0.120 0.525 0.449 0.157 0.671 0.175 0.077 0.076 0.177 0.058 0.197 0.569 
Marginal Effects 
              
  
Relative To 
              
 
Non-
Problem 
Drinking 
Only 
Abstinence 
-0.011 0.020 0.004 -0.014 -0.017 -0.007 0.037 -0.061 0.005 0.019 -0.288 0.150 0.121 0.017 
 
(0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.018) (0.021) (0.013) (0.020) (0.015) (0.010) (0.013) (0.022) (0.017) (0.015) (0.020) 
 
p=.395 p=.153 p=.741 p=.440 p=.402 p=.615 p=.066 p=.000 p=.652 p=.130 p=.000 p=.000 p=.000 p=.418 
 
Problem 
Drinking 
Less than 
50% of 
Period 
0.038 0.038 -0.001 -0.075 -0.081 0.035 -0.069 0.009 0.025 0.036 -0.291 0.007 0.152 0.131 
 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.012) (0.019) (0.011) (0.017) (0.012) (0.007) (0.012) (0.017) (0.010) (0.010) (0.015) 
 
p=.001 p=.001 p=.908 p=.000 p=.000 p=.001 p=.000 p=.476 p=.001 p=.003 p=.000 p=.451 p=.000 p=.000 
 
Problem 
Drinking 
More than 
50% of 
Period 
0.019 0.036 0.001 -0.056 -0.050 0.025 -0.058 0.009 0.016 0.033 -0.356 -0.032 0.041 0.346 
 
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (0.018) (0.010) (0.017) (0.013) (0.009) (0.010) (0.017) (0.008) (0.011) (0.015) 
  
p=.075 p=.002 p=.901 p=.000 p=.007 p=.017 p=.001 p=.506 p=.058 p=.002 p=.000 p=.000 p=.000 p=.000 
             
Continued on next page 
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  Appendix Table D.2. (Continued)  Marginal Effect of Drinking Status During COMBINE Treatment (T=2) - Estimated without controlling for unobserved heterogeneity 
 Drinking Outcome 
During COMBINE 
Treatment 
Not 
Employed 
Employed    
< 90% of 
Period 
Employed 
Part Time    
> 90% of 
Period 
Employed 
Full Time    
> 90% of 
Period 
Conditional 
Log Wage 
Anti-
Depress-
ant Use 
No 
Treatment 
Self 
Help 
Visits 
Out- 
patient 
Therapy 
(No 
RxT) RxT Abstinent  
Non-   
Problem 
Drinking 
Only 
Problem 
Drinking 
Less 
than 
50% of 
Period 
Problem 
Drinking 
More 
than 
50% of 
Period 
 
Problem 
Drinking 
Less 
than 
50% of 
Period 
Non-
Problem 
Drinking 
Only 
0.049 0.017 -0.006 -0.060 -0.063 0.042 -0.107 0.070 0.020 0.017 -0.003 -0.143 0.031 0.115 
 
(0.011) (0.013) (0.012) (0.018) (0.022) (0.013) (0.021) (0.015) (0.009) (0.011) (0.018) (0.016) (0.014) (0.019) 
 
p=.000 p=.185 p=.645 p=.001 p=.005 p=.002 p=.000 p=.000 p=.024 p=.136 p=.871 p=.000 p=.028 p=.000 
 
Problem 
Drinking 
More 
than 
50% of 
Period 
0.029 0.015 -0.003 -0.042 -0.033 0.032 -0.096 0.070 0.012 0.014 -0.068 -0.182 -0.080 0.330 
 
(0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.019) (0.024) (0.014) (0.019) (0.016) (0.010) (0.013) (0.020) (0.017) (0.016) (0.020) 
 
p=.011 p=.213 p=.814 p=.028 p=.178 p=.028 p=.000 p=.000 p=.227 p=.300 p=.001 p=.000 p=.000 p=.000 
Marginal Effects 
              
 
Problem 
Drinking 
>50% 
of 
Period 
Problem 
Drinking 
<50% 
of 
Period 
-0.020 -0.002 0.003 0.019 0.031 -0.010 0.011 0.000 -0.008 -0.003 -0.065 -0.039 -0.111 0.215 
 
(0.010) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.016) (0.011) (0.016) (0.012) (0.007) (0.011) (0.012) (0.008) (0.011) (0.014) 
 p=.046 p=.839 p=.772 p=.087 p=.068 p=.337 p=.479 p=.973 p=.253 p=.790 p=.000 p=.000 p=.000 p=.000 
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Appendix Table D.3 - Over Time Marginal Effects of Non-Problem Drinking Only v. Abstinent in Time Period 2 
Time 
Period 
Not        
Em-  
ployed 
Employed 
< 90% of 
Period 
Employed 
Part Time 
> 90% of 
Period 
Employed 
Full Time 
> 90% of 
Period 
Conditional 
Log Wage 
Anti-De-
pressant 
Use 
No      
Treat-  
ment 
Self Help 
Visits 
Outpatient 
Therapy 
(No RxT) RxT Abstinent  
Non-
Problem 
Drinking 
Only 
Problem 
Drinking 
Less than 
50% of 
Period 
Problem 
Drinking 
More than 
50% of 
Period 
3 
-0.011 0.015 -0.003 -0.001 -0.041 -0.011 0.036 -0.047 -0.001 0.012 -0.125 0.077 0.083 -0.035 
(0.006) (0.011) (0.007) (0.013) (0.006) (0.008) (0.014) (0.012) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.015) (0.017) 
p=.096 p=.179 p=.687 p=.910 p=.000 p=.152 p=.017 p=.001 p=.900 p=.161 p=.000 p=.000 p=.000 p=.040 
4 
-0.013 0.017 -0.003 -0.001 -0.046 -0.013 0.036 -0.044 -0.002 0.010 -0.167 0.104 0.086 -0.023 
(0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.014) (0.006) (0.009) (0.014) (0.011) (0.007) (0.008) (0.012) (0.011) (0.015) (0.017) 
p=.149 p=.139 p=.737 p=.961 p=.000 p=.175 p=.018 p=.001 p=.793 p=.191 p=.000 p=.000 p=.000 p=.193 
5 
-0.013 0.020 -0.003 -0.004 -0.052 -0.015 0.039 -0.049 -0.003 0.012 -0.191 0.120 0.098 -0.026 
(0.010) (0.013) (0.010) (0.016) (0.007) (0.011) (0.017) (0.013) (0.008) (0.009) (0.014) (0.013) (0.016) (0.018) 
p=.186 p=.123 p=.721 p=.824 p=.000 p=.196 p=.026 p=.001 p=.747 p=.194 p=.000 p=.000 p=.000 p=.151 
6 
-0.012 0.022 -0.004 -0.005 -0.059 -0.017 0.041 -0.052 -0.003 0.014 -0.216 0.139 0.102 -0.025 
(0.011) (0.013) (0.011) (0.018) (0.008) (0.013) (0.019) (0.014) (0.008) (0.010) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.019) 
p=.255 p=.113 p=.718 p=.774 p=.000 p=.206 p=.035 p=.001 p=.732 p=.195 p=.000 p=.000 p=.000 p=.191 
7 
-0.011 0.024 -0.005 -0.007 -0.067 -0.018 0.044 -0.057 -0.003 0.017 -0.231 0.154 0.106 -0.029 
(0.011) (0.014) (0.013) (0.020) (0.009) (0.015) (0.021) (0.015) (0.010) (0.012) (0.017) (0.018) (0.019) (0.020) 
p=.305 p=.109 p=.696 p=.726 p=.000 p=.231 p=.048 p=.001 p=.764 p=.189 p=.000 p=.000 p=.000 p=.145 
8 
-0.011 0.025 -0.006 -0.008 -0.075 -0.021 0.046 -0.062 -0.003 0.020 -0.244 0.170 0.108 -0.033 
(0.011) (0.015) (0.015) (0.021) (0.010) (0.017) (0.024) (0.017) (0.011) (0.015) (0.019) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) 
p=.333 p=.107 p=.701 p=.705 p=.000 p=.238 p=.061 p=.001 p=.763 p=.197 p=.000 p=.000 p=.000 p=.114 
9 
-0.011 0.027 -0.006 -0.010 -0.084 -0.023 0.048 -0.068 -0.003 0.023 -0.252 0.178 0.112 -0.038 
(0.012) (0.016) (0.016) (0.023) (0.012) (0.020) (0.026) (0.018) (0.013) (0.018) (0.019) (0.022) (0.023) (0.021) 
p=.348 p=.097 p=.700 p=.670 p=.000 p=.252 p=.078 p=.001 p=.800 p=.192 p=.000 p=.000 p=.000 p=.082 
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Appendix Table D.4 - Over Time Marginal Effects of Problem Drinking < 50% of the Period v. Abstinent During Time Period 2 
Time 
Period 
Not        
Em-  
ployed 
Employed 
< 90% of 
Period 
Employed 
Part Time 
> 90% of 
Period 
Employed 
Full Time 
> 90% of 
Period 
Conditional 
Log Wage 
Anti-De 
pressant 
Use 
No      
Treat-  
ment 
Self 
Help 
Visits 
Outpatient 
Therapy 
(No RxT) RxT Abstinent  
Non-  
Problem 
Drinking 
Only 
Problem 
Drinking 
<50% of 
Period 
Problem 
Drinking 
>50% of 
Period 
3 
0.022 0.025 -0.008 -0.039 -0.041 0.006 -0.050 0.018 0.011 0.021 -0.113 -0.001 0.089 0.026 
(0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.005) (0.006) (0.009) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.005) (0.010) (0.011) 
p=.000 p=.002 p=.154 p=.000 p=.000 p=.274 p=.000 p=.013 p=.054 p=.002 p=.000 p=.865 p=.000 p=.033 
4 
0.033 0.023 -0.010 -0.046 -0.047 0.009 -0.054 0.022 0.011 0.021 -0.141 0.007 0.093 0.041 
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.005) (0.007) (0.010) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.011) (0.005) (0.009) (0.012) 
p=.000 p=.004 p=.126 p=.000 p=.000 p=.206 p=.000 p=.005 p=.032 p=.001 p=.000 p=.198 p=.000 p=.002 
5 
0.038 0.028 -0.012 -0.054 -0.055 0.011 -0.065 0.027 0.014 0.025 -0.153 0.009 0.106 0.038 
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.011) (0.006) (0.008) (0.012) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.013) (0.006) (0.010) (0.012) 
p=.000 p=.002 p=.131 p=.000 p=.000 p=.182 p=.000 p=.004 p=.033 p=.001 p=.000 p=.170 p=.000 p=.004 
6 
0.043 0.030 -0.013 -0.060 -0.064 0.014 -0.074 0.031 0.014 0.028 -0.164 0.013 0.111 0.041 
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.006) (0.010) (0.014) (0.010) (0.007) (0.007) (0.014) (0.007) (0.010) (0.013) 
p=.000 p=.002 p=.154 p=.000 p=.000 p=.167 p=.000 p=.003 p=.038 p=.000 p=.000 p=.090 p=.000 p=.004 
7 
0.045 0.034 -0.014 -0.065 -0.074 0.017 -0.085 0.036 0.016 0.033 -0.167 0.013 0.116 0.038 
(0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.013) (0.007) (0.011) (0.016) (0.011) (0.008) (0.009) (0.015) (0.008) (0.012) (0.014) 
p=.000 p=.001 p=.158 p=.000 p=.000 p=.141 p=.000 p=.004 p=.044 p=.001 p=.000 p=.123 p=.000 p=.010 
8 
0.046 0.036 -0.014 -0.067 -0.084 0.021 -0.096 0.039 0.018 0.039 -0.170 0.013 0.121 0.036 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.014) (0.008) (0.013) (0.018) (0.013) (0.009) (0.010) (0.016) (0.009) (0.013) (0.015) 
p=.000 p=.001 p=.207 p=.000 p=.000 p=.126 p=.000 p=.004 p=.053 p=.001 p=.000 p=.172 p=.000 p=.022 
9 
0.047 0.037 -0.014 -0.070 -0.095 0.024 -0.107 0.042 0.019 0.045 -0.172 0.011 0.129 0.032 
(0.009) (0.010) (0.012) (0.015) (0.009) (0.015) (0.020) (0.014) (0.010) (0.012) (0.017) (0.010) (0.014) (0.016) 
p=.000 p=.001 p=.240 p=.000 p=.000 p=.110 p=.000 p=.006 p=.073 p=.001 p=.000 p=.289 p=.000 p=.052 
 
  
 
1
1
2
 
Appendix Table D.5 - Over Time Marginal Effects of Problem Drinking > 50% of Period v. Abstinent During Time Period 2 
Time 
Period 
Not     
Em- 
ployed 
Employed 
< 90% of 
Period 
Employed 
Part Time 
> 90% of 
Period 
Employed 
Full Time 
> 90% of 
Period 
Conditional 
Log Wage 
Anti-De- 
pressant 
Use 
No   
Treat-
ment 
Self 
Help 
Visits 
Out-
patient 
Therapy 
(No RxT) RxT Abstinent  
Non-
Problem 
Drinking 
Only 
Problem 
Drinking 
<50% of 
Period 
Problem 
Drinking 
>50% of 
Period 
3 
0.008 0.022 -0.005 -0.025 -0.026 0.001 -0.039 0.025 0.001 0.014 -0.124 -0.020 -0.014 0.158 
(0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.009) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.011) 
p=.059 p=.001 p=.277 p=.001 p=.000 p=.870 p=.000 p=.000 p=.841 p=.021 p=.000 p=.000 p=.110 p=.000 
4 
0.013 0.022 -0.006 -0.029 -0.030 0.001 -0.045 0.029 0.002 0.014 -0.159 -0.017 0.002 0.174 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.008) (0.004) (0.006) (0.010) (0.007) (0.004) (0.005) (0.011) (0.006) (0.008) (0.011) 
p=.025 p=.001 p=.283 p=.001 p=.000 p=.800 p=.000 p=.000 p=.704 p=.014 p=.000 p=.010 p=.818 p=.000 
5 
0.016 0.027 -0.006 -0.036 -0.036 0.002 -0.055 0.037 0.002 0.017 -0.169 -0.017 0.007 0.179 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.010) (0.005) (0.007) (0.013) (0.008) (0.005) (0.006) (0.012) (0.007) (0.009) (0.012) 
p=.024 p=.001 p=.303 p=.001 p=.000 p=.757 p=.000 p=.000 p=.707 p=.013 p=.000 p=.024 p=.444 p=.000 
6 
0.019 0.028 -0.007 -0.040 -0.043 0.003 -0.064 0.043 0.002 0.019 -0.182 -0.016 0.012 0.186 
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.011) (0.006) (0.008) (0.015) (0.010) (0.006) (0.007) (0.014) (0.008) (0.009) (0.013) 
p=.016 p=.001 p=.355 p=.001 p=.000 p=.736 p=.000 p=.000 p=.746 p=.014 p=.000 p=.054 p=.199 p=.000 
7 
0.020 0.032 -0.008 -0.044 -0.050 0.004 -0.074 0.050 0.002 0.022 -0.184 -0.017 0.013 0.188 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.012) (0.006) (0.010) (0.017) (0.011) (0.007) (0.009) (0.015) (0.009) (0.010) (0.014) 
p=.014 p=.001 p=.359 p=.001 p=.000 p=.656 p=.000 p=.000 p=.775 p=.016 p=.000 p=.057 p=.193 p=.000 
8 
0.020 0.033 -0.008 -0.046 -0.057 0.005 -0.084 0.057 0.002 0.026 -0.186 -0.019 0.013 0.192 
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.013) (0.007) (0.011) (0.019) (0.013) (0.008) (0.010) (0.016) (0.010) (0.010) (0.014) 
p=.016 p=.001 p=.426 p=.002 p=.000 p=.635 p=.000 p=.000 p=.823 p=.018 p=.000 p=.050 p=.208 p=.000 
9 
0.020 0.035 -0.008 -0.047 -0.065 0.007 -0.093 0.063 0.001 0.029 -0.186 -0.022 0.015 0.193 
(0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.014) (0.008) (0.013) (0.021) (0.014) (0.009) (0.012) (0.017) (0.010) (0.011) (0.015) 
p=.021 p=.001 p=.422 p=.002 p=.000 p=.571 p=.000 p=.000 p=.950 p=.022 p=.000 p=.036 p=.196 p=.000 
 
 
 
  
 
1
1
3
 
Appendix Table D.6 - Over Time Marginal Effects of Problem Drinking Less than 50% of Period v. Non-Problem Drinking Only 
Time 
Period 
Not     
Em- 
ployed 
Employed 
< 90% of 
Period 
Employed 
Part Time 
> 90% of 
Period 
Employed 
Full Time 
> 90% of 
Period 
Conditional 
Log Wage 
Anti-De-
pressant 
Use 
No   
Treat-
ment 
Self 
Help 
Visits 
Out-
patient 
Therapy 
(No RxT) RxT Abstinent  
Non-
Problem 
Drinking 
Only 
Problem 
Drinking 
<50% of 
Period 
Problem 
Drinking 
>50% of 
Period 
3 
0.032 0.010 -0.005 -0.037 0.000 0.017 -0.086 0.064 0.012 0.009 0.011 -0.078 0.006 0.061 
(0.007) (0.010) (0.008) (0.012) (0.007) (0.007) (0.015) (0.012) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.010) (0.014) (0.016) 
p=.000 p=.347 p=.522 p=.006 p=.955 p=.028 p=.000 p=.000 p=.142 p=.313 p=.142 p=.000 p=.689 p=.001 
4 
0.046 0.007 -0.008 -0.045 -0.002 0.021 -0.090 0.066 0.013 0.011 0.026 -0.097 0.007 0.064 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.014) (0.007) (0.009) (0.015) (0.011) (0.007) (0.008) (0.011) (0.013) (0.014) (0.017) 
p=.000 p=.513 p=.434 p=.002 p=.831 p=.022 p=.000 p=.000 p=.078 p=.205 p=.022 p=.000 p=.609 p=.001 
5 
0.051 0.008 -0.008 -0.051 -0.004 0.026 -0.104 0.076 0.016 0.013 0.038 -0.111 0.008 0.065 
(0.011) (0.012) (0.010) (0.015) (0.008) (0.011) (0.017) (0.013) (0.008) (0.010) (0.012) (0.015) (0.015) (0.018) 
p=.000 p=.500 p=.439 p=.002 p=.648 p=.018 p=.000 p=.000 p=.056 p=.194 p=.005 p=.000 p=.591 p=.001 
6 
0.055 0.008 -0.009 -0.055 -0.006 0.031 -0.115 0.083 0.017 0.015 0.052 -0.127 0.009 0.066 
(0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.017) (0.008) (0.012) (0.019) (0.013) (0.008) (0.011) (0.015) (0.018) (0.016) (0.019) 
p=.000 p=.482 p=.471 p=.003 p=.511 p=.015 p=.000 p=.000 p=.052 p=.180 p=.001 p=.000 p=.608 p=.002 
7 
0.056 0.010 -0.009 -0.058 -0.007 0.035 -0.128 0.093 0.019 0.017 0.064 -0.141 0.010 0.068 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.018) (0.009) (0.014) (0.021) (0.014) (0.009) (0.013) (0.016) (0.020) (0.018) (0.020) 
p=.000 p=.402 p=.492 p=.004 p=.424 p=.014 p=.000 p=.000 p=.054 p=.200 p=.000 p=.000 p=.571 p=.002 
8 
0.056 0.011 -0.009 -0.059 -0.009 0.042 -0.142 0.102 0.021 0.019 0.074 -0.156 0.014 0.069 
(0.012) (0.013) (0.015) (0.020) (0.010) (0.015) (0.023) (0.015) (0.010) (0.015) (0.017) (0.022) (0.019) (0.021) 
p=.000 p=.390 p=.566 p=.005 p=.382 p=.011 p=.000 p=.000 p=.052 p=.206 p=.000 p=.000 p=.490 p=.002 
9 
0.058 0.010 -0.008 -0.060 -0.011 0.047 -0.155 0.111 0.023 0.022 0.080 -0.167 0.017 0.070 
(0.012) (0.013) (0.016) (0.020) (0.011) (0.017) (0.026) (0.016) (0.012) (0.017) (0.017) (0.024) (0.021) (0.021) 
p=.000 p=.443 p=.609 p=.006 p=.348 p=.010 p=.000 p=.000 p=.066 p=.221 p=.000 p=.000 p=.420 p=.003 
 
 
  
 
1
1
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Appendix Table D.7 - Over Time Marginal Effects of Problem Drinking More than 50% of Period v. Non-Problem Drinking Only 
Time 
Period 
Not     
Em- 
ployed 
Employed 
< 90% of 
Period 
Employed 
Part Time 
> 90% of 
Period 
Employed 
Full Time > 
90% of 
Period 
Conditional 
Log Wage 
Anti-De-
pressant 
Use 
No   
Treat-
ment 
Self 
Help 
Visits 
Out-
patient 
Therapy 
(No RxT) RxT Abstinent  
Non-
Problem 
Drinking 
Only 
Problem 
Drinking 
<50% of 
Period 
Problem 
Drinking 
>50% of 
Period 
3 
0.019 0.007 -0.002 -0.024 0.015 0.012 -0.075 0.071 0.002 0.002 0.001 -0.097 -0.097 0.193 
(0.006) (0.010) (0.007) (0.011) (0.005) (0.007) (0.014) (0.012) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.013) (0.016) 
p=.007 p=.484 p=.815 p=.040 p=.006 p=.082 p=.000 p=.000 p=.798 p=.805 p=.943 p=.000 p=.000 p=.000 
4 
0.026 0.005 -0.003 -0.029 0.015 0.014 -0.081 0.074 0.004 0.004 0.009 -0.121 -0.084 0.196 
(0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.013) (0.005) (0.008) (0.014) (0.011) (0.007) (0.008) (0.011) (0.014) (0.013) (0.017) 
p=.006 p=.618 p=.763 p=.032 p=.009 p=.085 p=.000 p=.000 p=.603 p=.655 p=.423 p=.000 p=.000 p=.000 
5 
0.029 0.006 -0.003 -0.032 0.015 0.017 -0.094 0.085 0.005 0.005 0.022 -0.136 -0.091 0.205 
(0.010) (0.012) (0.010) (0.015) (0.006) (0.010) (0.017) (0.013) (0.008) (0.009) (0.013) (0.016) (0.015) (0.019) 
p=.007 p=.606 p=.784 p=.035 p=.015 p=.088 p=.000 p=.000 p=.553 p=.634 p=.092 p=.000 p=.000 p=.000 
6 
0.031 0.007 -0.003 -0.035 0.016 0.020 -0.105 0.095 0.005 0.005 0.034 -0.155 -0.090 0.211 
(0.011) (0.013) (0.012) (0.017) (0.007) (0.011) (0.018) (0.014) (0.008) (0.011) (0.015) (0.019) (0.016) (0.020) 
p=.008 p=.608 p=.828 p=.045 p=.024 p=.088 p=.000 p=.000 p=.559 p=.644 p=.027 p=.000 p=.000 p=.000 
7 
0.031 0.008 -0.003 -0.037 0.017 0.023 -0.118 0.108 0.005 0.005 0.047 -0.171 -0.093 0.218 
(0.011) (0.014) (0.013) (0.018) (0.008) (0.013) (0.021) (0.015) (0.009) (0.013) (0.016) (0.021) (0.017) (0.021) 
p=.010 p=.562 p=.850 p=.056 p=.035 p=.087 p=.000 p=.000 p=.605 p=.684 p=.007 p=.000 p=.000 p=.000 
8 
0.031 0.008 -0.002 -0.037 0.018 0.027 -0.130 0.119 0.005 0.006 0.058 -0.189 -0.094 0.225 
(0.012) (0.014) (0.015) (0.020) (0.009) (0.015) (0.023) (0.016) (0.010) (0.016) (0.017) (0.024) (0.019) (0.022) 
p=.013 p=.563 p=.903 p=.071 p=.046 p=.084 p=.000 p=.000 p=.632 p=.701 p=.002 p=.000 p=.000 p=.000 
9 
0.031 0.008 -0.002 -0.037 0.020 0.030 -0.141 0.131 0.004 0.006 0.066 -0.200 -0.097 0.231 
(0.012) (0.015) (0.017) (0.021) (0.010) (0.017) (0.026) (0.017) (0.012) (0.018) (0.018) (0.026) (0.021) (0.022) 
p=.016 p=.612 p=.896 p=.088 p=.055 p=.079 p=.000 p=.000 p=.759 p=.747 p=.001 p=.000 p=.000 p=.000 
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Appendix Table D.8 - Over Time Marginal Effects of Problem Drinking Less than 50% of Period v. Problem Drinking More than 50% of Period 
Time 
Period 
Not     
Em- 
ployed 
Employed 
< 90% of 
Period 
Employed 
Part Time 
> 90% of 
Period 
Employed 
Full Time 
> 90% of 
Period 
Conditional 
Log Wage 
Anti-De-
pressant 
Use 
No   
Treat-
ment 
Self 
Help 
Visits 
Out-
patient 
Therapy 
(No RxT) RxT Abstinent  
Non-
Problem 
Drinking 
Only 
Problem 
Drinking 
<50% of 
Period 
Problem 
Drinking 
>50% of 
Period 
3 
-0.014 -0.003 0.004 0.013 0.015 -0.005 0.011 0.007 -0.010 -0.007 -0.011 -0.019 -0.102 0.132 
(0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.007) (0.008) 
p=.001 p=.622 p=.394 p=.061 p=.001 p=.180 p=.128 p=.217 p=.017 p=.122 p=.051 p=.000 p=.000 p=.000 
4 
-0.020 -0.002 0.005 0.017 0.017 -0.007 0.010 0.007 -0.010 -0.007 -0.017 -0.024 -0.091 0.133 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.005) (0.007) (0.009) 
p=.002 p=.790 p=.333 p=.043 p=.001 p=.153 p=.225 p=.210 p=.021 p=.112 p=.030 p=.000 p=.000 p=.000 
5 
-0.022 -0.002 0.005 0.018 0.019 -0.009 0.010 0.010 -0.011 -0.008 -0.016 -0.026 -0.099 0.141 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.009) (0.005) (0.006) (0.009) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.005) (0.008) (0.010) 
p=.002 p=.819 p=.326 p=.052 p=.001 p=.150 p=.285 p=.162 p=.022 p=.124 p=.074 p=.000 p=.000 p=.000 
6 
-0.024 -0.002 0.006 0.020 0.022 -0.011 0.010 0.012 -0.012 -0.010 -0.018 -0.028 -0.099 0.145 
(0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.010) (0.005) (0.007) (0.010) (0.008) (0.005) (0.006) (0.010) (0.006) (0.008) (0.011) 
p=.002 p=.810 p=.337 p=.059 p=.000 p=.142 p=.348 p=.134 p=.025 p=.114 p=.086 p=.000 p=.000 p=.000 
7 
-0.025 -0.003 0.007 0.021 0.024 -0.013 0.010 0.015 -0.014 -0.011 -0.017 -0.030 -0.103 0.150 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.011) (0.006) (0.008) (0.012) (0.009) (0.006) (0.007) (0.011) (0.006) (0.009) (0.012) 
p=.003 p=.768 p=.350 p=.067 p=.000 p=.142 p=.386 p=.100 p=.027 p=.122 p=.131 p=.000 p=.000 p=.000 
8 
-0.026 -0.003 0.007 0.022 0.027 -0.015 0.012 0.018 -0.016 -0.013 -0.016 -0.032 -0.108 0.156 
(0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.012) (0.007) (0.010) (0.013) (0.010) (0.007) (0.008) (0.012) (0.007) (0.009) (0.013) 
p=.003 p=.771 p=.401 p=.076 p=.000 p=.128 p=.378 p=.083 p=.026 p=.124 p=.175 p=.000 p=.000 p=.000 
9 
-0.027 -0.002 0.006 0.023 0.030 -0.017 0.014 0.021 -0.019 -0.016 -0.014 -0.033 -0.114 0.161 
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.007) (0.011) (0.014) (0.011) (0.008) (0.010) (0.012) (0.008) (0.010) (0.014) 
p=.003 p=.805 p=.485 p=.070 p=.000 p=.128 p=.335 p=.067 p=.025 p=.121 p=.270 p=.000 p=.000 p=.000 
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  Appendix Table D.9. Marginal Effect of Lagged Employment Status Following COMBINE Treatment 
 
Lagged Employment 
Status During 
COMBINE Treatment 
and All Periods 
Following Combined 
Treatment 
Not       
Em- 
ployed 
Em- 
ployed 
< 90% 
of 
Period 
Em- 
ployed 
Part 
Time 
>90% of 
Period 
Em-  
ployed   
Full 
Time  
>90% of 
Period 
Condi-
tional     
Log    
Wage 
Anti-
De-
pressant 
Use 
No      
Treat-  
ment 
Self 
Help 
Visits 
Out-  
patient 
Therapy 
(No RxT) RxT 
Abst-
inent  
Non-
Problem 
Drinking 
Only 
Problem 
Drinking 
<50% of 
Period 
Problem 
Drinking 
>50% of 
Period 
Average Outcome 
              
 
Not 
Employed  0.234 0.198 0.109 0.458 2.780 0.166 0.685 0.166 0.077 0.072 0.267 0.097 0.225 0.410 
 
Employed 
< 90% of 
Period  0.169 0.224 0.125 0.482 2.806 0.155 0.697 0.161 0.071 0.072 0.290 0.098 0.229 0.383 
 
Employed 
Part Time 
> 90% of 
Period 
 
0.149 0.186 0.201 0.464 2.848 0.160 0.687 0.166 0.078 0.070 0.287 0.093 0.224 0.395 
 
Employed 
Full Time 
> 90% of 
Period 
 
0.142 0.162 0.105 0.591 2.828 0.162 0.692 0.163 0.077 0.067 0.279 0.098 0.221 0.401 
Marginal Effects 
              
  
Relative 
To               
 
Employed 
< 90% of 
Period 
Not 
Employed 
-0.065 0.025 0.016 0.024 0.026 -0.011 0.012 -0.005 -0.007 0.000 0.023 0.001 0.004 -0.027 
 
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) 
 
p=.000 p=.000 p=.010 p=.002 p=.001 p=.015 p=.056 p=.311 p=.158 p=.943 p=.001 p=.914 p=.505 p=.000 
 
Employed 
Part Time 
> 90% of 
Period 
-0.085 -0.013 0.092 0.006 0.068 -0.006 0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.002 0.020 -0.004 -0.001 -0.015 
 
(0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) 
 
p=.000 p=.067 p=.000 p=.505 p=.000 p=.095 p=.764 p=.943 p=.945 p=.609 p=.000 p=.312 p=.897 p=.009 
 
Employed 
Full Time 
> 90% of 
Period 
-0.092 -0.036 -0.004 0.133 0.047 -0.004 0.008 -0.003 0.000 -0.004 0.013 0.001 -0.004 -0.009 
 
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
  p=.000 p=.000 p=.266 p=.000 p=.000 p=.147 p=.052 p=.362 p=.960 p=.110 p=.001 p=.784 p=.297 p=.040 
            
Continued on next page 
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  Appendix Table D.9 (Continued). Marginal Effect of Lagged Employment Status Following COMBINE Treatment 
 
Lagged Employment 
Status During COMBINE 
Treatment and All Periods 
Following Combined 
Treatment 
Not       
Em- 
ployed 
Em- 
ployed 
< 90% 
of 
Period 
Em- 
ployed 
Part 
Time 
>90% of 
Period 
Em-  
ployed   
Full 
Time  
>90% of 
Period 
Condi-
tional     
Log    
Wage 
Anti-De-
pressant 
Use 
No      
Treat-  
ment 
Self 
Help 
Visits 
Out-  
patient 
Therapy 
(No RxT) RxT 
Absti-
nent  
Non-
Problem 
Drinking 
Only 
Problem 
Drinking 
<50% of 
Period 
Problem 
Drinking 
>50% of 
Period 
  
Relative to: 
              
Marginal Effects 
              
 
Employed 
Part Time 
> 90% of 
Period 
Employed 
< 90% of 
Period 
-0.020 -0.038 0.076 -0.018 0.042 0.005 -0.010 0.005 0.007 -0.002 -0.003 -0.005 -0.005 0.012 
 
(0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) 
 
p=.000 p=.000 p=.000 p=.013 p=.000 p=.328 p=.178 p=.403 p=.102 p=.671 p=.672 p=.404 p=.484 p=.111 
 
Employed 
Full Time 
> 90% of 
Period 
-0.027 -0.062 -0.020 0.109 0.021 0.007 -0.004 0.002 0.007 -0.004 -0.010 0.000 -0.008 0.018 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) 
 
p=.000 p=.000 p=.000 p=.000 p=.000 p=.049 p=.351 p=.647 p=.049 p=.129 p=.060 p=.937 p=.105 p=.002 
Marginal Effects 
              
 
Employed 
Full Time 
> 90% of 
Period 
Employed 
Part Time 
> 90% of 
Period 
-0.007 -0.024 -0.097 0.127 -0.021 0.002 0.006 -0.003 0.000 -0.003 -0.007 0.005 -0.003 0.006 
 
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) 
  
p=.092 p=.000 p=.000 p=.000 p=.000 p=.543 p=.311 p=.497 p=.968 p=.376 p=.070 p=.154 p=.514 p=.191 
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  Appendix Table D.10. Marginal Effect of Lagged Employment Status Following COMBINE Treatment - Estimated without controlling for unobserved heterogeneity 
 
Lagged Employment 
Status During 
COMBINE Treatment 
and All Periods Following 
Combined Treatment 
Not       
Em- 
ployed 
Em- 
ployed 
< 90% 
of 
Period 
Em- 
ployed 
Part 
Time 
>90% of 
Period 
Em-  
ployed   
Full 
Time  
>90% of 
Period 
Condi-
tional     
Log    
Wage 
Anti-De-
pressant 
Use 
No      
Treat-  
ment 
Self Help 
Visits 
Out-  
patient 
Therapy 
(No RxT) RxT Abstinent  
Non-
Problem 
Drinking 
Only 
Problem 
Drinking 
<50% of 
Period 
Problem 
Drinking 
>50% of 
Period 
Average Outcome 
              
 
Not 
Employed  
0.237 0.200 0.109 0.455 2.779 0.157 0.684 0.170 0.077 0.069 0.271 0.097 0.226 0.405 
 
Employed 
< 90% of 
Period  
0.169 0.226 0.123 0.482 2.771 0.150 0.698 0.162 0.071 0.069 0.289 0.098 0.232 0.381 
 
Employed 
Part Time 
> 90% of 
Period 
 
0.152 0.193 0.188 0.467 2.847 0.149 0.688 0.166 0.078 0.068 0.280 0.094 0.231 0.396 
 
Employed 
Full Time 
> 90% of 
Period 
 
0.144 0.161 0.102 0.593 2.855 0.152 0.692 0.165 0.076 0.066 0.278 0.099 0.223 0.400 
Marginal Effects 
              
  
Relative 
To               
 
Employed 
< 90% of 
Period 
Not 
Employed 
-0.068 0.027 0.014 0.027 -0.008 -0.008 0.014 -0.008 -0.006 0.000 0.018 0.001 0.006 -0.024 
 
(0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.009) (0.016) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) 
 
p=.000 p=.000 p=.024 p=.002 p=.589 p=.060 p=.041 p=.106 p=.209 p=.998 p=.001 p=.891 p=.362 p=.001 
 
Employed 
Part Time 
> 90% of 
Period 
-0.084 -0.007 0.079 0.012 0.068 -0.009 0.004 -0.004 0.001 -0.001 0.008 -0.004 0.004 -0.009 
 
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.008) (0.014) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) 
 
p=.000 p=.269 p=.000 p=.112 p=.000 p=.035 p=.505 p=.431 p=.775 p=.802 p=.182 p=.292 p=.462 p=.197 
 
Employed 
Full Time 
> 90% of 
Period 
-0.093 -0.038 -0.007 0.138 0.076 -0.006 0.008 -0.004 -0.001 -0.003 0.007 0.001 -0.003 -0.005 
 
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.010) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) 
  p=.000 p=.000 p=.080 p=.000 p=.000 p=.053 p=.080 p=.187 p=.765 p=.285 p=.094 p=.581 p=.490 p=.314 
            
Continued on next page 
  
  
 
1
1
9
 
 
  Appendix Table D.10 (Continued). Marginal Effect of Lagged Employment Status Following COMBINE Treatment - Estimated w/o controlling for unobserved heterogeneity 
 
Lagged Employment 
Status During 
COMBINE Treatment 
and All Periods Following 
Combined Treatment 
Not       
Em- 
ployed 
Em- 
ployed 
< 90% 
of 
Period 
Em- 
ployed 
Part 
Time 
>90% of 
Period 
Em-  
ployed   
Full 
Time  
>90% of 
Period 
Condi-
tional     
Log    
Wage 
Anti-De-
pressant 
Use 
No      
Treat-  
ment 
Self Help 
Visits 
Out-  
patient 
Therapy 
(No RxT) RxT Abstinent  
Non-
Problem 
Drinking 
Only 
Problem 
Drinking 
<50% of 
Period 
Problem 
Drinking 
>50% of 
Period 
                 
Marginal Effects 
              
 
Employed 
Part Time 
> 90% of 
Period 
Employed 
< 90% of 
Period 
-0.017 -0.034 0.065 -0.015 0.074 -0.001 -0.010 0.004 0.007 -0.001 -0.010 -0.004 -0.002 0.016 
 
(0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.008) (0.015) (0.004) (0.007) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
 
p=.003 p=.000 p=.000 p=.056 p=.000 p=.829 p=.193 p=.536 p=.124 p=.829 p=.136 p=.428 p=.813 p=.033 
 
Employed 
Full Time 
> 90% of 
Period 
-0.025 -0.065 -0.021 0.111 0.082 0.002 -0.006 0.003 0.005 -0.003 -0.012 0.001 -0.009 0.020 
 
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.010) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
 
p=.000 p=.000 p=.000 p=.000 p=.000 p=.584 p=.292 p=.339 p=.168 p=.398 p=.013 p=.879 p=.072 p=.000 
Marginal Effects 
              
 
Employed 
Full Time 
> 90% of 
Period 
Employed 
Part Time 
> 90% of 
Period 
-0.009 -0.031 -0.086 0.126 0.008 0.003 0.004 0.000 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 0.005 -0.007 0.004 
 
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.011) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006) 
  p=.045 p=.000 p=.000 p=.000 p=.433 p=.392 p=.479 p=.964 p=.552 p=.509 p=.745 p=.148 p=.179 p=.517 
 
  
 
1
2
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Appendix Table D.11. Marginal Effect of Each COMBINE Treatment Arm On Outcomes Following COMBINE Treatment 
COMBINE Treatment Arm 
Not        
Em-  
ployed 
Em- 
ployed    
< 90% 
of 
Period 
Em- 
ployed 
Part Time 
>90% of 
Period 
Em-  
ployed   
Full Time  
>90% of 
Period 
Condi-
tional     
Log    
Wage 
Anti-De-
pressant 
Use 
No      
Treat-  
ment 
Self Help 
Visits 
Out-  
patient 
Therapy 
(No RxT) RxT 
Ab- 
stinent  
Non-
Problem 
Drinking 
Only 
Problem 
Drinking 
<50% of 
Period 
Problem 
Drinking 
>50% of 
Period 
Average Outcome 
              
 
MM Only 
 
0.131 0.181 0.124 0.564 3.090 0.126 0.684 0.143 0.063 0.109 0.306 0.115 0.224 0.355 
 
Acam + MM 
 
0.144 0.167 0.170 0.520 2.929 0.170 0.642 0.137 0.079 0.141 0.341 0.111 0.187 0.361 
 
Nalt + MM 
 
0.183 0.187 0.136 0.495 2.828 0.184 0.514 0.256 0.070 0.159 0.325 0.078 0.258 0.339 
 
Acam + Nalt+ 
MM  
0.163 0.194 0.111 0.532 2.896 0.155 0.586 0.201 0.079 0.134 0.366 0.087 0.224 0.323 
 
MM + CBI 
 
0.160 0.196 0.124 0.520 2.641 0.173 0.625 0.202 0.080 0.092 0.325 0.099 0.214 0.362 
 
Acam + MM + 
CBI  
0.172 0.176 0.121 0.531 2.834 0.159 0.620 0.183 0.094 0.103 0.283 0.116 0.250 0.351 
 
Nalt + MM+ CBI 
 
0.154 0.166 0.145 0.535 2.858 0.180 0.642 0.121 0.077 0.159 0.277 0.118 0.207 0.398 
 
Acam + Nalt + 
MM + CBI  
0.137 0.179 0.106 0.579 2.815 0.212 0.651 0.124 0.100 0.125 0.324 0.096 0.200 0.380 
  CBI Only   0.155 0.185 0.132 0.528 2.908 0.157 0.606 0.219 0.103 0.072 0.301 0.099 0.232 0.367 
 
 
          
Continued on next page 
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Appendix Table D.11 (Continued). Marginal Effect of Each COMBINE Treatment Arm On Outcomes Following COMBINE Treatment 
COMBINE 
Treatment 
Arm 
Not        
Em-  
ployed 
Em- 
ployed    
< 90% 
of 
Period 
Em- 
ployed 
Part 
Time 
>90% of 
Period 
Em-  
ployed   
Full 
Time  
>90% of 
Period 
Condi-
tional     
Log    
Wage 
Anti-De-
pressant 
Use 
No      
Treat-  
ment 
Self 
Help 
Visits 
Out-  
patient 
Therapy 
(No RxT) RxT Ab- stinent  
Non-
Problem 
Drinking 
Only 
Problem 
Drinking 
<50% of 
Period 
Problem 
Drinking 
>50% of 
Period 
Marginal Effects Relative To: MM Only 
            
 
Acam + 
MM 
0.013 -0.015 0.046 -0.045 -0.160 0.044 -0.042 -0.006 0.016 0.032 0.035 -0.004 -0.037 0.006 
 
(0.018) (0.032) (0.026) (0.041) (0.023) (0.024) (0.040) (0.025) (0.022) (0.022) (0.033) (0.029) (0.026) (0.034) 
 
p=.447 p=.646 p=.075 p=.282 p=.000 p=.067 p=.301 p=.805 p=.467 p=.149 p=.292 p=.886 p=.164 p=.855 
 Nalt + 
MM 
0.052 0.005 0.012 -0.070 -0.262 0.058 -0.170 0.113 0.007 0.050 0.019 -0.037 0.034 -0.016 
 
(0.024) (0.037) (0.027) (0.044) (0.026) (0.026) (0.036) (0.030) (0.018) (0.023) (0.037) (0.032) (0.032) (0.031) 
 
p=.029 p=.888 p=.655 p=.113 p=.000 p=.025 p=.000 p=.000 p=.688 p=.032 p=.609 p=.243 p=.293 p=.609 
 
Acam + 
Nalt+ 
MM 
0.033 0.013 -0.013 -0.033 -0.194 0.029 -0.098 0.057 0.015 0.025 0.059 -0.028 0.001 -0.032 
 
(0.022) (0.037) (0.025) (0.043) (0.021) (0.029) (0.042) (0.030) (0.018) (0.023) (0.035) (0.028) (0.028) (0.035) 
 
p=.134 p=.727 p=.608 p=.455 p=.000 p=.326 p=.021 p=.055 p=.391 p=.267 p=.092 p=.313 p=.986 p=.367 
 MM + 
CBI 
0.029 0.015 0.001 -0.045 -0.449 0.047 -0.059 0.059 0.017 -0.017 0.019 -0.016 -0.010 0.007 
 
(0.023) (0.034) (0.026) (0.044) (0.023) (0.026) (0.042) (0.031) (0.021) (0.023) (0.040) (0.032) (0.032) (0.033) 
 
p=.210 p=.669 p=.973 p=.310 p=.000 p=.073 p=.165 p=.059 p=.422 p=.458 p=.635 p=.614 p=.766 p=.836 
 
Acam + 
MM + 
CBI 
0.042 -0.006 -0.003 -0.033 -0.256 0.033 -0.064 0.039 0.031 -0.006 -0.024 0.001 0.026 -0.003 
 
(0.023) (0.035) (0.024) (0.042) (0.022) (0.025) (0.041) (0.028) (0.020) (0.024) (0.034) (0.031) (0.029) (0.038) 
 
p=.077 p=.871 p=.897 p=.436 p=.000 p=.204 p=.126 p=.166 p=.136 p=.810 p=.484 p=.978 p=.372 p=.931 
 
Nalt + 
MM+ 
CBI 
0.023 -0.015 0.021 -0.029 -0.232 0.054 -0.042 -0.022 0.014 0.050 -0.029 0.002 -0.017 0.044 
 
(0.022) (0.033) (0.022) (0.036) (0.024) (0.025) (0.037) (0.024) (0.018) (0.023) (0.030) (0.032) (0.027) (0.034) 
 
p=.290 p=.647 p=.345 p=.416 p=.000 p=.031 p=.255 p=.356 p=.430 p=.029 p=.336 p=.941 p=.530 p=.207 
 
Acam + 
Nalt + 
MM + 
CBI 
0.006 -0.003 -0.018 0.014 -0.275 0.086 -0.033 -0.020 0.037 0.016 0.018 -0.019 -0.024 0.025 
 
(0.025) (0.035) (0.027) (0.039) (0.023) (0.027) (0.039) (0.025) (0.022) (0.024) (0.036) (0.032) (0.031) (0.038) 
 
p=.800 p=.937 p=.516 p=.716 p=.000 p=.002 p=.403 p=.442 p=.096 p=.517 p=.626 p=.554 p=.446 p=.509 
 CBI 
Only 
0.025 0.004 0.008 -0.037 -0.182 0.031 -0.078 0.076 0.040 -0.037 -0.005 -0.016 0.009 0.012 
 
(0.022) (0.037) (0.023) (0.041) (0.025) (0.021) (0.038) (0.029) (0.017) (0.020) (0.040) (0.032) (0.031) (0.034) 
  p=.257 p=.922 p=.712 p=.374 p=.000 p=.138 p=.041 p=.011 p=.025 p=.074 p=.900 p=.616 p=.783 p=.714 
            
Continued on next page 
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Appendix Table D.11 (Continued). Marginal Effect of Each COMBINE Treatment Arm On Outcomes Following COMBINE Treatment 
COMBINE 
Treatment 
Arm 
Not        
Em-  
ployed 
Em- 
ployed    
< 90% 
of 
Period 
Em- 
ployed 
Part Time 
>90% of 
Period 
Em-  
ployed   
Full Time  
>90% of 
Period 
Condi-
tional     
Log    
Wage 
Anti-De-
pressant 
Use 
No      
Treat-  
ment 
Self 
Help 
Visits 
Out-  
patient 
Therapy 
(No RxT) RxT 
Ab- 
stinent  
Non-
Problem 
Drinking 
Only 
Problem 
Drinking 
<50% of 
Period 
Problem 
Drinking 
>50% of 
Period 
Marginal Effects Relative To: Acam + MM 
          
 
Nalt + 
MM 
0.039 0.020 -0.034 -0.025 -0.101 0.014 -0.128 0.119 -0.009 0.018 -0.016 -0.033 0.071 -0.022 
 
(0.022) (0.024) (0.024) (0.027) (0.031) (0.026) (0.031) (0.028) (0.018) (0.016) (0.036) (0.024) (0.027) (0.030) 
 
p=.083 p=.402 p=.158 p=.355 p=.001 p=.593 p=.000 p=.000 p=.628 p=.259 p=.661 p=.174 p=.009 p=.466 
 Acam + 
Nalt+ MM 
0.019 0.028 -0.059 0.012 -0.033 -0.015 -0.056 0.064 -0.001 -0.007 0.025 -0.024 0.037 -0.038 
 
(0.021) (0.022) (0.025) (0.029) (0.028) (0.026) (0.036) (0.026) (0.018) (0.018) (0.033) (0.022) (0.022) (0.031) 
 
p=.368 p=.223 p=.020 p=.677 p=.242 p=.552 p=.126 p=.017 p=.971 p=.718 p=.460 p=.267 p=.092 p=.225 
 MM + 
CBI 
0.016 0.029 -0.045 0.000 -0.289 0.002 -0.018 0.065 0.001 -0.049 -0.016 -0.012 0.027 0.001 
 
(0.026) (0.021) (0.025) (0.029) (0.024) (0.023) (0.036) (0.027) (0.020) (0.022) (0.034) (0.024) (0.026) (0.031) 
 
p=.543 p=.166 p=.069 p=.999 p=.000 p=.922 p=.631 p=.018 p=.951 p=.025 p=.641 p=.623 p=.303 p=.984 
 
Acam + 
MM + 
CBI 
0.028 0.009 -0.049 0.012 -0.095 -0.012 -0.022 0.045 0.015 -0.038 -0.059 0.005 0.063 -0.010 
 
(0.023) (0.020) (0.023) (0.028) (0.026) (0.024) (0.037) (0.023) (0.019) (0.019) (0.031) (0.024) (0.027) (0.030) 
 
p=.211 p=.652 p=.037 p=.678 p=.000 p=.620 p=.546 p=.056 p=.432 p=.055 p=.064 p=.832 p=.023 p=.755 
 Nalt + 
MM+ CBI 
0.010 -0.001 -0.025 0.016 -0.071 0.010 0.000 -0.016 -0.002 0.018 -0.064 0.007 0.020 0.037 
 
(0.023) (0.021) (0.021) (0.029) (0.028) (0.024) (0.037) (0.024) (0.020) (0.019) (0.029) (0.023) (0.023) (0.029) 
 
p=.659 p=.973 p=.247 p=.586 p=.012 p=.695 p=.995 p=.508 p=.925 p=.343 p=.028 p=.781 p=.391 p=.208 
 
Acam + 
Nalt + 
MM + 
CBI 
-0.007 0.012 -0.064 0.059 -0.115 0.042 0.009 -0.013 0.021 -0.016 -0.017 -0.015 0.013 0.019 
 
(0.027) (0.021) (0.023) (0.029) (0.027) (0.026) (0.034) (0.020) (0.022) (0.019) (0.031) (0.023) (0.023) (0.029) 
 
p=.791 p=.573 p=.006 p=.042 p=.000 p=.113 p=.794 p=.499 p=.350 p=.391 p=.578 p=.507 p=.561 p=.522 
 
CBI Only 
0.011 0.018 -0.038 0.008 -0.021 -0.013 -0.037 0.082 0.024 -0.069 -0.040 -0.012 0.045 0.006 
 
(0.025) (0.020) (0.024) (0.030) (0.028) (0.021) (0.038) (0.026) (0.021) (0.020) (0.035) (0.026) (0.023) (0.033) 
 
p=.650 p=.366 p=.124 p=.792 p=.447 p=.546 p=.335 p=.002 p=.257 p=.001 p=.260 p=.652 p=.052 p=.851 
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Appendix Table D.11 (Continued). Marginal Effect of Each COMBINE Treatment Arm On Outcomes Following COMBINE Treatment 
COMBINE 
Treatment 
Arm 
Not        
Em-  
ployed 
Em- 
ployed    
< 90% 
of 
Period 
Em- 
ployed 
Part 
Time 
>90% of 
Period 
Em-  
ployed   
Full Time  
>90% of 
Period 
Condi-
tional     
Log    
Wage 
Anti-De-
pressant 
Use 
No      
Treat-  
ment 
Self 
Help 
Visits 
Out-  patient 
Therapy (No 
RxT) RxT 
Ab- 
stinent  
Non-
Problem 
Drinking 
Only 
Problem 
Drinking 
<50% of 
Period 
Problem 
Drinking 
>50% of 
Period 
Marginal Effects Relative To: Nalt + MM 
           
 
Acam + 
Nalt+ 
MM 
-0.020 0.008 -0.025 0.037 0.068 -0.029 0.072 -0.056 0.008 -0.024 0.040 0.009 -0.033 -0.016 
 
(0.026) (0.021) (0.027) (0.030) (0.029) (0.027) (0.035) (0.034) (0.018) (0.018) (0.040) (0.021) (0.028) (0.026) 
 
p=.453 p=.717 p=.352 p=.216 p=.021 p=.280 p=.044 p=.101 p=.657 p=.177 p=.316 p=.668 p=.243 p=.549 
 MM + 
CBI 
-0.023 0.009 -0.011 0.025 -0.188 -0.012 0.110 -0.054 0.010 -0.067 0.000 0.021 -0.044 0.023 
 
(0.031) (0.026) (0.026) (0.032) (0.026) (0.025) (0.037) (0.032) (0.019) (0.021) (0.043) (0.025) (0.028) (0.027) 
 
p=.465 p=.716 p=.665 p=.440 p=.000 p=.640 p=.003 p=.093 p=.591 p=.002 p=.995 p=.407 p=.118 p=.392 
 
Acam + 
MM + 
CBI 
-0.010 -0.011 -0.015 0.037 0.006 -0.026 0.106 -0.074 0.024 -0.056 -0.043 0.038 -0.008 0.013 
 
(0.027) (0.024) (0.023) (0.029) (0.027) (0.025) (0.035) (0.028) (0.017) (0.019) (0.034) (0.022) (0.031) (0.032) 
 
p=.695 p=.655 p=.496 p=.212 p=.829 p=.306 p=.003 p=.009 p=.168 p=.004 p=.205 p=.087 p=.799 p=.692 
 
Nalt + 
MM+ 
CBI 
-0.029 -0.021 0.009 0.041 0.030 -0.004 0.128 -0.135 0.007 0.000 -0.048 0.039 -0.051 0.060 
 
(0.023) (0.024) (0.023) (0.032) (0.028) (0.024) (0.036) (0.029) (0.017) (0.020) (0.030) (0.022) (0.027) (0.026) 
 
p=.204 p=.400 p=.707 p=.205 p=.277 p=.860 p=.001 p=.000 p=.689 p=.991 p=.109 p=.075 p=.063 p=.024 
 
Acam + 
Nalt + 
MM + 
CBI 
-0.046 -0.008 -0.030 0.084 -0.014 0.028 0.137 -0.132 0.030 -0.034 -0.001 0.018 -0.057 0.041 
 
(0.032) (0.025) (0.026) (0.030) (0.029) (0.028) (0.036) (0.029) (0.021) (0.022) (0.038) (0.024) (0.028) (0.030) 
 
p=.149 p=.755 p=.252 p=.007 p=.631 p=.332 p=.000 p=.000 p=.154 p=.117 p=.973 p=.456 p=.043 p=.172 
 CBI 
Only 
-0.028 -0.002 -0.004 0.033 0.080 -0.027 0.091 -0.037 0.033 -0.087 -0.024 0.021 -0.025 0.028 
 
(0.024) (0.025) (0.023) (0.032) (0.029) (0.024) (0.037) (0.032) (0.019) (0.020) (0.037) (0.023) (0.029) (0.028) 
  p=.253 p=.953 p=.866 p=.309 p=.007 p=.269 p=.016 p=.246 p=.091 p=.000 p=.512 p=.362 p=.382 p=.306 
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Appendix Table D.11 (Continued). Marginal Effect of Each COMBINE Treatment Arm On Outcomes Following COMBINE Treatment 
COMBINE 
Treatment 
Arm 
Not        
Em-  
ployed 
Em- 
ployed    
< 90% 
of 
Period 
Em- ployed 
Part Time 
>90% of 
Period 
Em-  
ployed   
Full Time  
>90% of 
Period 
Condi-
tional     
Log    
Wage 
Anti-De-
pressant 
Use 
No      
Treat-  
ment 
Self 
Help 
Visits 
Out-  
patient 
Therapy 
(No RxT) RxT Ab- stinent  
Non-
Problem 
Drinking 
Only 
Problem 
Drinking 
<50% of 
Period 
Problem 
Drinking 
>50% of 
Period 
Marginal Effects Relative To: Acam + Nalt+ MM 
         
 
MM + 
CBI 
-0.004 0.002 0.014 -0.012 -0.256 0.018 0.039 0.002 0.002 -0.042 -0.041 0.012 -0.010 0.039 
 
(0.029) (0.024) (0.022) (0.031) (0.027) (0.024) (0.042) (0.031) (0.020) (0.021) (0.037) (0.023) (0.027) (0.025) 
 
p=.902 p=.942 p=.533 p=.698 p=.000 p=.469 p=.355 p=.959 p=.925 p=.044 p=.280 p=.601 p=.703 p=.130 
 
Acam + 
MM + 
CBI 
0.009 -0.019 0.010 0.000 -0.062 0.004 0.034 -0.018 0.015 -0.031 -0.083 0.029 0.026 0.028 
 
(0.026) (0.024) (0.025) (0.030) (0.025) (0.025) (0.042) (0.026) (0.022) (0.022) (0.034) (0.020) (0.028) (0.032) 
 
p=.730 p=.435 p=.692 p=.991 p=.016 p=.882 p=.423 p=.484 p=.485 p=.150 p=.016 p=.155 p=.365 p=.370 
 
Nalt + 
MM+ 
CBI 
-0.009 -0.028 0.034 0.004 -0.038 0.025 0.056 -0.079 -0.001 0.025 -0.088 0.031 -0.017 0.075 
 
(0.025) (0.022) (0.024) (0.031) (0.027) (0.025) (0.033) (0.027) (0.018) (0.018) (0.033) (0.022) (0.024) (0.029) 
 
p=.701 p=.207 p=.152 p=.910 p=.169 p=.324 p=.089 p=.004 p=.945 p=.182 p=.009 p=.168 p=.471 p=.010 
 
Acam + 
Nalt + 
MM + 
CBI 
-0.026 -0.016 -0.005 0.047 -0.082 0.057 0.065 -0.077 0.022 -0.010 -0.042 0.009 -0.024 0.057 
 
(0.031) (0.025) (0.025) (0.032) (0.028) (0.031) (0.039) (0.028) (0.021) (0.020) (0.038) (0.021) (0.027) (0.033) 
 
p=.402 p=.538 p=.851 p=.152 p=.004 p=.066 p=.101 p=.008 p=.312 p=.630 p=.275 p=.674 p=.380 p=.084 
 CBI 
Only 
-0.008 -0.009 0.021 -0.004 0.012 0.003 0.020 0.018 0.024 -0.062 -0.064 0.012 0.008 0.044 
 
(0.023) (0.022) (0.024) (0.034) (0.029) (0.027) (0.045) (0.034) (0.021) (0.022) (0.042) (0.024) (0.024) (0.028) 
  p=.731 p=.674 p=.370 p=.905 p=.685 p=.928 p=.665 p=.593 p=.242 p=.007 p=.127 p=.610 p=.739 p=.112 
Marginal Effects Relative to MM+ CBI 
          
 
Acam + 
MM + 
CBI 
0.013 -0.020 -0.004 0.012 0.194 -0.014 -0.005 -0.020 0.013 0.011 -0.043 0.017 0.036 -0.010 
 
(0.031) (0.023) (0.023) (0.025) (0.027) (0.023) (0.037) (0.028) (0.019) (0.024) (0.037) (0.023) (0.029) (0.031) 
 
p=.682 p=.387 p=.864 p=.643 p=.000 p=.549 p=.900 p=.487 p=.480 p=.642 p=.255 p=.460 p=.220 p=.742 
 
Nalt + 
MM+ 
CBI 
-0.006 -0.030 0.020 0.016 0.218 0.007 0.017 -0.081 -0.003 0.067 -0.048 0.018 -0.007 0.037 
 
(0.030) (0.023) (0.024) (0.029) (0.023) (0.023) (0.037) (0.027) (0.018) (0.021) (0.037) (0.023) (0.024) (0.027) 
 
p=.845 p=.194 p=.391 p=.589 p=.000 p=.750 p=.647 p=.004 p=.861 p=.002 p=.199 p=.426 p=.761 p=.178 
 
Acam + 
Nalt + 
MM + 
CBI 
-0.023 -0.017 -0.019 0.059 0.174 0.039 0.026 -0.078 0.020 0.033 -0.001 -0.003 -0.014 0.018 
 
(0.028) (0.025) (0.022) (0.030) (0.022) (0.028) (0.038) (0.025) (0.020) (0.025) (0.036) (0.023) (0.026) (0.031) 
 
p=.420 p=.480 p=.394 p=.051 p=.000 p=.170 p=.491 p=.003 p=.333 p=.192 p=.977 p=.887 p=.590 p=.554 
 CBI 
Only 
-0.005 -0.011 0.008 0.008 0.268 -0.015 -0.019 0.017 0.023 -0.020 -0.024 0.000 0.018 0.006 
 
(0.027) (0.021) (0.022) (0.030) (0.025) (0.025) (0.041) (0.029) (0.020) (0.020) (0.032) (0.022) (0.024) (0.026) 
 
p=.869 p=.608 p=.738 p=.792 p=.000 p=.544 p=.639 p=.573 p=.263 p=.331 p=.452 p=.996 p=.448 p=.835 
Continued on Next Page 
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Appendix Table D.11 (Continued). Marginal Effect of Each COMBINE Treatment Arm On Outcomes Following COMBINE Treatment 
COMBINE 
Treatment Arm 
Not        
Em-  
ployed 
Em- ployed    
< 90% of 
Period 
Em- 
ployed 
Part Time 
>90% of 
Period 
Em-  
ployed   
Full 
Time  
>90% of 
Period 
Condi-
tional     
Log    
Wage 
Anti-De-
pressant 
Use 
No      
Treat-  
ment 
Self 
Help 
Visits 
Out-  
patient 
Therapy 
(No RxT) RxT 
Ab- 
stinent  
Non-
Problem 
Drinking 
Only 
Problem 
Drinking 
<50% of 
Period 
Problem 
Drinking 
>50% of 
Period 
Marginal Effects Relative To: Acam + MM+CBI 
           
 
Nalt + MM+ 
CBI 
-0.019 -0.010 0.024 0.004 0.024 0.021 0.022 -0.061 -0.017 0.056 -0.005 0.002 -0.043 0.047 
 
(0.029) (0.022) (0.023) (0.030) (0.024) (0.025) (0.034) (0.024) (0.018) (0.021) (0.030) (0.021) (0.026) (0.030) 
 
p=.518 p=.666 p=.294 p=.896 p=.322 p=.394 p=.519 p=.011 p=.365 p=.009 p=.860 p=.942 p=.096 p=.115 
 
Acam + Nalt 
+ MM + 
CBI 
-0.036 0.003 -0.015 0.047 -0.020 0.053 0.031 -0.059 0.006 0.022 0.042 -0.020 -0.050 0.028 
 
(0.029) (0.022) (0.023) (0.029) (0.026) (0.028) (0.034) (0.022) (0.019) (0.023) (0.032) (0.022) (0.029) (0.033) 
 
p=.216 p=.891 p=.532 p=.103 p=.449 p=.057 p=.360 p=.009 p=.741 p=.358 p=.193 p=.370 p=.093 p=.399 
 CBI Only 
-0.017 0.009 0.012 -0.004 0.074 -0.001 -0.015 0.036 0.009 -0.031 0.019 -0.017 -0.018 0.016 
 
(0.023) (0.023) (0.020) (0.026) (0.027) (0.026) (0.041) (0.031) (0.019) (0.023) (0.035) (0.022) (0.028) (0.030) 
 
p=.468 p=.679 p=.569 p=.883 p=.008 p=.962 p=.723 p=.235 p=.640 p=.179 p=.595 p=.455 p=.528 p=.607 
Marginal Effects Relative To: Nalt+MM+CBI 
           
 
Acam + Nalt 
+ MM + 
CBI 
-0.017 0.013 -0.039 0.043 -0.044 0.032 0.009 0.003 0.023 -0.034 0.047 -0.022 -0.007 -0.019 
 
(0.029) (0.022) (0.022) (0.029) (0.026) (0.027) (0.034) (0.021) (0.021) (0.018) (0.033) (0.021) (0.025) (0.030) 
 
p=.556 p=.574 p=.082 p=.144 p=.091 p=.244 p=.789 p=.908 p=.274 p=.062 p=.163 p=.316 p=.789 p=.533 
 CBI Only 
0.001 0.019 -0.013 -0.008 0.050 -0.023 -0.036 0.098 0.026 -0.087 0.024 -0.018 0.025 -0.031 
 
(0.026) (0.024) (0.022) (0.031) (0.022) (0.023) (0.042) (0.030) (0.020) (0.020) (0.036) (0.021) (0.025) (0.028) 
 
p=.958 p=.421 p=.566 p=.807 p=.026 p=.334 p=.386 p=.001 p=.201 p=.000 p=.502 p=.384 p=.315 p=.276 
Marginal Effects Relative to Acam+Nalt+MM+CBI 
       
 CBI Only 
0.018 0.006 0.026 -0.051 0.094 -0.054 -0.046 0.095 0.003 -0.052 -0.023 0.003 0.032 -0.013 
 
(0.026) (0.023) (0.024) (0.032) (0.028) (0.025) (0.040) (0.025) (0.022) (0.024) (0.035) (0.022) (0.023) (0.030) 
  p=.484 p=.782 p=.282 p=.119 p=.001 p=.032 p=.263 p=.000 p=.899 p=.028 p=.513 p=.883 p=.168 p=.677 
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Appendix Table D.12. Marginal Effect of Each COMBINE Treatment Arm On Outcomes Following COMBINE Treatment- Estimated without controlling for unobserved heterogeneity 
COMBINE Treatment Arm 
Not        
Em-  
ployed 
Em- 
ployed    
< 90% 
of 
Period 
Em- 
ployed 
Part Time 
>90% of 
Period 
Em-  
ployed   
Full Time  
>90% of 
Period 
Condi-
tional     
Log    
Wage 
Anti-De-
pressant 
Use 
No      
Treat-  
ment 
Self Help 
Visits 
Out-  
patient 
Therapy 
(No 
RxT) RxT 
Ab- 
stinent  
Non-
Problem 
Drinking 
Only 
Problem 
Drinking 
<50% of 
Period 
Problem 
Drinking 
>50% of 
Period 
Average Outcome 
              
 
MM Only 
 
0.170 0.193 0.113 0.524 2.899 0.097 0.714 0.129 0.068 0.089 0.285 0.108 0.237 0.370 
 
Acam + MM 
 
0.166 0.172 0.151 0.511 2.891 0.168 0.636 0.154 0.084 0.127 0.345 0.114 0.195 0.345 
 
Nalt + MM 
 
0.196 0.184 0.123 0.496 2.818 0.149 0.549 0.260 0.074 0.117 0.314 0.080 0.266 0.340 
 
Acam + Nalt+ 
MM  
0.199 0.186 0.104 0.511 2.809 0.124 0.622 0.200 0.083 0.094 0.357 0.086 0.221 0.336 
 
MM + CBI 
 
0.154 0.191 0.128 0.526 2.751 0.135 0.663 0.192 0.078 0.067 0.321 0.100 0.208 0.371 
 
Acam + MM + 
CBI  
0.191 0.180 0.107 0.522 2.804 0.134 0.636 0.204 0.098 0.062 0.283 0.110 0.252 0.355 
 
Nalt + MM+ 
CBI  
0.168 0.169 0.140 0.523 2.819 0.171 0.665 0.119 0.085 0.132 0.268 0.115 0.215 0.402 
 
Acam + Nalt + 
MM + CBI  
0.139 0.176 0.104 0.580 2.899 0.182 0.680 0.140 0.108 0.073 0.301 0.107 0.215 0.376 
  CBI Only   0.173 0.191 0.125 0.511 2.939 0.140 0.607 0.225 0.112 0.057 0.304 0.091 0.242 0.363 
 
 
          
Continued on next page 
  
  
  
 
1
2
7
 
Appendix Table D.12 (Continued). Marginal Effect of Each COMBINE Treatment Arm On Outcomes Following COMBINE Treatment - Estimated without controlling for unobserved heterogeneity 
COMBINE 
Treatment 
Arm 
Not        
Em-  
ployed 
Em- 
ployed    
< 90% of 
Period 
Em- 
ployed 
Part 
Time 
>90% of 
Period 
Em-  
ployed   
Full 
Time  
>90% 
of 
Period 
Condi-
tional     
Log    
Wage 
Anti-De-
pressant 
Use 
No      
Treat-  
ment 
Self 
Help 
Visits 
Out-  
patient 
Therapy 
(No RxT) RxT Ab- stinent  
Non-
Problem 
Drinking 
Only 
Problem 
Drinking 
<50% of 
Period 
Problem 
Drinking 
>50% of 
Period 
Marginal Effects Relative To: MM Only 
          
 
Acam 
+ MM 
-0.005 -0.021 0.038 -0.013 -0.008 0.071 -0.079 0.025 0.016 0.038 0.060 0.006 -0.042 -0.025 
 
(0.039) (0.032) (0.024) (0.034) (0.033) (0.024) (0.036) (0.023) (0.016) (0.024) (0.036) (0.035) (0.034) (0.038) 
 
p=.901 p=.516 p=.115 p=.708 p=.805 p=.004 p=.030 p=.268 p=.345 p=.110 p=.096 p=.859 p=.221 p=.515 
 Nalt + 
MM 
0.026 -0.009 0.011 -0.028 -0.082 0.052 -0.165 0.131 0.006 0.028 0.029 -0.028 0.029 -0.029 
 
(0.032) (0.028) (0.025) (0.035) (0.034) (0.026) (0.036) (0.028) (0.017) (0.019) (0.033) (0.036) (0.034) (0.040) 
 
p=.420 p=.762 p=.672 p=.419 p=.019 p=.049 p=.000 p=.000 p=.728 p=.134 p=.380 p=.437 p=.394 p=.461 
 
Acam 
+ 
Nalt+ 
MM 
0.028 -0.007 -0.008 -0.013 -0.090 0.027 -0.092 0.072 0.015 0.005 0.072 -0.022 -0.016 -0.034 
 
(0.026) (0.031) (0.022) (0.036) (0.034) (0.024) (0.035) (0.028) (0.016) (0.023) (0.039) (0.038) (0.036) (0.040) 
 
p=.286 p=.837 p=.705 p=.712 p=.009 p=.258 p=.009 p=.011 p=.344 p=.830 p=.070 p=.567 p=.659 p=.392 
 MM + 
CBI 
-0.016 -0.002 0.016 0.002 -0.148 0.038 -0.051 0.064 0.010 -0.022 0.035 -0.008 -0.029 0.001 
 
(0.028) (0.030) (0.027) (0.031) (0.031) (0.022) (0.034) (0.028) (0.014) (0.022) (0.037) (0.036) (0.034) (0.038) 
 
p=.557 p=.958 p=.556 p=.949 p=.000 p=.081 p=.139 p=.024 p=.493 p=.306 p=.340 p=.828 p=.408 p=.976 
 
Acam 
+ MM 
+ CBI 
0.021 -0.013 -0.005 -0.003 -0.096 0.037 -0.078 0.075 0.030 -0.027 -0.002 0.002 0.015 -0.015 
 
(0.040) (0.030) (0.025) (0.037) (0.033) (0.020) (0.033) (0.024) (0.018) (0.018) (0.036) (0.035) (0.033) (0.039) 
 
p=.609 p=.671 p=.832 p=.947 p=.005 p=.065 p=.020 p=.003 p=.101 p=.126 p=.949 p=.955 p=.650 p=.707 
 
Nalt + 
MM+ 
CBI 
-0.003 -0.024 0.028 -0.001 -0.081 0.074 -0.049 -0.010 0.017 0.043 -0.017 0.007 -0.022 0.032 
 
(0.022) (0.024) (0.022) (0.033) (0.033) (0.022) (0.032) (0.020) (0.017) (0.022) (0.035) (0.039) (0.035) (0.043) 
 
p=.900 p=.323 p=.211 p=.971 p=.016 p=.001 p=.127 p=.605 p=.323 p=.056 p=.624 p=.861 p=.530 p=.453 
 
Acam 
+ Nalt 
+ MM 
+ CBI 
-0.031 -0.017 -0.009 0.056 -0.001 0.085 -0.035 0.011 0.040 -0.016 0.016 -0.001 -0.022 0.006 
 
(0.022) (0.027) (0.020) (0.032) (0.030) (0.025) (0.033) (0.023) (0.016) (0.019) (0.038) (0.036) (0.033) (0.039) 
 
p=.155 p=.536 p=.674 p=.078 p=.977 p=.001 p=.304 p=.631 p=.013 p=.399 p=.675 p=.985 p=.517 p=.871 
 CBI 
Only 
0.003 -0.001 0.012 -0.014 0.039 0.043 -0.108 0.096 0.044 -0.032 0.018 -0.017 0.005 -0.006 
 
(0.034) (0.028) (0.025) (0.037) (0.036) (0.022) (0.033) (0.026) (0.016) (0.021) (0.037) (0.037) (0.035) (0.041) 
  p=.940 p=.964 p=.622 p=.716 p=.281 p=.055 p=.002 p=.000 p=.007 p=.135 p=.624 p=.646 p=.884 p=.876 
            
Continued on next page 
 
  
 
1
2
8
 
Appendix Table D.12 (Continued). Marginal Effect of Each COMBINE Treatment Arm On Outcomes Following COMBINE Treatment - Estimated without controlling for unobserved heterogeneity 
COMBINE 
Treatment Arm 
Not        
Em-  
ployed 
Em- 
ployed    
< 90% 
of 
Period 
Em- 
ployed 
Part 
Time 
>90% 
of 
Period 
Em-  
ployed   
Full Time  
>90% of 
Period 
Condi-
tional     
Log    
Wage 
Anti-De-
pressant 
Use 
No      
Treat-  
ment 
Self 
Help 
Visits 
Out-  
patient 
Therapy 
(No RxT) RxT 
Ab- 
stinent  
Non-
Problem 
Drinking 
Only 
Problem 
Drinking 
<50% of 
Period 
Problem 
Drinking 
>50% of 
Period 
Marginal Effects Relative To: Acam + MM 
           
 Nalt + MM 
0.031 0.012 -0.028 -0.015 -0.074 -0.019 -0.086 0.106 -0.010 -0.010 -0.031 -0.035 0.071 -0.005 
 
(0.046) (0.022) (0.029) (0.032) (0.029) (0.029) (0.034) (0.030) (0.018) (0.024) (0.033) (0.019) (0.024) (0.033) 
 
p=.503 p=.586 p=.344 p=.638 p=.014 p=.507 p=.011 p=.001 p=.591 p=.680 p=.345 p=.069 p=.004 p=.883 
 Acam + Nalt+ 
MM 
0.033 0.014 -0.047 0.000 -0.082 -0.044 -0.013 0.046 0.000 -0.033 0.012 -0.028 0.026 -0.009 
 
(0.038) (0.022) (0.023) (0.030) (0.031) (0.025) (0.034) (0.031) (0.020) (0.023) (0.034) (0.023) (0.022) (0.032) 
 
p=.392 p=.525 p=.046 p=.990 p=.009 p=.078 p=.699 p=.141 p=.993 p=.153 p=.728 p=.222 p=.249 p=.771 
 
MM + CBI 
-0.011 0.019 -0.023 0.015 -0.140 -0.033 0.028 0.039 -0.006 -0.060 -0.025 -0.014 0.013 0.026 
 
(0.040) (0.023) (0.027) (0.029) (0.034) (0.025) (0.036) (0.031) (0.019) (0.024) (0.037) (0.022) (0.025) (0.032) 
 
p=.773 p=.406 p=.401 p=.608 p=.000 p=.185 p=.451 p=.220 p=.760 p=.013 p=.508 p=.517 p=.602 p=.429 
 Acam + MM + 
CBI 
0.025 0.008 -0.044 0.010 -0.088 -0.035 0.000 0.050 0.015 -0.065 -0.062 -0.004 0.057 0.010 
 
(0.063) (0.026) (0.030) (0.036) (0.032) (0.024) (0.033) (0.026) (0.021) (0.019) (0.033) (0.020) (0.024) (0.032) 
 
p=.688 p=.759 p=.152 p=.774 p=.007 p=.157 p=.995 p=.054 p=.493 p=.001 p=.062 p=.829 p=.018 p=.759 
 Nalt + MM+ 
CBI 
0.002 -0.003 -0.011 0.012 -0.072 0.003 0.030 -0.035 0.001 0.005 -0.077 0.001 0.020 0.057 
 
(0.038) (0.021) (0.024) (0.029) (0.033) (0.026) (0.033) (0.022) (0.019) (0.027) (0.036) (0.023) (0.026) (0.029) 
 
p=.958 p=.886 p=.658 p=.689 p=.033 p=.922 p=.370 p=.110 p=.957 p=.863 p=.033 p=.981 p=.439 p=.051 
 Acam + Nalt + 
MM + CBI 
-0.026 0.004 -0.047 0.069 0.007 0.014 0.044 -0.014 0.024 -0.054 -0.044 -0.007 0.020 0.031 
 
(0.036) (0.022) (0.022) (0.030) (0.027) (0.026) (0.033) (0.024) (0.018) (0.021) (0.036) (0.019) (0.024) (0.032) 
 
p=.472 p=.847 p=.035 p=.025 p=.789 p=.597 p=.182 p=.545 p=.191 p=.010 p=.223 p=.714 p=.412 p=.332 
 
CBI Only 
0.007 0.020 -0.026 -0.001 0.047 -0.028 -0.029 0.071 0.028 -0.070 -0.042 -0.023 0.047 0.018 
 
(0.044) (0.023) (0.029) (0.029) (0.032) (0.026) (0.036) (0.028) (0.020) (0.020) (0.034) (0.020) (0.023) (0.031) 
 
p=.869 p=.406 p=.367 p=.979 p=.137 p=.279 p=.425 p=.013 p=.157 p=.001 p=.218 p=.258 p=.041 p=.563 
    
        
Continued on next page 
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Appendix Table D.12 (Continued). Marginal Effect of Each COMBINE Treatment Arm On Outcomes Following COMBINE Treatment - Estimated without controlling for unobserved heterogeneity 
COMBINE 
Treatment Arm 
Not        
Em-  
ployed 
Em- 
ployed    
< 90% 
of 
Period 
Em- 
ployed 
Part 
Time 
>90% 
of 
Period 
Em-  
ployed   
Full Time  
>90% of 
Period 
Condi-
tional     
Log    
Wage 
Anti-
De-
pressant 
Use 
No      
Treat-  
ment 
Self 
Help 
Visits 
Out-  
patient 
Therapy 
(No RxT) RxT 
Ab- 
stinent  
Non-
Problem 
Drinking 
Only 
Problem 
Drinking 
<50% of 
Period 
Problem 
Drinking 
>50% of 
Period 
Marginal Effects Relative To: Nalt + MM 
           
 
Acam + Nalt+ 
MM 
0.002 0.002 -0.019 0.015 -0.009 -0.025 0.073 -0.060 0.010 -0.023 0.043 0.006 -0.045 -0.005 
 
(0.037) (0.024) (0.024) (0.028) (0.037) (0.029) (0.033) (0.033) (0.021) (0.020) (0.034) (0.020) (0.026) (0.033) 
 
p=.953 p=.931 p=.432 p=.600 p=.817 p=.388 p=.029 p=.078 p=.648 p=.256 p=.205 p=.749 p=.088 p=.891 
 
MM + CBI 
-0.042 0.007 0.005 0.030 -0.066 -0.014 0.114 -0.067 0.004 -0.051 0.007 0.021 -0.058 0.031 
 
(0.038) (0.021) (0.027) (0.033) (0.037) (0.028) (0.036) (0.033) (0.017) (0.019) (0.040) (0.023) (0.028) (0.033) 
 
p=.267 p=.739 p=.851 p=.361 p=.073 p=.615 p=.002 p=.046 p=.824 p=.009 p=.868 p=.382 p=.042 p=.363 
 Acam + MM + 
CBI 
-0.005 -0.004 -0.016 0.026 -0.014 -0.016 0.087 -0.056 0.024 -0.055 -0.031 0.030 -0.014 0.015 
 
(0.052) (0.025) (0.027) (0.033) (0.036) (0.026) (0.035) (0.031) (0.020) (0.017) (0.032) (0.018) (0.025) (0.033) 
 
p=.919 p=.862 p=.549 p=.445 p=.695 p=.557 p=.015 p=.072 p=.226 p=.001 p=.328 p=.096 p=.587 p=.660 
 Nalt + MM+ 
CBI 
-0.029 -0.015 0.017 0.027 0.001 0.022 0.116 -0.141 0.011 0.015 -0.046 0.035 -0.051 0.062 
 
(0.032) (0.021) (0.028) (0.028) (0.035) (0.028) (0.036) (0.027) (0.018) (0.023) (0.034) (0.019) (0.026) (0.034) 
 
p=.369 p=.474 p=.537 p=.338 p=.975 p=.445 p=.002 p=.000 p=.557 p=.529 p=.184 p=.068 p=.054 p=.074 
 Acam + Nalt + 
MM + CBI 
-0.057 -0.008 -0.019 0.084 0.081 0.033 0.131 -0.120 0.034 -0.044 -0.013 0.028 -0.051 0.036 
 
(0.032) (0.022) (0.025) (0.026) (0.033) (0.029) (0.032) (0.029) (0.019) (0.019) (0.036) (0.020) (0.028) (0.032) 
 
p=.077 p=.719 p=.436 p=.002 p=.015 p=.255 p=.000 p=.000 p=.084 p=.020 p=.715 p=.173 p=.073 p=.258 
 CBI Only 
-0.023 0.007 0.002 0.015 0.121 -0.009 0.057 -0.035 0.038 -0.060 -0.011 0.012 -0.024 0.023 
 
(0.044) (0.022) (0.029) (0.032) (0.037) (0.024) (0.040) (0.034) (0.017) (0.020) (0.035) (0.019) (0.025) (0.034) 
  p=.592 p=.737 p=.956 p=.655 p=.002 p=.720 p=.153 p=.311 p=.031 p=.003 p=.765 p=.543 p=.337 p=.493 
 
  
         
Continued on next page 
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Appendix Table D.12 (Cont’d). Marginal Effect of COMBINE Treatment Arm On Outcomes Following COMBINE Treatment - Estimated w/o controlling for unobserved heterogeneity 
COMBINE 
Treatment Arm 
Not        
Em-  
ployed 
Em- 
ployed    < 
90% of 
Period 
Employed 
Part Time 
>90% of 
Period 
Employed   
Full Time  
>90% of 
Period 
Condi-
tional     
Log    
Wage 
Anti-De-
pressant 
Use 
No      
Treat-  
ment 
Self 
Help 
Visits 
Out-patient 
Therapy  
(No RxT) RxT 
Ab- 
stinent  
Non-
Problem 
Drinking 
Only 
Problem 
Drinking 
<50% of 
Period 
Problem 
Drinking 
>50% of 
Period 
Marginal Effects Relative To: Acam + Nalt+ MM 
        
 MM + CBI 
-0.044 0.005 0.024 0.015 -0.058 0.011 0.041 -0.008 -0.006 -0.027 -0.036 0.014 -0.013 0.035 
 
(0.034) (0.024) (0.024) (0.030) (0.036) (0.021) (0.037) (0.033) (0.017) (0.022) (0.043) (0.024) (0.028) (0.030) 
 
p=.195 p=.836 p=.309 p=.615 p=.115 p=.604 p=.269 p=.814 p=.746 p=.217 p=.396 p=.565 p=.647 p=.244 
 Acam + 
MM + CBI 
-0.008 -0.007 0.003 0.011 -0.006 0.010 0.013 0.004 0.015 -0.032 -0.074 0.024 0.031 0.019 
 
(0.042) (0.024) (0.024) (0.031) (0.032) (0.022) (0.031) (0.032) (0.022) (0.019) (0.035) (0.022) (0.026) (0.033) 
 
p=.860 p=.789 p=.891 p=.726 p=.862 p=.655 p=.670 p=.906 p=.499 p=.102 p=.037 p=.266 p=.236 p=.560 
 Nalt + 
MM+ CBI 
-0.031 -0.017 0.036 0.012 0.010 0.047 0.043 -0.082 0.001 0.038 -0.089 0.029 -0.006 0.066 
 
(0.026) (0.022) (0.023) (0.025) (0.033) (0.024) (0.033) (0.027) (0.019) (0.024) (0.036) (0.025) (0.027) (0.030) 
 
p=.236 p=.431 p=.115 p=.629 p=.771 p=.057 p=.191 p=.003 p=.950 p=.124 p=.016 p=.257 p=.825 p=.031 
 
Acam + 
Nalt + MM 
+ CBI 
-0.059 -0.010 0.000 0.069 0.089 0.058 0.057 -0.061 0.024 -0.021 -0.056 0.021 -0.006 0.040 
 
(0.022) (0.022) (0.019) (0.026) (0.029) (0.024) (0.030) (0.028) (0.020) (0.019) (0.040) (0.022) (0.026) (0.033) 
 
p=.009 p=.652 p=.995 p=.009 p=.003 p=.016 p=.056 p=.030 p=.215 p=.256 p=.160 p=.328 p=.821 p=.217 
 
CBI Only 
-0.026 0.005 0.021 0.000 0.129 0.016 -0.016 0.025 0.028 -0.037 -0.053 0.005 0.021 0.028 
 
(0.035) (0.023) (0.027) (0.028) (0.033) (0.024) (0.033) (0.030) (0.022) (0.020) (0.037) (0.022) (0.024) (0.033) 
  p=.459 p=.817 p=.448 p=.989 p=.000 p=.499 p=.633 p=.418 p=.198 p=.066 p=.149 p=.819 p=.386 p=.403 
Marginal Effects Relative to MM+ CBI 
          
 
Acam + 
MM + CBI 
0.037 -0.011 -0.021 -0.005 0.052 -0.001 -0.027 0.012 0.021 -0.005 -0.038 0.010 0.044 -0.016 
 
(0.042) (0.026) (0.024) (0.033) (0.036) (0.021) (0.033) (0.030) (0.020) (0.016) (0.038) (0.022) (0.025) (0.030) 
 
p=.381 p=.663 p=.381 p=.893 p=.147 p=.950 p=.406 p=.700 p=.297 p=.774 p=.317 p=.658 p=.081 p=.601 
 Nalt + 
MM+ CBI 
0.013 -0.022 0.012 -0.003 0.068 0.036 0.002 -0.074 0.007 0.065 -0.053 0.015 0.007 0.031 
 
(0.036) (0.022) (0.027) (0.027) (0.033) (0.024) (0.034) (0.028) (0.016) (0.024) (0.039) (0.026) (0.027) (0.031) 
 
p=.708 p=.305 p=.657 p=.907 p=.046 p=.133 p=.953 p=.010 p=.678 p=.009 p=.181 p=.576 p=.800 p=.320 
 
Acam+Nalt 
+ MM 
+CBI 
-0.015 -0.015 -0.024 0.054 0.147 0.047 0.017 -0.053 0.030 0.006 -0.020 0.007 0.007 0.005 
 
(0.030) (0.025) (0.022) (0.028) (0.033) (0.025) (0.034) (0.025) (0.019) (0.018) (0.041) (0.024) (0.030) (0.031) 
 
p=.621 p=.545 p=.274 p=.059 p=.000 p=.061 p=.627 p=.034 p=.121 p=.734 p=.631 p=.762 p=.809 p=.868 
 CBI Only 
0.019 0.000 -0.004 -0.016 0.187 0.006 -0.057 0.032 0.034 -0.010 -0.017 -0.009 0.034 -0.008 
 
(0.048) (0.024) (0.033) (0.030) (0.032) (0.022) (0.035) (0.030) (0.019) (0.019) (0.034) (0.023) (0.027) (0.032) 
 
p=.693 p=.990 p=.917 p=.607 p=.000 p=.808 p=.114 p=.287 p=.078 p=.602 p=.617 p=.697 p=.208 p=.816 
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Appendix Table D.12 (Continued). Marginal Effect of Each COMBINE Treatment Arm On Outcomes Following COMBINE Treatment - Estimated without controlling for unobserved heterogeneity 
COMBINE 
Treatment Arm Not Em-  ployed 
Em- 
ployed    < 
90% of 
Period 
Em- 
ployed 
Part 
Time 
>90% 
of 
Period 
Em-  
ployed   
Full Time  
>90% of 
Period 
Condi-
tional     
Log    
Wage 
Anti-De-
pressant 
Use 
No      
Treat-  
ment 
Self 
Help 
Visits 
Out-  
patient 
Therapy 
(No RxT) RxT 
Ab- 
stinent  
Non-
Problem 
Drinking 
Only 
Problem 
Drinking 
<50% of 
Period 
Problem 
Drinking 
>50% of 
Period 
Marginal Effects Relative To: Acam + MM+CBI 
           
 
Nalt + MM+ 
CBI 
-0.024 -0.011 0.033 0.001 0.015 0.037 0.029 -0.085 -0.014 0.070 -0.015 0.005 -0.037 0.047 
 
(0.046) (0.024) (0.027) (0.029) (0.033) (0.024) (0.030) (0.023) (0.022) (0.019) (0.032) (0.022) (0.026) (0.033) 
 
p=.608 p=.652 p=.221 p=.965 p=.648 p=.123 p=.329 p=.000 p=.541 p=.001 p=.644 p=.831 p=.156 p=.164 
 Acam + Nalt 
+ MM + CBI 
-0.052 -0.004 -0.003 0.059 0.095 0.048 0.044 -0.064 0.010 0.011 0.018 -0.003 -0.037 0.021 
 
(0.040) (0.023) (0.021) (0.031) (0.031) (0.025) (0.031) (0.023) (0.020) (0.014) (0.035) (0.019) (0.028) (0.029) 
 
p=.204 p=.875 p=.872 p=.061 p=.003 p=.057 p=.155 p=.006 p=.639 p=.441 p=.607 p=.887 p=.189 p=.464 
 
CBI Only 
-0.018 0.012 0.018 -0.011 0.135 0.007 -0.029 0.021 0.013 -0.005 0.021 -0.019 -0.010 0.008 
 
(0.056) (0.024) (0.032) (0.033) (0.033) (0.021) (0.029) (0.026) (0.021) (0.016) (0.036) (0.020) (0.025) (0.034) 
 
p=.748 p=.628 p=.578 p=.735 p=.000 p=.753 p=.310 p=.424 p=.522 p=.750 p=.569 p=.349 p=.686 p=.806 
Marginal Effects Relative To: Nalt+MM+CBI 
           
 Acam + Nalt 
+ MM + CBI 
-0.028 0.007 -0.036 0.057 0.080 0.011 0.015 0.021 0.023 -0.059 0.033 -0.008 0.000 -0.026 
 
(0.022) (0.020) (0.023) (0.027) (0.031) (0.023) (0.033) (0.023) (0.018) (0.021) (0.037) (0.024) (0.027) (0.032) 
 
p=.202 p=.719 p=.112 p=.034 p=.010 p=.624 p=.659 p=.355 p=.202 p=.006 p=.381 p=.754 p=.994 p=.416 
 
CBI Only 
0.005 0.023 -0.016 -0.012 0.120 -0.030 -0.059 0.106 0.027 -0.075 0.035 -0.024 0.027 -0.039 
 
(0.027) (0.022) (0.026) (0.028) (0.032) (0.023) (0.035) (0.024) (0.019) (0.022) (0.035) (0.024) (0.025) (0.030) 
 
p=.844 p=.300 p=.549 p=.658 p=.000 p=.197 p=.101 p=.000 p=.153 p=.001 p=.306 p=.334 p=.286 p=.205 
Marginal Effects Relative to Acam+Nalt+MM+CBI 
           
 CBI Only 
0.034 0.015 0.021 -0.070 0.040 -0.042 -0.073 0.085 0.004 -0.016 0.003 -0.016 0.027 -0.013 
 
(0.032) (0.022) (0.025) (0.030) (0.030) (0.025) (0.036) (0.027) (0.020) (0.017) (0.036) (0.020) (0.026) (0.033) 
  p=.291 p=.497 p=.400 p=.022 p=.181 p=.105 p=.043 p=.002 p=.841 p=.346 p=.944 p=.406 p=.305 p=.699 
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Appendix Table D.13. Marginal Effect of Lagged Treatment Choice Following COMBINE Treatment 
 Lagged 
Treatment 
Choice 
Not       
Em- 
ployed 
Em- 
ployed < 
90% of 
Period 
Em- 
ployed 
Part 
Time 
>90% of 
Period 
Em-  
ployed   
Full 
Time  
>90% of 
Period 
Condi-
tional     
Log    
Wage 
Anti-De-
pressant 
Use 
No      
Treat-  
ment 
Self 
Help 
Visits 
Out-  
patient 
Therapy 
(No RxT) RxT 
Ab-
stinent  
Non-
Problem 
Drinking 
Only 
Problem 
Drinking 
<50% of 
Period 
Problem 
Drinking 
>50% of 
Period 
Average Outcome 
             
 
No 
Treatment 
0.160 0.177 0.121 0.542 2.842 0.190 0.671 0.082 0.048 0.198 0.285 0.094 0.212 0.410 
 
Self Help 
Visits 
0.161 0.185 0.135 0.518 2.845 0.181 0.705 0.123 0.125 0.048 0.274 0.107 0.216 0.402 
 
Outpatient 
Therapy (No 
RxT) 
0.159 0.176 0.125 0.540 2.814 0.158 0.679 0.225 0.064 0.032 0.281 0.096 0.230 0.393 
 
RxT 0.156 0.177 0.124 0.543 2.832 0.158 0.837 0.080 0.050 0.034 0.233 0.105 0.219 0.443 
Marginal Effects Relative to No Treatment 
           
 
Self Help 
Visits 
0.001 0.008 0.014 -0.023 0.004 -0.010 0.034 0.040 0.077 -0.151 -0.010 0.013 0.004 -0.007 
 
(0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.018) (0.009) (0.012) (0.012) (0.017) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) 
 
p=.915 p=.417 p=.133 p=.062 p=.737 p=.334 p=.060 p=.000 p=.000 p=.000 p=.547 p=.231 p=.724 p=.500 
 Outpatient 
Therapy (No 
RxT) 
-0.001 -0.001 0.004 -0.002 -0.028 -0.032 0.008 0.143 0.016 -0.166 -0.003 0.002 0.018 -0.017 
 
(0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) (0.015) (0.012) (0.005) (0.012) (0.012) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) 
 
p=.935 p=.873 p=.550 p=.848 p=.000 p=.000 p=.604 p=.000 p=.004 p=.000 p=.796 p=.845 p=.050 p=.080 
 
RxT 
-0.004 -0.001 0.003 0.002 -0.010 -0.032 0.166 -0.003 0.001 -0.165 -0.052 0.011 0.008 0.033 
 
(0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.011) (0.005) (0.004) (0.012) (0.011) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) 
  p=.619 p=.931 p=.639 p=.862 p=.220 p=.000 p=.000 p=.569 p=.708 p=.000 p=.000 p=.100 p=.325 p=.000 
            
Continued on next page 
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Appendix Table D.13 (Continued). Marginal Effect of Lagged Treatment Choice Following COMBINE Treatment  
 Lagged 
Treatment 
Choice 
Not       
Em- 
ployed 
Em- 
ployed 
< 90% 
of 
Period 
Em- ployed 
Part Time 
>90% of 
Period 
Em-  
ployed   
Full Time  
>90% of 
Period 
Condi-
tional     
Log    
Wage 
Anti-De-
pressant 
Use 
No      
Treat-  
ment 
Self 
Help 
Visits 
Out-  
patient 
Therapy 
(No RxT) RxT Abstinent  
Non-
Problem 
Drinking 
Only 
Problem 
Drinking 
<50% 
of 
Period 
Problem 
Drinking 
>50% of 
Period 
Marginal Effects Relative to SH Visits 
           
 
Outpatient 
Therapy (No 
RxT) 
-0.002 -0.010 -0.010 0.022 -0.032 -0.023 -0.026 0.102 -0.061 -0.015 0.007 -0.012 0.014 -0.009 
 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.006) (0.014) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) 
 
p=.842 p=.296 p=.291 p=.053 p=.001 p=.009 p=.042 p=.000 p=.000 p=.007 p=.612 p=.261 p=.194 p=.336 
 
RxT 
-0.005 -0.009 -0.011 0.025 -0.013 -0.022 0.132 -0.043 -0.075 -0.014 -0.042 -0.002 0.003 0.040 
 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.013) (0.009) (0.011) (0.005) (0.014) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) 
 
p=.551 p=.282 p=.150 p=.009 p=.135 p=.007 p=.000 p=.000 p=.000 p=.011 p=.003 p=.839 p=.742 p=.000 
Marginal Effects Relative to Outpatient Therapy (No RxT) 
         
 RxT 
-0.003 0.001 -0.001 0.004 0.019 0.001 0.158 -0.145 -0.014 0.001 -0.049 0.010 -0.011 0.050 
 
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.010) (0.005) (0.003) (0.010) (0.006) (0.005) (0.009) 
  p=.461 p=.885 p=.818 p=.600 p=.001 p=.915 p=.000 p=.000 p=.004 p=.659 p=.000 p=.099 p=.050 p=.000 
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Appendix Table D.14. Policy Experiment: Marginal Effects of 5% and 10% Higher Gas Prices on Outcomes 
  
Gas Prices During All 
Periods 
Not        
Em-  
ployed 
Em- 
ployed 
<90% 
of 
Period 
Em- 
ployed 
Part 
Time 
>90% of 
Period 
Em-  
ployed   
Full 
Time  
>90% of 
Period 
Condi-
tional     
Log    
Wage 
Anti-De-
pressant 
Use 
No      
Treat-  
ment 
Self Help 
Visits 
Out-  
patient 
Therapy 
(No RxT) RxT 
Ab-    
stinent  
Non-
Problem 
Drinking 
Only 
Problem 
Drinking 
<50% of 
Period 
Problem 
Drinking 
>50% of 
Period 
Marginal Effects   
              
  
Relative 
to: 
              
 
5%    higher 
gas prices 
Original 
Gas Prices 
-0.001 -0.002 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.001 -0.005 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.016 0.000 -0.007 -0.009 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) 
 
p=.729 p=.567 p=.495 p=.889 p=.067 p=.782 p=.418 p=.725 p=.558 p=.660 p=.008 p=.966 p=.053 p=.038 
 
10% higher 
gas prices 
-0.002 -0.003 0.004 0.002 0.009 0.002 -0.010 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.035 0.000 -0.014 -0.022 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.004) (0.010) (0.011) (0.008) (0.005) (0.007) (0.012) (0.006) (0.007) (0.011) 
 
p=.706 p=.578 p=.567 p=.819 p=.071 p=.825 p=.374 p=.638 p=.573 p=.664 p=.005 p=.990 p=.033 p=.031 
Marginal Effects   
              
 
10% higher 
gas prices 
5% gas 
prices 
-0.001 -0.002 0.002 0.001 0.004 0.001 -0.006 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.018 0.000 -0.008 -0.010 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) 
  p=.681 p=.590 p=.641 p=.745 p=.078 p=.864 p=.333 p=.558 p=.588 p=.667 p=.003 p=.941 p=.026 p=.026 
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Not        
Em-  
ployed
Employed 
<90% of 
Period
Employed 
Part Time 
>90% of 
Period
Employed   
Full Time  
>90% of 
Period
Condition
al Log 
Wage
Anti-
Depressant 
Use
No      
Treat-  
ment
Self Help 
Visits
Out-  
patient 
Therapy 
(No RxT)
RxT
Ab-    
stinent 
Non-
Problem 
Drinking 
Only
Problem 
Drinking 
<50% of 
Period
Problem 
Drinking 
>50% of 
Period
0.003 0.000 -0.004 0.001 0.014 0.035 -0.125 -0.033 -0.010 0.168 0.046 -0.011 -0.009 -0.026
(0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) (0.014) (0.007) (0.005) (0.013) (0.012) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009)
p=.683 p=.984 p=.528 p=.910 p=.087 p=.000 p=.000 p=.000 p=.034 p=.000 p=.000 p=.117 p=.252 p=.005
Appendix Table D.15. Policy Experiment: Marginal Effects of Extended Pharmacotherapy Use on Outcomes
Experimental 
Two Periods 
of Pharmaco-
therapy Use
Relative to: 
One period of 
Pharmaco-
therapy Use
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Figure 3. Model Fit Over Time: Alcohol Treatment Consumption
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Figure 5. Employment Outcomes Over Time by Alcohol Use During COMBINE Treatment
Abstinent NHDDs Only
HDDs <50% of Period HDDs >50% of Period
.1
5
.2
.2
5
.3
.3
5
.4
.4
5
3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Abstinent
.0
5
.1
.1
5
3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Non Prob Drinking Only
.1
.1
5
.2
.2
5
.3
3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Problem Drinking <50% of Period
.2
5
.3
.3
5
.4
.4
5
3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Problem Drinking >50% of Period
P
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
Periods After COMBINE Treatment
Figure 6. Alcohol Outcomes Over Time by COMBINE Treatment
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Figure 7. Alcohol Outcomes Over Time by by Lagged Employment
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